tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5251183560375528307.post1149753938201936103..comments2024-03-28T21:34:42.328-05:00Comments on Bit Tooth Energy: Deepwater Oil Spill - a longer term problem, personnelHeading Outhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01790783659594652657noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5251183560375528307.post-15634323510658365242010-06-10T08:54:13.334-05:002010-06-10T08:54:13.334-05:00Kinuachdrach, as you know, right now you couldn...Kinuachdrach, as you know, right now you couldn't get a tax break for a oil company if you were the president of the world. But I think you are on the right path.<br /><br /> How can a company be expected to work a difficult well, with its increased costs with the same mind set as it might have on an easy well? It only stands to reason that the more costly well will have pressure on it to come in on schedule/budget. <br /> Once the personnel work with the pressured well model, it becomes the default practice.<br /> At what level this procedure becomes apparent in the corporate world will be vague I would think.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11757248279650275674noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5251183560375528307.post-41451030195433467142010-06-10T08:32:51.043-05:002010-06-10T08:32:51.043-05:00Good thoughts about manpower. But better inspecto...Good thoughts about manpower. But better inspectors are not the answer to preventing completely-avoidable catastrophes like the Deepwater Horizon.<br /><br />The basic problem, from what we have learned to date, is that BP was pursuing a "Drill The Limit" approach in its Gulf of Mexico drilling. They were seeking to save time wherever possible -- entirely understandable when a drilling rig costs $1 Million per day. But very short-sighted.<br /><br />BP departed from good practices -- minimal final cement job; no check on cement placement; accepting dubious pressure tests; no follow-up squeeze cementing; and unloading the mud before the final cement plug had been set. Each of those actions saved time, and ended up costing 11 men their lives and untold environmental damage.<br /><br />Everyone involved in drilling must have known at the time that those decisions were risky. They were probably doing them because they had been done before in other wells and BP had got away with it (because those earlier wells were probably not so troublesome). How do we fix the problem of Operators knowlingly cutting corners?<br /><br />We need a different model than the regulatory approach -- which has been tried & failed. Punishing BP appropriately (CEO in jail, full financial costs of restitution, etc) should prevent a recurrence for a generation, until everyone forgets. <br /><br />Perhaps we should also look at changing the tax law on drilling, to remove some of the financial pressures on Operators which lead them to take unnecessary risks.Kinuachdrachhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13275320683766290581noreply@blogger.com