Showing posts with label Daniel Yergin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Daniel Yergin. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

George Will is afloat in a sea of fuel

Last Sunday George Will wrote about the abundance of fossil fuels in his column for the Washington Post. He began by surmising that Titusville, PA might have a claim to being most responsible for the modern world through the contribution of oil to world wealth. He then went on to list some of the many folk that have predicted (falsely) the arrival of a peak in oil production and the amount of reserves that are available.
In 1977, scold in chief Jimmy Carter predicted that mankind "could use up all the proven reserves of oil in the entire world by the end of the next decade." Since then the world has consumed three times more oil than was then in the world's proven reserves.
He does not see that America, or the world for that matter, can wean themselves from a dependence on hydrocarbons, and quotes Keith Rattie, the chief executive of Questar, from a commencement speech as well as Edward Morse, from a story in Foreign Affairs in which Morse states that there is plenty of natural gas available – perhaps a hundred years at the present rate of consumption, and that the deep water fields just beginning to be exploited are significantly larger than thought. And he includes Daniel Yergin as stating that" the resource base of the planet is sufficient to keep up with demand for decades to come.”

From all this he concludes that it is only the environmentalists that are going to ensure scarcity for the planet. So where does one begin to disassemble what would appear, at first sight, to be a rational argument based on the utterances of three prominent individuals?

To pick the last first, it has unfortunately not been that long since I last wrote about Dr Yergin and CERA. Earlier this month I noted, after giving a number of occasions in the past that CERA had been wrong, that some of the assumptions that they were currently using to project future oil production were likely to be wrong also.

The most obvious immediate reason is the collapse of the oil industry in Mexico. Having fallen from the projected 4 mbd to potentially only 2.7 mbd next year, global supply is going to have to find another source for that 1.3 mbd. Bear in mind that Mexican production has been falling as fast as 100,000 bd per month at Cantarell and the magnitude of this problem becomes apparent. The current hope of seeing 10 mbd from Iraq by 2020 is, I would suggest, also perhaps more than a little optimistic.

So let’s tick Dr Yergin from the list, and move on to Edward Morse and the prediction of natural gas production from fields such as the Marcellus and from the deep waters of the world. This case is a little more tricky to argue, but only in the sense that there are considerable resources in both these regions of the world and that they will continue to produce significant quantities of fuel for some considerable time. The questions that are being raised are, however, more along the lines of how much and for how long will they produce and at what cost?

Evidence to date (that I am trying to explain in the tech talks, but haven’t got to the downside talks yet) is that by using new technologies these fields can be produced with very high initial yields from slickwater, multi-frac’ed horizontal wells, but that these wells have a much shorter life and faster decline rate than was predicted when the production from these fields were estimated. The deepwater fields require dramatically higher investment costs and while the technology and equipment is available, to some limited degree, there aren’t that many rigs that can be mobilized to drill in these conditions. Further continued production from some of the weaker rocks that the oil lies in, at these depths, is going to continue to be a technical challenge, driving costs higher and higher and further limiting levels of production available. Yes there will be oil, but it will be more expensive and there won’t be nearly as much as one might think at any one given time (the production rate) to even maintain current levels of production very much longer.

Which brings me to look at Mr Rattie’s speech, which is one that I have considerable agreement with. Except for the assumption that we can continue to grow our way into the future in terms of increasing supplies to meet an increase in global demand for energy that will increase by 30 – 50% over the next two decades. He lists some of the anticipated growth:
The Salt Lake Tribune recently celebrated the startup of a 14 MW geothermal plant near Beaver, Utah. That‟s wonderful! But the Tribune failed to put 14 MW into perspective. Utah has over 7,000 MW of installed generating capacity, primarily coal. America has about 1,000,000 MW of installed capacity. Because U.S. demand for electricity has been growing at 1-2 % per year, on average we’ve been adding 10-20,000 MW of new capacity every year to keep pace with growth. Around the world coal demand is booming – 200,000 MW of new coal capacity is under construction, over 30,000 MW in China alone. In fact, there are 30 coal plants under construction in the U.S. today that when complete will burn about 70 million tons of coal per year.
Mr Rattie also points out something that is sometimes missed in the debate about coal and natural gas fired power plants:
America has about one million MW of installed electric generation capacity. Forty percent of that capacity runs on natural gas – about 400,000 MW, compared to just 312,000 MW of coal capacity.

But unlike those coal plants, which run at an average load factor of about 75%, America’s existing natural gas-fired power plants operate with an average load factor of less than 25%. Turns out that the market has found a way to cut CO2 emissions without driving the price of electricity through the roof – natural gas’s share of the electricity market is growing, and it will continue to grow – with or without cap and trade.
That is surely true in the short term, but the questions about natural gas production, and the fact that if natural gas were, for example, to be used at double the current rate (i.e. to produce 50% of the nation’s electricity) then even if the current prediction of 100 years of gas at current levels of consumption were true, then at double the rate, the lifetime of the reserve would be cut to 50 years. Given the questions on production referred to above, it may, be quite likely that estimates are at about twice reality, and thus there might be 50 years of supply, but this is likely to be consumed at somewhat higher rates than current, so that the effective lifetime is going to be closer to 25 – 30 years, I would suspect. (And don't forget that Questar is one of the largest natural gas producers, who may be vulnerable in the fight to retain market share as the increased availability of natural gas from conventional sources struggles against supplies from the gas shales and from LNG supplies - in the short term).

Oh I anticipate that there will be adjustments in the fuel mix in the future, the decline in oil’s share of the market will have to be replaced with some alternate fuel, and natural gas will have to carry some of this burden. I tend to see that there will be problems in getting an adequate amount of energy supplied from renewable sources, as the scale of their use grows, and the realistic availability of good sites for development of new farms reduces. (It is all too easy to just say we need the equivalent of say half of Utah, without recognizing just what percentage of Utah is actually available – just to pick some numbers for the sake of discussion).

Put this all together, and in an ideal world, when gold, oil and natural gas production could continue to increase in availability every year, then George Will’s suggestions might well come to pass. Unfortunately when there is a realistic limit to the actual volumes available, as we are now seeing with gold, so shall we soon see with oil, and before then I would suggest that Mr Will seek additional advice from elsewhere – perhaps here?
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Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Future Projections of Oil Demand and the IEA WEO

Exasperated sigh! Well there is this story in the Wall Street Journal that has also been picked up over at the Financial Times that deals with a “leak” of the predictions that will come out of the International Energy Agency next week, with their new World Energy Outlook. (Thanks, Leanan) The story begins:
The International Energy Agency next week will make a "substantial" downward revision to its long-term forecast for global oil demand, a person familiar with the matter said, marking the second year running the group has slashed its view of the world's thirst for oil.
Now this is where we start to get a little argumentative. Not because the amount of oil will actually reach 106 mbd as the WEO suggested last year, but rather because of the reasons for the actual number likely not being that high. (And there is a caveat to this – shades of Daniel Yergin – in that I am talking about fossil fuel and not what might, by then, be available from biofuels, since in that time frame algae may be a practical source of significant volume.) Every month I write a post on what is happening with the nations driving habits, and tie it into gasoline demand. The last curve shows that, even though we are have been in an economic slowdown for over a year that the nation’s driving level has already returned (on a 12-month cumulative value) to the point it was in 2004.

2 month running total of vehicle miles driven in the USA. (FHWA)

Given that a majority of the crude oil produced goes into transportation fuels, and that those demands are likely to see an increase, other conditions being equal, from the increased market for cars in Asia, initially demand will not reduce because of conservation.

Ford just announced that Chinese sales in October were 20,027 cars, up 80% over a year ago. For the year so far they have sold 188,244 cars up 40% on the same period last year. Increasingly new car volumes are being driven by sales in the emerging markets of Asia Suzuki profits are four-times higher than anticipated because of sales in India. They sold 85,415 units there in October, and a growth rate of 20%. Overall sales for the year are expected to be around 1.8 million vehicles. Part of the sales have been driven by the Indian equivalent of “Cash for Clunkers” but it is also moved by the desire for vehicles and the ability of manufacturers to now start to provide them.
Tata Motors reported a 28% increase at 22,232 units, the highest this fiscal. Ford India and General Motors India also showed significant growth in October 2009. Ford saw a 98% jump in sales at 3,458 units, primarily triggered by growth in Fiesta sales. Riding high on the success of the Chevrolet brand, General Motors India registered a record growth of 15% in sales at 7,413 units in October 2009.
The size of the demand, therefore, could have been expected, were there copious amounts of fuel to be available, or even just adequate amounts at a reasonable price, to may well have continued to increase to the level that the WEO will predict. The problem will come, not from that part of the equation, but rather from the supply side. And here, I would suspect, since I haven’t seen the report yet, that the WEO will continue to obfusticate around the issue.

To reiterate, we know that non-OPEC global production has now fairly evidently peaked and is in decline. OPEC retain the capability to increase production by perhaps 2-3 mbd, at best, and face, well within the period to 2030, the likelihood of dropping production from their major fields. The number of countries that can produce at 1 mbd now just about fits on a single slide for one of my lectures:

World’s largest Oil producers (production in parentheses is from 2004, and red highlights shows those declining in production).

I see that at the end of the article Daniel (Yergin) is finally admitting that there is a peak production coming in the future
There is a market assumption today that we will head back to the old days of rapid oil demand, but we think we are heading into new days," in which the growth in consumption will be more subdued, said Dan Yergin, chairman of IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates.
Hard to back away from those cornucopian dreams, isn’t it, Daniel?

No, the sad fact is that the limited availability of crude is going to drive up the prices within a couple of years, so that it will be this that limits and changes demand, rather than the impacts of those driven by the desire to guard against Climate Change by moving toward a more energy efficient future. Not that energy efficiency has anything wrong with it, just that the incentive for change is going to come from an unavailability of oil at a reasonable price – so that both price and production limits will constrain use in the 2030, to levels well below those of today, rather than higher, and we need to be working on alternative replacement strategies a lot harder than we currently are. The IEA WEO will not, unfortunately, provide much ammunition for that argument, as it would appear.

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