OGPSS - Thoughts on the Precautionary Principle

As Michael Brander tells it, in his book on the Scottish Highland Regiments, the Scottish Highlands produced, between 1740 and 1815 men for some 86 Highland Regiments who travelled around the world to strengthen the British Empire. But, towards the end of that period sheep were introduced into Scotland and the great land clearances began that replaced the crofters on the estates with the occasional lone shepherd and his flocks. Thus, by the time of the Crimean War when the Duke of Sutherland tried to raise a regiment he got no volunteers. As an old man explained to him:

I am sorry for the response your Grace’s proposals are meeting here today, so near the spot where your maternal grand-mother, by giving some forty-eight hours notice, marshaled 1,500 men to pick out the 800 she required. But there is a cause for it, and a genuine cause, and, as your Grace demands to know it, I must tell you, as I see that none else is inclined in the assembly to do so. These lands are now devoted to rear dumb animals which your parents considered of far more value than men . . . . your parents, yourself and your Commissioners have desolated the glens and the straths of Sutherland where you should find hundreds, yea thousands of men to meet and respond to your call cheerfully had your parents kept faith with them. How could your Grace expect to find men where they are not?

The anecdote illustrates that are long-term consequences to policy decisions, often not fully recognized when the original decisions are made. I was reminded of the Scottish situation as I contemplate the great race to renewable energy and natural gas, and the rapid replacement being urged for coal-fired power stations and nuclear power plants. And there are some grounds for seeing an analogy to that earlier situation.

Coal and uranium are found underground and while there is a large surface mining component to mining, as these reserves are exhausted, or embargoed for environmental or other political reasons, the need, over time will move increasingly to the development of the deeper reserves. Mines, however do not spring up overnight. Just as you cannot get a baby in a month by making nine women pregnant, so the process of discovery, raising capital, permitting and development can mean that over a decade can pass before coal is produced in commercial quantitites. And that assumes that the Administration is somewhat favorable to the idea. As a candidate, now President Obama said "If someone wants to build a new coal-fired power plant they can, but it will bankrupt them because they will be charged a huge sum for all the greenhouse gas that's being emitted."

As President he appointed Dr. Stephen Chu to head the Department of Energy, an individual who has said “Coal is my worst nightmare.”. And to follow on his statement as a candidate, the President appointed Lisa Jackson to the EPA who issued a finding that greenhouse gases constitute a threat to public health and welfare, with a series of actions to reduce carbon pollution. In such a political climate it is unlikely that applications for new mines and plants will receive an accelerated resolution. (Just consider the case of decision on the Keystone Pipeline, which continues to drag on.) If there is a sudden discovered need for new coal and nuclear power plants they will not (as with the Highlanders) be there to answer that call, and nor can they be for over a decade after the call is made.

Now it is not my intention here to argue the logic of a current change to natural gas, as the large reserve within the United States becomes available and, at low cost, provides a source of energy that helps keep the nation’s industry competitive. But what I would like to do is to invoke the same Precautionary Principle that has been used as an initial basis for action on control of power plant emissions and other factors with environmental impact. (see for example principle fifteen).

The precautionary principle can be briefly stated as:

the theory that an action should be taken when a problem or threat occurs, not after harm has bee inflicted; an approach to decision-making in risk management which justifies preventive measures or policies despite scientific uncertainty about whether whether detrimental effects will occur.

There is a significant scientific question as to the long-term reliability of the production levels for oil and natural gas that is being produced from the shales of the United States, and it has been articulated well both by Art and Rune, among others at the Oil Drum.

And as China draws an increasing amount of fuel out of Turkmenistan, Iran and the Middle East, with the potential for an additional increase in the draw from Russia, there is some concern that as China buys for the long-term, that tightening supplies will begin to limit the availability of fuel for Western Europe and the United States.

With the occasional collapse of the odd wind turbine, and the difficulty in seeing how solar power can help in the blizzards and snow storms I have gone through in the last week, there is some concern over the size of the contribution that these technologies can make into the energy mix of the next decade.

In those circumstances, a wise application of the Precautionary Principle to future energy supplies, in both Europe and the United States, might suggest that sufficient legacy power systems be left in place to ensure that neither community is left short of energy in the years ahead. This is to guard against the proposed replacements being either inadequate or insufficient to meet the future need.

And yet, unfortunately this is not likely to occur. As with many arguments and tools used in political debate, once a position or an argument has been adopted it is extremely rare for it to be renounced. The consequences of current decision making rarely come back to haunt those politicians who make them, since they often occur past the current elective term and are thus of less interest to those who are more focused on the next election.

Yet longer-term events do eventually arrive, and time having passed, the day of reckoning is becoming visible. It is likely that the Bakken will peak before the end of the current Administration. Ofgem has already raised concerns over an over-reliance on imported natural gas into the UK, and warned of possible shortages by the end of 2015, and urged a diversification of supply types. The IEA recently issued a chart that shows their projections for the energy future to 2035.


Figure 1. Past and future distribution of energy demand for the different sectors of the world (IEA )

The writing is beginning to appear on the wall. And while the Precautionary Principle is aimed more at less obvious, high risk scenarios – the risks to the world of a failure in the global supply chain, or even a national one is of such a high impact that even with a lower probability of occurrence than is becoming evident, it would be wise to start looking for answers. It is likely already far too late, and the world remains replete with folk denying the existence of a problem (even as gas prices continue to rise) but it will be interesting to see how the new Secretary of Energy addresses the situation.

The OFGEM Report - bad news which may be optimistic

As the year starts its move towards a close, there are an increasing reams of reports coming out that review aspects of the global energy supply. One of these came out in the UK last week. It is the report from the UK’s Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) on Project Discovery – which looks at four future energy scenarios for the UK.

The report recognizes that the UK has a growing problem. This is because there are two directives from the European Union, the Large Combustion Plant Directive and the Industrial Emissions Directive (pdf) that increasingly restrict the use of coal and oil-fired power plants, when, at the same time, some nuclear plants will also be closing which will lead to a reduced number of major power plants being available. New power plants take time to plan, permit and construct and the postponement of construction of the new power plant at Kingsnorth this past week merely underlines the coming problems.

And so OFGEM set out to see what the challenges and risks to the UK would be over the next twenty years. The report is the result of that investigation.

It looked at four scenarios based on two levels of economic recovery and two levels of investment in green technologies, which combine to the four scenarios examined.

The four scenarios OFGEM examined.

The scenarios had some underlying assumptions to allow dealing with the conditions that were imposed in the models. There is, for example, the assumption that investment for each scenario (which reaches 200 billion British Pounds (BP) for The Green Transition scenario) will be available and will allow the timely investment in power generating systems that meet the targets set. (As a source of reference the UK spent $8 billion BP in 2008 on utility capital investment for the green scenarios this will have to rise to 30 billion BP in 2019).

With an increased reliance on imported natural gas, where the domestic production falls short, there is also the assumption that this will be available – an area of concern in times of high demand in a severe winter. (And this winter may be one) This will, however, become more of an issue in the UK as it responds to the EU directives and loses a significant sector of its electricity generating power after 2015. The report notes that the market and the regulatory arrangements can well undergo severe testing as the nation moves out of the comfortable position it currently holds, with large gas reserve (by normal standards) and a robust gas infrastructure.

The investigation applied a number of stress tests, under the different scenarios, and evaluated their results. The results were summarized in the following figure:

OFGEM stress tests and their perceived results (Bacton is the UK gas import facility)

The designation 1 in 20 refers to the worst condition in the past 20-years with the peak day being the highest demand for energy on the coldest day; and the severe winter being a period of 60-days of exceptionally high natural gas (NG) demand.

While the rapid response and move to green energy both tighten the NG market, when there is not this initial high demand, then the evaluation is that the market will remain oversupplied, though tightening towards the end of the study period.

Perhaps the assumption that raises the greatest doubt is the one that crude oil prices rise to $130/bbl and then fall back, as upstream investments provide the additional supplies needed, to a price of $110/bbl. They cite the IEA and the EIA models as justification for these assumptions, which apply to the rapid growth scenarios. When there is a slower rebound of the economy, then oil prices are anticipated to stabilize at $90/bbl (and they point out that the EIA is predicting that it would actually fall to $50/bbl).

The peak price that they see for NG is 100p/therm under the rapid growth scenario, while carbon dioxide prices are set at 50 BP/ton by 2025 (assuming a global agreement at the meeting in Copenhagen this winter).

In assuming that adequate NG will be available it appears that they are assuming that all the gas pipelines projected will be funded and adequately supplied at full capacity (something that is currently quite questionable for Nabucco, as but one example – though Nabucco only becomes necessary under the rapid demand scenarios), though they also assume that LNG will be available to fill any shortfalls, and that NG will appear from the Yamal fields in the time and quantities predicted (either 2013 or 2014).

OFGEM assumed European supplies of natural gas

In all scenarios they recognize that there must be an increase in the amount of NG supplied from Russia, though, as noted, there is an assumption that there will be enough LNG to make up any shortfall. (Global demand is expected to double or treble by 2020 – to somewhere between 350 bcm and 700 bcm/year – and largely the USA takes care of itself).

As with many of the models of an energy future this one includes the caveat

provided the market participants respond adequately to market signals

but with those responses governed also by perceptions of future politics, and the potential limitations of future supply, that caveat may well cover a multitude of unpleasant outcomes. Yet this is recognized also realistically (but with no real current solution being available to provide an answer).

there are security of supply risks within each scenario, but as important is to consider the implications for security of supply resulting from the huge range of uncertainty that the scenarios cover. For example, by 2020 gas demand could be as low as 77 bcm/yr or as high as 113 bcm/yr depending on the scenario, low carbon generation could make up anywhere between 21% and 52% of the mix, the levels of investment required in the GB energy market (excluding upstream investment) could range between £96bn and £200bn depending on the extent of environmental actions. Together with more traditional risk factors such as commodity prices and project risks, this means that investors face difficult decisions before committing large sums of capital to new projects.

The way in which these events unfold in the UK is that report is now open to public comment with specific questions being identified that OFGEM is interested in getting answers to.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out, though I fear that some of the assumptions that have been made as the review progressed are a little optimistic about future supplies of oil and natural gas.

Although it has the highest investment cost, it appears that the Green Transition is perceived as giving the best outcome:

The Green Transition summary

While perhaps the dash for energy scenario projecting the worst outcome:

The Dash for Energy summary of outcomes

It will be interesting to follow the story, and see how Britain reacts, given that, as the report notes, while the time for decision is here, the conditions are still pleasant, and the urgency of the situation is not yet apparent.