OGPSS - The dangers of complacency

Perceptions based, perhaps on too small a collection of information, can lead into opinions that, on investigation, turn out to be incorrect. Just recently a couple of friends had mentioned that charities that they are associated with were seeing a decline in donations. I built this into a picture of the general public being less able to afford earlier levels of giving, perhaps because of the continued impact of higher costs of fuel. The perception is, however, as a general statement wrong, and (Via the National Park Service from The Giving Institute I learn that:

Americans gave more than $298.42 billion in 2011 to their favorite causes despite the economic conditions. Total giving was up 4 percent from $286.91 in 2010. This slight increase is reflective of recovering economic confidence.

The greatest portion of charitable giving, $217.79 billion, was given by individuals or household donors. Gifts from individuals represented 73 percent of all contributed dollars, similar to figures for 2010.

In the perception that is becoming increasingly prevalent on the future of energy supplies, and particularly crude oil, the current adequacy of supply is projected forward to anticipate no problems with supply in the future. Peak oil is now being suggested to occur, not because the supply is limited, but because, with the increasing use of renewable energy, demand will peak, and then decline. Bloomberg New Energy Finance founder Michael Liebreich is quoted as projecting that the growth in fossil fuel use will almost stop by 2030, while Citi Commodity Researchers are suggesting that the increases in prices will drive increases in efficiency that will bring a peak in oil demand “much sooner than the market expects.”


Figure 1. Projected changes in global oil demand from Citi Commodity Researchers)

This anticipation of future gains in efficiency of use is a common thread to pictures of the future from the three major oil companies that I recently reviewed. All three, ExxonMobil, Shell and BP expect that energy efficiency gains will have a major impact on demand. BP, for example, anticipates that through 2030 energy demand will increase 36%, but that without this improvement in efficiency global energy would have to double by 2030.

One of the problems in assessing the changes in efficiency over time is that, when looking at the past decade, one has to recognize the significant impact of the recession. For example, the Odyssee project looked at energy use in Europe and clearly showed the impact of the recession on demand.


Figure 2. Changes in electricity use in the countries of Europe following the start of the recession. (Odyssee)

What also caught my attention in looking where most of the energy savings were occurring was that it was in countries catching up to Western Europe, rather than in the more established West, and that when the overall savings are totaled these appear to have slowed significantly.


Figure 3. Overall energy savings in the EU relative to a 2000 baseline (Odyssee)

The second problem with the curve that Citi projects lies in the rate at which vehicles are switched from diesel and gasoline to natural gas power. There is currently an economic incentive in parts of the world to make this change, it currently sells at around the equivalent of $2.10/gallon in the USA. Yet it requires both infrastructure and an investment of capital to make the change at any level of significance. Nevertheless it remains a key ingredient of the Pickens Plan that Boone Pickens has been selling around the country for a number of years now.

The fact that Clean Energy Fuels can list all 22 stations that added natural gas pumps along the “Natural Gas Highway” in the November-January period, does not indicate a great rush to build that infrastructure. It is easier to change the local distributor networks, with companies such as Waste Management indicating that they will use CNG in 80% of their new trucks, than it is to see the rapid change of the longer distance haulers, and for passenger vehicles. A recent article in the Washington Post noted that only 20,381 vehicles ran on natural gas of the 14.5 million new cars and trucks sold last year. Further not only does a CNG vehicle cost more to purchase, it also has a lower range, although for some applications that may not be much of a handicap.


Figure 4. Average Annual Vehicle miles travelled by category (Alternate Fuels Data Center )

Yet, at the moment, it is the use of ethanol that is having the most impact on alternate fuel use. Other than that there has been little indication of much change in the market.


Figure 5. Alternate Fuel Vehicles in use from 1995 to 2010. (Alternate Fuels Data Center )

And in this regard Europe has also seen little movement toward the use of natural gas, in contrast with the use of biofuels, and neither has made large gains.


Figure 6. Comparative penetration of liquid fuels market in Europe by biofuels and natural gas (Odyssee)

The problem, of course, is that if these improvements in efficiency and switches to alternate fuels do not occur, then the demand will continue along the Business-As-Usual line, and, as BP forecasts, demand will double by 2030.

The question as to what will be available to meet that enhanced demand remains one of the great imponderables that folk seem, again, unwilling to face. Certainly with a steadily increasing demand, and the constraints on supply that these pages have continued to document over the years, it becomes very difficult to see how price stability can be maintained, where demand exceeds supply at a given price. The problems that this will bring, particularly those nations that now subsidize fuel, a policy that is unlikely to change in Asia, are likely to be major. Yet for countries such as India, which last year has spent the allocated fuel subsidy budget for the year by the end of July the political costs of change remain very high and could well remain in place until the financial burden becomes intolerable. Unfortunately, with the current complacency, at that point it will then be too late to start searching for alternate answers.

The Citicorp Energy Projection - a Gentle Cough

Gasoline prices remain high, and Reuters recently noted that there are enough countries with civil unrest, technical problems and bad weather that there are around a million barrels a day of possible supply that are not getting to the market. . Yet with Saudi Arabia continuing to reassure that it is willing to pump more oil, if needed, there appears to be, superficially, little cause for supply concerns this year. By the same token, in the longer term, concerns over supply also seem to be increasingly discounted. For example Citigroup has just released a new report on Energy 2020:North America as the new Middle East. The report suggests that there is really no concern with future supplies of oil and gas, perhaps most clearly shown with this plot:

The Citigroup view of the coming energy future (Citigroup)

I would argue that the numbers for Saudi Arabia and Russia are difficult to realistically justify. For the Kingdom, which is reported to be producing 9.9 mbd, to increase production by another 2 mbd is optimistic, given the ageing of their primary fields and the decline in remaining volumes that I will discuss in future posts in the current series on that country. The projection of an increase in Russian production is a similar concern. With the decline in production from Western Siberia there is not enough new production coming from Timan-Pechora and Eastern Siberia to sustain existing levels let alone see an increase in production – a point that has been made by Russian officials in the past. However the real concern lies with the relatively unrealistic image that is being projected for US production over the next eight years.

North American shale plays (EIA map, cited by Citigroup)

The image that the above figure projects is that the country is covered in shale, all waiting to provide its wealth to the nation. But that is not the case and shale plays have been a hot topic for a number of years now. And while the map above shows a carpet of shale that has the potential to produce oil and/or natural gas it does not clearly enough distinguish the considerable difference between deposits that are presently economic, and those that are not. (The small number of fields that are labelled as prospective does not speak well for the future).

If one examines the prediction for future production it shows that overall US growth in production of all liquids will rise from some 9 mbd at the end of 2011 to 11.6 mbd in 2015 and then go on to a figure of 15.6 mbd in 2020. (Note that this includes natural gas liquids (NGLs), refining gains and growth in the production of biofuels). The contribution of the various sectors is broken down into:

Projected growth in US production (Citigroup )

In the Deepwater category Citigroup cite existing production from Atlantis, Perdido, Shenzi, Silvertip, Tahiti, and Thunder Horse. Future gains will then come from Big Foot, Gunflint, Hadrian, Jack, Knotty Head, Lucius, Moccasin, St. Malo, Stones, Tubular Bells and Vito. Tiber, Buckskin, Kaskida, Appomattox and Heidelberg. But the report sees gains in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) total liquids as likely peaking in 2016 at around 2.2 mbd and the gains projected in the above table that might come beyond that as being an “upside potential” based on a change in regulatory factors and the ability of oil companies to bring their reserves on line.

Citigroup projection of future production from Deepwater (Citigroup)

Part of my problem with this approach is that it totally seems to discount the declining production and failure to meet target projections from existing GOM platforms which, among others, has been well documented by Jean Laherrère (here, here and here) and by Darwinian at The Oil Drum (TOD). Looking at the fields that Citigroup have cited it is pertinent to examine first their relative size, as Jean illustrated.

Discoveries in the GOM (Jean Laherrère)

In this context it might be well to remember that as a rule of thumb (from the Russian posts) a 500 mmboe field may produce around 120 kbd. However it should be noted that some of the GOM fields are having problems reaching their target, and that production is falling at a rate of around 20% per year, as Darwinian showed for the cumulative production of Thunder Horse Atlantis and Tahiti, which were projected to produce 550 kbd in total.

History of production from Thunder Horse, Atlantis and Tahiti combined (Darwinian )

With production having already fallen 300 kbd from projections, mainly through lower production from Thunder Horse and Atlantis, it is hard to see how to justify the numbers that Citigroup are using.

The Citigroup projection for Alaska anticipates possible gains from the Shell activities in the Chukchi Sea, although the exploratory wells have yet to be drilled and the geographical challenges to be met in bringing that oil ashore are not yet fully addressed. The Alaskan pipeline is currently flowing at around 609 kbd, which is high enough to prevent wax and ice build up, but with ongoing declines in production and problems arising once the flow falls below 600 kbd how long it can continue to perform satisfactorily is open to question. They cite heavy oil operations at Milne Point which has been declining in production, and West Sac which is a very heavy, cold oil which has raised considerable technical issues in achieving the production of around 15 kbd at present, with existing plans only adding 150 million barrels in total to reserves. The other source that is cited is to produce the light crude from the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (NPRA). Given that the bridge from Alpine into the Conoco-Phillips wells in the NPRA has just been approved suggests that an increase in production from the region is still some time away. Put together it suggests that the estimates for a 500 kbd increase in Alaskan production within the next eight years is not a reasonably likely occurrence.

Location of fields and development along the North Slope (Free Republic )

And the third source that Citigroup cite are the oil from shale deposits shown at the top of the post. They see growth of 2.4 mbd in oil production and 1.5 mbd in NGLs from the increase in production from natural gas. The production gains are broken down as follows:

Projected sources of oil from shale plays (Citigroup)

The plot, again, includes a large volume of “upscale potential” which might come from a change in regulations, government and oil company attitudes. I have written about some of the more realistic views of the possible future production of the Bakken and the Niobrara, the Tuscaloosa and the Chatanooga. In this regard it is worth noting that while Citigroup see production from the Bakken rising to around 1 mbd in 2016, and being sustained at that level through 2022, this is not the view of the folk in North Dakota who are monitoring well production and permits.

Anticipated production from the Bakken and Three Forks in North Dakota (DMR March 2012 )

It is instructive to this argument to note that Fidelity E&P has just celebrated reaching a production record of 3,500 bd in the Bakken which it derives from 58 wells. As they continue to run 5 rigs, and have been able to drill a long lateral horizontal well in 28 days they should be able to increase production this year, but they are fighting the rapid decline in existing wells, which requires that more wells be drilled every year, and that (as the better spots become drained) so the drilling activity must accelerate to sustain existing production.

Typical Bakken well production (ND DMR )

Production from the Bakken in North Dakota reached 546 kbd in January, and this production came from 6,617 wells which gives an average of 82.5 bd production from each well. Activity is such that some 250 wells are waiting on fracture services and rigs capable of drilling 20,000+ ft are at 95% utilization in the area. And prices of natural gas are down to $1.89/kcf. Bear in mind that, after a while, it becomes harder to find a spot where no-one has already been.

Map of wells planned and drilled in a section of the Bakken (DMR Presentation to Farm Bureau )

On the ground it looks more like this:


Well sites in the Bakken (Vern Whitten for DMR – Farm Presentation)

The North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources has a series of very informative presentations on the Bakken, including hydraulic fracturing, and the above were taken from the Presentation to the Piece Country Farm Bureau on March 15th.

Current plans anticipate that the Niobrara may reach 250 kbd of production by 2020. The problem, however, as Art Berman has skillfully pointed out is that, as the ND plot above shows, the current wells have a high decline rate, and production levels drop dramatically once the wells are brought on line. Art has explained the background to this for gas wells drilled into shale but the impact for oil wells, where the oil has a higher viscocity than the natural gas, can be significantly greater. Given that well costs are in the order of $10 million per well (depending on location DMR gives the ND price at around $8.5 million, and numbers for the Eagle Ford have been quoted at $8 million) the amount of oil that must be produced over the first few years to justify investment is significant. There are, for example, some 1,400 wells producing in the Eagle Ford play. The play produced 30.4 million barrels of oil in 2011, and is anticipated to add 200 kbd of production this year with the potential to reach 1.2 mbd by 2015. But the high decline rates mean that wells must be replaced rapidly to sustain those levels of production.

It is this disregard for the declining production from existing and future wells that appears to be neglected in the Citigroup study. Those plays which will yield rapidly in generating high initial well production will, in turn, be the first that decline significantly and need replacement. Yet replacement will, over time, have to be in poorer parts of the formation, requiring that multiple wells replace the initial producer, and so bounds on production will be reached, likely before the end of the decade. Citigroup anticipate that the risks in development of the shale plays, whether in Texas or California, come as much from an inability to transport the oil generated and from environmental policy, they see few geological risks – which is a pity, since it is the geology that will control production and its decline, and the ultimate profitability of these ventures.

And finally Citigroup see that cellulosic ethanol will come into its own this decade, and that it will provide half the 2 mbd of biofuels produced in 2020. Unfortunately the economics of large scale production that have led to failures of ventures to date have over-ridden the mandated production levels that the group cite as their foundation, and there is no indication that this will change in the next eight years.

In short, though this is an interesting exercise it is too full of “could” and thus will not make much of a useful contribution to meaningful discussion of future production.