Kansas temperatures revisited - the TOBS effect

Having restarted the analysis of the temperature data, the second state along the road is Kansas. In the original post on the topic I had used the homogenized data, and had ignored (through ignorance of location) one of the GISS sites. So we will redo the data and see if there are any changes in the conclusions. In case you are new to this I am comparing the GISS station average data for the different states with the averages from the USHCN sites for each state.

Having looked at the three different sets of data available (Raw, corrected for time of observation (TOBS) and homogenized) in this set I am going to use the TOBS set.

And that means that first I have to get them, which I do from selecting the Map Sites for Kansas at the USHCN web page, and then clicking on the “Get Monthly Data” icon, selecting the “create a download file of data summarized by year”; and then selecting the “Annual Average Mean Temperature – TOBS,” and hitting the submit button.

This is for Anthony, KS so after downloading the file, which is comma separated (csv), I label it and save it to the desk top. The files for all 31 stations is handled in the same way, and then each is copied and pasted over the data in the master file that I made for the original homogenized data. (The file is then saved with a TOBS label).


Now there was another error that I made in the original file. I thought that only Wichita, Topeka and Concordia were in Kansas, from Chiefio’s list, however there are also Dodge City and Goodland that I did not include. So I need to go to the GISS site and download (and convert) those temperatures. It is mildly irritating to find that the Goodland data only goes back to 1948, so that when one just runs an average comparison of the two sets of data, the shorter series has a quite significant impact. However, with this data series, in contrast to the homogenized data set, there are significant gaps, particularly in the early years in the individual station data. If one goes back and compares the homogenized data plot both lines, although taken to the second power are relatively close to straight, and both show a change in response from positive difference to negative difference around 1950 (which is odd given that the initial plot had three full GISS station data to work with).


Interestingly, with the TOBS correction only in the data, there is realistically no trend with the standard deviations on the data, while there was a declining trend in the earlier plot that is not evident from the TOBS data.


In regard to the overall trend of temperature in the state over the past 115 years:


One thing that I have just noticed, however, in comparing the two sets of data, is that the scale of the vertical axis has changed. The above is the data for the average temp with the only correction being the time of day of observation. This is the plot from the homogenized data set, that I put up last February.


The shapes are close to the same, and the highest temperatures were during the dust bowl years, but the values themselves have changed – how odd. So a quick check back on that data, and there was an error - I had not correctly averaged the initial data set, and when I corrected that the two curves are much closer, with the homogenized set now falling very close to the TOBS in overall average values (homogenized value 54.8 deg, for the TOBS data 54.78 deg) but the rate of temperature increase is now less.

One of the original thoughts related to the correlation with population, and the revised plot of this, shown with a log population scale, shows:


The zero population value was 52.1 deg and the correlation coefficient was at 0.08, which given that the homogenized data is supposed to compensate for population levels is a bit odd, but never mind, we really are still in the early game without huge numbers for the larger cities.

Looking at the three basic parameters that began to evolve (or not) from the data, these are the variation with latitude (which is fairly logical):


The correlation with longitude gets better, relative to Missouri, but that is explicable:


As one moves west through Kansas one starts to approach the Rockies, and the land rises. Thus if one looks at the effect of this rising elevation:


You note, from the r-squared value, that it is likely that the change in elevation is the stronger driver toward temperature drop.

Interestingly with using the TOBS data the correlation with latitude has improved, as has that with elevation, which is much better than that with the homogenized data, though the longitudinal correlation is slightly worse.

So more questions, some trends remain, we will just have to see how this pans out as we move into gold-mining country.

Deepwater Oil Spill - results as the testing begins

The picture that everyone has long been waiting to see became available after 3:25 pm (Eastern) this afternoon, when BP closed the choke lines on the 3-ram stack, and oil stopped flowing into the Gulf.


The process started on Wednesday evening , after a delay during which the Admiral gave permission for the process to start, and held the press conference that I reported on yesterday.

It was followed by the Kent Wells conference, which had been delayed, in which he noted that the relief well had finished a gyro survey to locate its position, and prepared the site for the casing to be set this weekend. Then the drill pipe etc was pulled back into the casing while the integrity test was run. It was left in the well so that, in case there was any passage created between the two wells during the test (they are only just over four feet apart) then heavy mud could be immediately pumped down the RW to kill the risk of any additional problems. (The drill has 30 ft to go to reach the casing point, but is at the desired 2 degree angle).

One of the changes to the plan from that originally conceived was to add four ROVs that would be stationed around the well to alleviate the fears of those who had become worried by the continuing plethora of stories of a breached well casing. Although many of these stories have been discussed, and their invalidity shown, nevertheless in order to keep everyone happy, particularly those with political prominence) four ROVs were set around the well to watch the seabed and ensure there were no leaks.

This is one example of the results – the seabed is stable, with no oil and gas bubbling up from non-existent leaks. (BOA ROV 2)

Had there been any leakage from the well it would likely have come up around the casing of the well at the bottom. Here is the shot (BOA ROV 1) of the mud-line of the well. (The point where the well breaks through the mud to the sea bed).

As you can see, there is none. (The well casing with the BOP above it are just to the right of the lights of the illuminating ROV)

The other change that Secretary Chu apparently imposed was that there be a conference every six hours during the test (which is scheduled to run 48 hours).

The initial plan was to close the rams sealing the well (which happened before I wrote the post yesterday) and then to close the kill line (the two ports that produced the vertical jets I showed last evening) and then to slowly (over a few minutes) close the choke, monitoring the pressure, until the flow ceased.

There should also be a little clarity in the discussion at this point. There are two sets of valves and circuits involved in this process. The first of these are the circuits on the original blowout preventer (BOP) . The kill and choke lines attached to those circuits were modified so that oil and gas are fed through them to the vessels on the surface which are either collecting or burning off the fuel. The second set of kill and choke valves are on the new stack that was mounted above the BOP, and it is these new valves that are being opened and closed. When the stack valves are open the oil flows out into the water, rather than into directed lines, and so they are not the same circuits. At the beginning of the test the BOP valves were closed, so that all the flow went up to the stack where it can flow out through either the drill pipe at the top, the kill lines to the side, or the choke line – which is the curved yellow pipe at the top of the well. The drill pipe flow was first closed, using the central ram in the stack.

As the test began (and as Kent Wells noted in the morning briefing today) there was a leak.

we noticed a leak on a hub on the choke line. And so when we saw that, that would have precluded us from properly doing the test we needed to get that fixed. Fortunately, as everything, we always plan so we had a second choke on surface. So we disconnected that choke and hub system. Took it up, brought the other one down, landed it this morning and we’re once again going through the process of positioning ourselves to do the well integrity tests.

There were in fact two trips to the surface before the choke line was fully in place.

The well was then ready to ramp up for the test, and this was the schedule that Kent Wells reported in the afternoon briefing today

At 10:30 this morning we closed the kill line and since we had already had the middle ram of the capping stack closed that meant the only flow at that point was going out through the choke line and what was also being collected through the Q4000 and the helix producer.

Then between 10:30 and 12:30 we shut down the Q4000, we shut down the helix producer and that meant only flow was going up through the choke line and then at 12:30 we started to close the choke, we would do it a half a turn at a time to just slowly start to close the well in.

And at about 1:15 this afternoon we issued that the integrity test was starting. The official time of the choke being fully closed, which meant the well was fully shut in is approximately 2:25 this afternoon and as of that time there is no flow of oil going into the gulf of Mexico. So obviously this is an encouraging point of time. Remember this is the start of our test.

So the well is currently shut-in, though the results have not been all that had been hoped for. Admiral Allen has already issued a terse comment:

"We're encouraged by this development, but this isn't over. Over the next several hours we will continue to collect data and work with the federal science team to analyze this information and perform additional seismic mapping runs in the hopes of gaining a better understanding on the condition of the well bore and options for temporary shut in of the well during a hurricane. It remains likely that we will return to the containment process using this new stacking cap connected to the risers to attempt to collect up to 80,000 barrels of oil per day until the relief well is completed."

Part of the problem, apparently, is that the well pressure has not reached the 8 - 9,000 psi level that it was hoped it would reach, but instead it is reported to have fallen slightly shy of 7,000 psi. While this is below the expectation, it is higher than the 6,000 psi that Admiral Allen had set as the target below which they would assume a loss in integrity, and restart the flow of oil to the surface vessels.

To try and add a little context to this, at the beginning of the leak the pressure of the oil and gas in the rock at the bottom of the well was measured at 11,900 psi. When the oil and gas fill the well that fluid column has a certain weight that balances some of the rock pressure, and the difference should be the pressure at the top of the column (which is where the BOP and stack sit). That gives the 8 – 9,000 psi range.

If the well pressure at the BOP is measured, however, at just shy of 7,000 psi then there are two possibilities. The first is that there has been so much flow of fluid out of the well that the driving pressure of the fluid in the rock has fallen by the 1,500 psi or so that brings the pressures down to those seen.

While that is a possibility, it may be unlikely because, at the time that the Top Kill was tried and as the Admiral noted just the other day, the well pressure could not be raised above 6,000 psi as they pumped in mud, even though at one stage they stopped the flow of oil out of the well.

What this could indicate is that there is a possibility of crossflow at the bottom of the well. What this means that the oil and gas that are flowing out of the reservoir into the bottom of the well, are, under the pressure in the well, now flowing into a higher reservoir of rock, now that they can't get out of the well. Depending on where that re-injection flow is this may, or may not, suggest that the casing has lost integrity. This is a topic that has been covered in the comments at The Oil Drum, where fdoleza has noted

Exactly. I believe the flow will be coming out of the bottom sand and going into the upper sand. It would not be a leak, but it would tell them why their pressure data ain't a classical surface buildup. And I sure hope they're modeling temperatures and so on, because this is a very interesting case. They don't have downhole gauges, so they'll have to take the way the oil cools down as it sits to get a better idea of the way things are moving down below.

If there are questions whether there is still flow in the formation or from the original formation into surrounding rock, then it is possible that the RW is close enough to the WW that putting a set of very sensitive microphones down the RW might allow some triangulation to estimate where such a flow might be occurring. It might make it easier that the well hasn’t been finally cased yet. But the test has 2 days to run, and will be evaluated every 6 hours. With time some of these questions may be answered as the test continues. (If there is no flow anywhere, after a while all the readings should become quite stable).

Oh, and just as this started to look like a little good news, there is this from the National Hurricane Center:

The windows of opportunity are not likely to remain open long. It is encouraging, however, that there may now be an answer if these do turn into hurricanes.

Deepwater Oil Spill - starting the testing program

When things are going well down at the Deepwater oil spill site in the Gulf there are press conferences, data flows in a timely manner and the public can understand what is going on. When there are problems, these get delayed. Then as I noted yesterday we become dependant on the videos that BP release, to get a closer and more immediate view of the actual situation. That can at least show the occasional something significant. Today’s such topic is the picture of the well from the Skandi ROV that I took at around 6:15 pm. (though Admiral Allen also had something interesting to note, which I will point to at the end of the post.) And in an update there was a leak on the choke line, so a part (the yellow pipe below) has been removed for repair - the "as is" shot is at the end of the post.

UPDATE The part was repaired and replaced, and at 3:37 pm with the choke line closed, oil stopped flowing from the well into the Gulf.



In his second press conference yesterday, Kent Wells had noted (as I wrote yesterday)

down below two rams there’s a what we call our flow T and there’s two sides to it and that’s where the flow would be coming out when we actually shut one of the rams.

As you may note from the picture the flow has now switched from the top drill pipe section to the two ports below the rams. We can thus presume that the well integrity test is now underway.

That particular flow has now been going on for over 2 hours (the feeds are no longer synchronous with real time) and this was as late a picture as I can currently pull up from the Skandi ROV that showed the picture above:

The two separate flows from the two ports can be discerned still.

So what is going on? Kent Wells tried to explain in his brief this morning. First he ran over the numbers, and then apologized that the schedule that he had anticipated yesterday has fallen behind. Specifically he noted that

The second review that was going on was our team of scientists and industry experts who were once again looking at all the analysis and the procedures – the test procedures that were put in place to make sure that the test was absolutely designed to maximize what we would learn from it and minimize any risk under all possible scenarios. And this test is so important that a decision was taken to give them another 24 hours to make sure that this was the best possible test procedure we could execute. It was just felt that this is so important we wanted to make sure that there was no questions in any minds that we would learn the most from this and we’d minimize risk and so that was the decision that was taken yesterday.

For which, I expect, you can read that Secretary Chu, and his visiting team had a set of questions and discussion points that had to be gone over and reviewed with them, to ensure that they were happy, and would therefore give their thoughtfully considered blessings. They were supposed to have everything settled by the afternoon press conference.

The plan is that at midday today, the team will get back together and a decision will be (maken) – be taken on the path forward. If any amendments need to be made to the test they’ll be made at that point and I’ll certainly let you know at our 2:30 meeting where we stand on that and the path forward.

But what we don’t want to do is move forward with a test that ends up with inconclusive results. And so that’s what the 24 hours is about. We just need to make sure that there’s absolute clarity on this is the right test, this will give us the most information, this will minimize the risk and we can proceed forward and as a result of that then know the best path forward after that, whether it’s to shut in the well, whether it’s to go to containment, what does it mean for the kill with the relief wells. All of those things. We just need to make sure that this is right not – as much as we want to do things as soon as possible, we also want to make sure that they’re done absolutely correct.

But problems apparently persisted as became more obvious this afternoon, as the time for the start of the integrity test (and the explanatory press conference) kept getting put back later and later, until it reached 5 pm when apparently the decision was reached. That transcript is not out yet, but the result was evident with the change in the path of the oil through the stack. There are presently 3 ROVs monitoring the flow (the 2 Skandi ROVs and the BOA ROV 2) and over the course of time the flow out of the ports has changed from the relatively small flow shown above to higher volume flows, and back.

Skandi ROV view showing the higher flow levels from the ports – this is the ROV that is issuing the dispersant in 3 jets from the wand in the picture, at lower flow rates those jets are visible.

The third ROV, the BOA one has moved around so that the lack of flow from the drill pipe is confirmed when the pipe is back-lit from the Skandi ROV that took the first shots above.


In the details of the process that Kent Wells described the process changes include:

I mean the one thing that – and of course I can’t predict exactly how the ROV cameras will be set up but what we will be doing is on the capping stack, we will be opening the two side vents and so there will be – instead of flow just coming out the top, there will be – you’ll start to see flow coming out of the two side vents and then the top gets closed and then one side vent gets closed and then over a period of about a couple hours we close the other choke mechanism. So that would indicate when – that the test has started when we’re shutting down that third event. Whether you’ll get to see all that and figure that, I don’t know. But we’re committed to keeping you posted on where we’re going.

Well the shut-off and diversion of the flow is documented in the pictures above, though it hasn’t been possible to show the switching of the flows, unless this was where the volumes coming from the well and shown by the Skandi ROV changed.

The problem of concern, determining whether, if there is a leak, as indicated by a problem in getting to the 8,000 to 9,000 psi pressure in the well, it is caused at depth or near the surface. As was repeated at this brief

The – in terms of the risk, this is all about as we shut in the pressures, what do the pressures mean. Where – like I say, we don’t know – if we can’t build up pressure, where does that mean the pressure’s being relieved and it can be everything from down very deep to shallower and it was really about trying to understand what do the pressures over time mean, where does that mean the pressures being relieved and it’s one thing to have pressure being relieved deep down. It’s a more difficult situation as it’s being relieved shallow and that’s what we’re just looking at is what do all the pressures mean to make sure we understand exactly what’s going on. And I think I’ve talked about that before, what we want to do is avoid that oil’s being put out in the shallow environment and then there’s always the potential is motive that might be that it could breach up to the surface.

The discussion topics that have led to the delay were further addressed by Admiral Allen at his 4 pm press conference:

We consulted extensively with outside experts from academia. Our science team, led by Secretary of Energy Chu, consulted also with other members of industry regarding of potential issues we should definitely deal with. I will zero right in on what the discussion was mainly about and I’ll be happy to answer some questions about it.



We have never been sanguine or sure that we have known the condition of the wellbore and the casing pipe since the event occurred. As we've gotten closer to having the potential to close in and do pressure readings on the capping stack, we have had numerous discussions about what the current status is of the wellbore and the casing and the implications if they had been damaged or if there was any communication outside the wellbore that might bring oil or hydro carbons into what we call the geological formation potentially to the – to the sub-sea floor.

Some – some questions were raised yesterday about the implications of leakage and how that interfaced with the test as we start to shut down the valves and increase pressure in the capping stack and I'll go over that process in a minute.

What we might expect, what we’re – even low probability, high consequence outcomes.

As a result of that, we asked BP to go back and give us some more information on the structural strength of certain portions of the casing pipes. They had run down there particularly around the 22-inch and 18-inch casing pipes. We asked for some more information about assumptions that could lead to irreversible leakage outside the well from external experts. And we thought about what kind of thresholds we would need to look at as we ran the well integrity test.



That took us about 24 hours to work through all of that. We've had a number of conversations. And early this afternoon, I briefed the president and members of the cabinet on the way forward and at this time will be releasing an order to BP to proceed with the well integrity test, but we gave them some additional direction and we did this to make sure that we were taking due care, and in some cases maybe an over abundance of caution to make sure that we didn't do any irreversible harm to the wellbore as we proceed forward.

Ho noted that the test is being run in 6-hour increments, so that if they started at 17:00 Central, then the second stage should start at 23:00 Central. (about 10 minutes from now as I write).

The stages, as the Admiral reported are:


Here’s how we intend to do the well integrity test. We will slowly take down production from the Q4000 and the helix producer later on today to the point where they are not producing anymore. That will force the oil up through the blowout preventer into the capping stack. At that point, the kill line, the choke line, and the top of the stack will be open, and there’ll be product releasing from there and we know that that's the reason we’ve got the skimmers and the additional capacity on the surface to deal with that.

We will then in sequence close the middle ram here, which will stop the flow out of the top of the stack and then we will take pressure readings.

We will then close the kill line and take pressure readings.

 Following that, we will use a remotely operated vehicle that will hook on to the – that – the little bar here that actually turns a valve, and this choke line has been especially constructed – if you looked at the video, you'll see kind of a yellow object up there with a curved up pipe. That is the choke line. That is the last way for oil to leave the capping stack.

 We will slowly close that, very, very slowly, in partial turns, and measure pressure at the same time. In that manner, we will slowly close the entire capping stack and start the reading pressure.

OK?

 Now, as we do that, we're going to be watching very closely the pressure readings. If the pressure readings stay low, that will tell us that the oil is probably going someplace else and we need to consider the fact we may have a breach in the well bore or in one of the – in one of the casings. If that is the case and we have very low pressure readings for about three hours, we will probably stop at that point. That will be the assumption and we will go into production, bring everything back online so we minimize the amount of oil that's going into the environment and we will assess the results of that test.

At the end of 48 hours, we will stop the test, assess all the information we have. We will probably do another seismic run over the area around the well to detect any potential hydrocarbon or methane leaks from the sea floor. And then we will assess whether or not we need to go into another cycle of closing the capping stack down, taking pressure readings, and this will lead us possibly to two very positive directions. Number one, at some point our ability to determine that we can, with confidence, shut the well in and understand we're not harming the well bore and the casings.

The Admiral did also report on the result of the seismic survey

There’s a seismic test that was done yesterday and we do not have those results until this morning. And what they did was to reinforce the fact there was not a problem where there could have been. And so we had more confidence in the way we’re looking at the alternatives that’s come about.

There was one interesting comment on the top kill operation that is, I believe new

Tell you what – why we’ve been obsessing over this, and (probably) I should have explained a little bit more on the front. We tried the top kill back in May, and we pumped a lot of mud into that well, and as long as we were pumping mud into the well, we were suppressing the oil. But the maximum pressure we were able to achieve pumping the mud down the well bore was only around 6,000 (GSI), so the question is why aren’t we able to achieve a greater pressure head and be successful with the top kill? And you can postulate a number of things, but two we’re discussing, and this was part of the discussion over the last couple of days.



One of them we’re just (pointing) out to the top of the blowout preventer, like we saw the oil escaping. And there was a lot of mud (inaudible) there. The other one was that as it was being forced down, it might be escaping the (as it reached) the casing through the well bore. We don’t know that. The (admission of something) was potentially wrong and we should have this discussion partially due to the fact that we’ve never been comfortable with what the 6,000 psi meant during the top kill effort and what the implication for not being able to achieve a higher pressure.

Now if they couldn’t get the pressure above 6,000 psi then that may be indicative that they were injecting more fluid somewhere in the well, since the reservoir pressure is 11,900 psi. On the other hand if the well stopped the oil flow (which he says it did) then you have to get into how much mud they were able to drive down the column to determine whether they have a problem or not.

It will be interesting to see what the transcript for tomorrow morning's brief brings.

Current status at 10 am Eastern

Deepwater Oil Spill - awaiting the integrity test

Ah! The joys of trying to work out what is happening at the seabed around the leaking well in the Gulf, and relying on the images from the ROV cameras. Consider the image that I have just pulled up from the Enterprise ROV 1, which BP has designated as “looking for leaks.” Not wishing to be querulous but that looks suspiciously like a diamond cutting saw in the ROV’s clasp.

Image from the Enterprise ROV 1 – “performing leak monitoring.”

On that little note of caution, there does seem to be some delay, or perhaps “slow, methodical, unseen progress” in regard to closing the valves etc in order to test the integrity of the well. At roughly 10 pm Eastern, the flow does not appear to have changed much, if at all, and the BP site notes that the test has not yet started. (Nor has it two hours later having finished writing this post).

The white pipe is injecting dispersant, that changes the color of the oil/gas to more brown and seems to be coming in spurts rather than regularly at the moment, but this may be because of the changes in the equipment below the leak, which is likely siphoning off a considerable volume from the well.

I do note, however that Secretary Chu came down to monitor the test today, and this may have a little impact on the schedules.

His involvement in the spill has been continually underlined by the Administration.

Secretary Chu assembled a scientific team of top scientists and has made three trips to Houston, monitoring the progress of BP's effort to contain the leak and helping to design the strategies for moving forward. The team includes:

Dr. Tom Hunter, Director of the Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories
Dr. George A. Cooper, an expert in materials science and retired professor from UC Berkeley
Richard Lawrence Garwin, a physicist and IBM Fellow Emeritus
Dr. Alexander H. Slocum, professor of mechanical engineering at MIT

(Ed. note - George Cooper, who I know and respect, is a retired petroleum engineer)

Secretary Chu is on the phone with his science team a minimum of 1-2 times a day, 7 days a week, and the calls frequently last 90 minutes or more. Secretary Chu and members of his team also have a dialogue with BP executives each morning.

They visited the BOP manufacturer (Cameron) and their main competitor (National Oilwell Varco) back in May, and have had, among other things, the following input to the operation:

• Due to our suggestion, BP used high energy gamma rays to image parts of the internal state of the BOP. Lab personnel have independently analyzed the 2D gamma ray images. That imaging is crucial in helping understand what is happening inside the BOP and informing the approach moving forward. For example, it told engineers which valves and rams inside the BOP were closed and which were open, and it showed that a piece of drill pipe was stuck inside the BOP. Trying to determine what was wrong with the BOP without this information is akin to determining why your car has stopped running if you have no working gauges and can't open the hood.
• They strongly encouraged BP to collect additional pressure measurements, which were very valuable in interpreting the behavior of the well and BOP after each top kill and/or junk shot attempt, and ultimately those measurements helped the government and BP determine that the top kill was not going to work and that it was time to move on. The measurements also showed that the top kill attempts did not significantly erode the BOP.
• During the top kill attempts, the team suggested rechecking all of the hydraulics on the BOP, which BP did. As a result, one of the pipe ram valves closed more tightly and provided more resistance to the flow.
• The team conducted an extensive suite of structural analyses to assess the stability of the riser system in support of the choke and kill series.
• The team conducted an independent set of analyses to explain the oil and mud flow during the choke and kill series. This provided an understanding of the operational limits of the containment system going forward.

The list does not, however, appear to have been updated since June 15th.

After the visit today Admiral Allen issued the following statement:

"Today I met with Secretary Chu, Marcia McNutt and other scientists and geologists as well as officials from BP and other industry representatives as we continue to prepare and review protocols for the well integrity test - including the seismic mapping run that was made around the well site this morning. As a result of these discussions, we decided that the process may benefit from additional analysis that will be performed tonight and tomorrow.

Both the Helix Producer and the Q4000 collection systems are currently on line with the potential to exceed the containment capability that existed before the sealing cap was installed, and skimmers continue to be surged to the well site in anticipation of any increased oil flow as part of the transition. The drilling of relief wells also continues- the first relief has been drilled to a depth of 17,840 feet below the Gulf surface, and the second to a depth of approximately 15,963 feet below the surface."

The time of the more than 200 scientists and engineers that the Secretary has involved in these decisions is no doubt a part of the $99.7 million bill that the Administration presented to BP today. BP have already paid previous bills totaling $122.3 million to the Administration.

In today’s briefing the Admiral noted that the seismic run that was carried out this morning was to provide a baseline measurement of the seabed condition before the pressurization test of the well casing occurred. It also had to be carried out in daylight, since the vessel running the sensors had to steam through the fleet assembled around the well, and the sensors also were likely to be degraded by too much adjacent noise as they ran the scan.

He also corrected the sequence for the close down of the flows out of the well. (My concern yesterday) The sequence is

When we get ready to start the well integrity test, we will first cease production through the Q4000 and the Helix Producer I. We will then divert all the hydrocarbons up into the new capping stack. Valves through the kill and the choke lines for the new capping stack will be opened. And the center bore is already open. So we will be venting basically through three different exits on the capping stack, the kill line and the choke line, and the main line going through the bore.

Then in sequence we will attempt to close the stack down and assess the pressure readings. As we do that, the first thing we will do is close the main ram. There are three rams. The middle one will be closed and that will basically shut off the flow outward through the top of the capping stack. At that point we’ll take pressure readings. We will then close the kill line, which is the second remaining outlet and take pressure readings.

The third and most critical will be the choke line. There is a special device that has been built on the capping stack. You will see it. If you look at the video, it is yellow. It is long horizontally and it is a curved up pipe for the exit of the hydrocarbons. That choke line will be controlled by a remotely operating vehicle, which will slowly close it incrementally. And this is going to be very, very important because we want to measure the amount of closure, which will be measured gradually by turns of that choke line valve by an ROV simultaneously taking pressure readings.

The goal is to slowly close that down and understand the changes in pressure as we are closing it until that choke line is closed. At that point, there’ll be no hydrocarbons exiting from the capping stack. And we will go into a period where we’re going to start taking pressure readings. It will go in basically 6, 24, and 48 hour increments depending on the results.

Once the well is shut in then the pressure at the BOP (which is monitored by transducers and not the visible gages) should rise to between 8 and 9,000 psi (which Admiral Allen, a long time ago, had said was monitored just downstream of the BOP at the start of remediation). This is the anticipated value when the weight of the oil/gas column is subtracted from the pressure in the bottom of the well. Anything less than this will indicate that there may be some problems within the body of the well. Incidentally the gages that the ROVs are monitoring are monitoring pressures in the accumulator lines that run the hydraulics of the rams and power tools.

The Admiral was also more precise on the exact location of the relief well

Development Driller III is now at 17,840 feet measured depth. They’ve been there for a day or two. They are doing testing to make sure they have the right angle of attack as they close in for the last 60 or 70 feet before they’ll actually try and make the penetration for the relief well.

And the current estimate of how far away they are from the condo well at this point is four feet four inches. So you can imagine this gets pretty precise as they’re trying to go down another 60 or so feet and actually hit the point where they can drill into the annulus and potentially to a seven inch casing pipe. So that continues as well.

The Admiral noted that they are on pace to have 1,000 skimmers along the coast by the end of the month, and that they are using 2 million tyvek suits a month (the suits worn in cleaning the beaches) and there is a growing concern about the national supply of these.

And he pointed out that a part of the shut-down process will be visible

What we will do in sequence is we will stop production on the Q4000 and the Helix Producer I and remove the way for the hydrocarbons to exit through the kill and the choke lines on the original blow out preventer. That will move to three exit points, the choke and the kill lines of the capping stack and then the top opening of the capping stack. Then we will in sequence first, there are three rams that are a part of the capping stack. The middle ram will be closed. That will seal the upper opening from any hydrocarbon release. That will leave us the kill and the choke lines.

The kill line will then be closed as well. Now remember this is either open or shut. That will leave the choke line of the capping stack as a last way for hydrocarbons to exit from the capping stack. And that is set up with a specially designed engineered and built, you’ll be able to see it on the video. It’s a horizontal, yellow piece of equipment that has a pipe that curves up where the hydrocarbons would exit and at the other end there’s a place to insert a tool with a remotely operated vehicle and then slowly close the valve, which we will do that while we are taking pressure readings.

This is the control panel he was talking about, taken at 5 pm Eastern.


BP is also now holding twice daily briefings. In the morning one Kent Wells gave the actual timeline for the 3-ram stack installation

First in terms of the capping stack, last night at 6:20 pm we actually landed the stack on top of the transition spool. By 7:00 we had it fully connected and sealed on top of that device. And then at 8:30 we actually disconnected the drill pipe from the drill ship enterprise from it and so it was in place and free standing at that point in time.

The tests of the flow to the Helix Producer showed that it could sustain flows of up to 12,500 bd (as high as they went) He slightly corrected the Admiral on the relief well:

The first relief well is at 17,840 feet. Right now we’re running another survey to confirm the distance from the Macondo well, the direction from the Macondo well and the inclination of it.

We only have another 30 feet to drill before our final casing point and so we want to make sure that this well is perfectly lined up. So that’s why we’re doing this confirmation run. We’ll do that then we’ll trip back in the hole and we’ll drill that final 30 feet. Then we’ll come back in and what we call open up the hole to make it large enough to run the casing and most likely we’ll be running casing in the hall on Sunday, but of course there can be variability to that. But what I would say is that we’re on track and I’m still looking for the most likely intercept of the Macondo well being at the end of July.

He went on to say, in regard to that intersection

So the inclination we’re looking for at the bottom is somewhere in the range of two to two and a half degrees and we think we’re in that range, we just want to confirm that. And that lines us up as we then – after we set the casing I’ll come back and talk about that in a second. We’ll have about 100 to 150, 200 feet to drill to intersect and that two degree angle allows us to do that in that period of time. So that’s why we want that particular angle.

In the afternoon briefing he pointed out that when the sequence of tests on the 3-ram stack begins:

down below two rams there’s a what we call our flow T and there’s two sides to it and that’s where the flow would be coming out when we actually shut one of the rams.

However, as I pointed out at the start of this post (and as still holds true) the integrity test has yet to be initiated.

Deepwater Oil Spill - the 3-ram stack

After a relatively long and technically difficult process BP has managed to locate and install the three-ram Lower Stack on the flowing well in the Gulf. At the same time the viewing site has been changed, so that the feeds from all 14 ROVs can be seen together. The view from Skandi ROV2 shows the flow from the well is now issuing from the segment of drill pipe left at the top of the stack, after the installing drill pipe was disconnected.

Flow from the top of the 3-ram stack at 10:45 pm Eastern Monday – the color is due to the injection (through the white feed) of the dispersant into the flow.

Just as a reminder, this is how the assembly looks underneath this drill pipe.



The White cylinder above the yellow transition spool is designated by Cameron (who make it) as a Cameron HC 18¾-in., 10000 psi connector, with the HC designation standing for High Capacity. Inside it looks like this:



BP held a press conference on Monday in which they commented on the problems noted on Sunday with the Helix Producer feed, and that these had been fixed.

We did encounter two problems which created some delay yesterday. One was with issues on a hydraulic control line for a valve (so that it couldn’t work) and the second was a leak in the methanol system. Both of those issues have been resolved and we will be starting up the helix producer later today. It will likely take several days to ramp up to a full capacity, which is at about 25,000 barrels a day, which with the Q4000 would give us a total capacity of around 33,000 barrels a day of containment.

BP also admitted to a slight problem that delayed the installation of the 3-ram stack today, though as with the flow line problem it has also been fixed to allow the installation which was completed after the press conference.

We did have a problem with the deployment real (sic) on the Inspiration. We had a backup plan and moved to that backup plan and will be attaching the cap later this morning.

With the stack in position, the next step is to connect up the hydraulics, so that the power can be applied to the rams and that they will close the flow. This is some of what is going on with the array of other ROVs whose operations are now available for monitoring.

Prior to that I suspect that they will, Monday evening, check the flow of oil through the kill line to the Helix Producer, to ensure that it can handle the flow, and that this will occur concurrent with the flow to the Q4000. Once those numbers have been confirmed, and the flow conditions validated, the shear rams will be closed. I would suspect that this will happen first, since it will increase the pressure in the well somewhat, as the flow path out is restricted to the kill and choke circuits. Then, after checking to ensure that the well is retaining its integrity – no leaks into the surrounding rock through the casing or any other of the horrific disasters that have floated through comments over the past few weeks – the flow to the choke and kill will slowly be closed. As they are closed the pressure in the well will continue to be monitored, together with the flow out of the two lines. (Having now read the full transcript I note that BP are going to do it the other way around, closing the rams last instead of first. Well I think it might be more logical to do it the other way, but they know more about the relative benefits of the choice than I).

If the pressure continues to rise (indicating no leaks) as the flow trails to zero, then the well will have been shut-in. The flow will have stopped, and a test will be run, for a planned 48 hours to ensure that all the seals are holding.

At that time I expect that the choke and kill lines may re-open, but without there being some unforeseen incident, I do not expect the rams to re-open. Once the well stops pumping out oil into the Gulf, the political difficulties in restarting that flow un-necessarily are considerable. And if there is a problem then in addition to the choke and kill lines the riser to the Enterprise can be re-connected, and take 15,000 bd up the pipe, for a total system capacity of around 50,000 bd without letting any more oil out into the water.

If the current tests are successful, then the risks of additional leakage into the Gulf during a Hurricane are also going to be greatly reduced, and the pressure on the relief well becomes a little less.

We’re now at 17,840 feet. We’ve completed our eleventh ranging run to locate the original well bore, we’re approximately five feet away from that well and we’re about 30 feet vertically from the point at which we’ll set casing. We expect the casing operation to begin this coming weekend.

Work on the second relief well has now been stopped with the current end cased and cemented, until circumstances indicate that it will be needed.

The process to cement the last casing was also reviewed

we’ll get to the final casing point. Then we actually do what we call open up the hole. We just make the hole a little larger so that we can run the casing an cement it in place. After we do that we’ll run some logs, which are basically tell us about the cement bond log, tell us about making sure everything’s right. And then we’ll prepare to start to drill out and we’ll have done a BOP test before doing, so there's a fair amount of work to do before we sort of start to drill out.

And then we’ve got about another hundred feet to go, is what we’re anticipating before we intersect the Macondo well, and of course that will be plus or minus, it won't be exactly a hundred feet. But it will be in that range. But we would drill that very precisely doing a number of ranging runs. And that will all take time so that’s why you’ve heard me talk before. I anticipateus intercepting the Macondo well sometimes toward the end of July and then the kill procedure, the kill and cementing procedure, depending upon where the flow is, analysis, casing or boat, could be anywhere from a number of days to a few weeks to do that.

Incidentally in the press conference on Sunday morning Kent Wells noted that each of the bolts on the flange of the riser weighed 52 lbs.

In the afternoon briefing they also noted that there was only one piece of drill pipe found in the BOP, at the moment no-one knows what happened to the second piece of pipe.

And for those who, like me, have some difficulty working out which camera is showing what, here are some additional shots of the stack (h/t Mark Moore), from different angles, so that some of the component locations may be clearer.


And this is the main control panel, with the ability to operate the valves with the ROVs made rather evident. I suspect this picture was taken a little while ago, and the port cut for a valve with a cutting torch has been cleaned up a little since then.

Deepwater Oil Spill - inserting the transition spool

At about 1 pm (Eastern) I checked on the feeds, and it appears, using the camera on the BOA ROV 1, that the transition spool has been lowered into place (the old riser was removed at about 3 am this morning) and is now ready to be inserted into the top of the riser.

Flange removed from the well, and the surface awaits the transition spool.

Transition spool approaches the flowing well

I will update as I notice other things of interest - though will be out some of this afternoon.

UPDATE 1. Apparently there was some soccer game or something on this afternoon, so I became a bit distracted, and was not watching when the transition spool was seated, some time around 3 pm. Since then they have been tightening the bolts. The next step will be to set the Lower stack on top of the spool, and then lock it in place.

UPDATE 2. The Ocean Intervention ROV 1 keeps looking at a pressure gage as it manipulates around the transition spool.

Pressure gage (which goes up to a pressure of 6,500 to 7,000 psi)

I suspect that this is the pressure in the hydraulics when they do the final tightening of the bolts on the transition spool, to ensure that they are adequately all tightened, since, after looking at the gage, it went over and moved the torque wrench to another bolt.

Torque wrench being moved around the bolts holding the transition spool in place on the BOP.

Obviously assembling the rig is taking a bit longer than I thought, though I think I may have seen the Lower capping stack somewhere around in an earlier shot.

Looking at the various camera shots on Monday morning, there are a lot of pictures of gages around the kill line that would be feeding oil down the new line from the BOP. Given that they are all still reading zero, it suggests that there is a little problem.

Also the word is apparently out that the capping stack is on its way down to the site.

Ane here it is, being monitored by the Inspiration ROV, which you see through the the Akamai video set .

State temperatures - Missouri corrected for observation time

The data that I have been correlating in regard to the temperatures of the different recording stations in the different states of the Union, now comes in three flavors, rather than the one that I started with. The three are the Raw data, data that has been adjusted for the time of day of observation (TOBS), and that which has been homogenized to account for the urban heat island effect, among other things.

However the little data that I have massaged from about 8 states suggests that those massaging the data who ignored town sizes below 10,000 folk were neglecting a sensitivity that the data was beginning to repetitively indicate. Thus it does not seem appropriate to continue with using the “homogenized” data of the set that was the only one available at the U.S. Historical Climate Network (USHCN) when I started . On the other hand, a strong case can be made that the adjustment that the USHCN has made to correct for the varying time of days at which the readings were taken is a legitimate one. If one goes to the USHCN website and selects the time of day corrected data (under the listing TOBS for time of observation) then one can, in the same way as I did last week create a table of information using this simple correction to the Raw data. And so, I will see, this week, whether making that change will affect the trends in the data.

Using the procedures that I have outlined, therefore, I have just done that, and will now continue to work back through the states I have already covered (marking the list with either RAW or TOBS) and beyond using this less manipulated data. For Missouri, you may recall that my original concern was for the difference between the GISS stations and the USHCN. Last week I posted the comparison of the Raw data and it showed that changing the data and the measuring stations both made a difference.

The blue line is for the homogenized data, the red is for the raw.

And if I now look at the difference using the TOBS data I get:


A slight upward trend, but not that significant. As for the temperatures in Missouri, over the past 100 years, with the correction – really there is no trend, it has been relatively stable:


I do note that the highest temperatures were some decades ago.

Actually a little surprise in looking at the changes in standard deviation. They had been reducing over time, with both the raw and homogenized data, but when the TOBS values are used, then there is a slight increase over time.


And for the four parameters that had started to appear to have an impact on relative temperature across the states. First there is latitude:


For which there is not much change. Then there is longitude:


And though the state is relatively flat though it rises toward the west, the change due to elevation:


Which gives a better correlation (and one more logically based) than longitude.

And finally that of population, which I have shown both with log and normal scales, but for tonight – because it emphasizes the effect of towns below 10,000 in size, I’ll use the normal one again.


And so, starting with this as the new baseline of a mid-western state, let’s head off West again, and see what the TOBS data will show.