Showing posts with label SEC Regulations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SEC Regulations. Show all posts

Monday, June 27, 2011

The gas shale e-mails and the NYT stories about them

I doubt that this will ever reach the levels of public interest that has led earlier exposures of information to acquire a “gate” appendage, but the New York Times (NYT) has begun a running series of articles, starting this weekend, on e-mails that they have acquired that largely deal with the gas shale business. In the discussion on Focus today, it was the first topic of conversation, and so I thought I would write about what the fuss is about. Not, I should hasten to add, that any of this should come as a surprise to you gentle readers, since many of the “revelations” have been covered here in the past.

There is a considerable body of literature that tends to look at future supplies of natural gas, particularly from shales, through very optimistic lenses. This includes reports from such agencies as the EIA and the IEA that suggest that the world is entering the “Golden Age of Natural Gas.” Recent discoveries and projections have led to estimates that the world will be afloat on natural gas for the foreseeable future, as many countries have natural gas tied to shale layers, and American success in developing these deposits could lead to similar success in other countries, providing large volumes of indigenous fuel, at potentially low cost. Unfortunately, as those who have read my posts here know, much of this is over-inflated and not going to happen. While I discussed the problems with the EIA report back in April (haven’t got round to writing on the IEA report yet,) the fundamental points remain valid. The point brought out by the NYT is that the concerns that I have written about are also prevalent within the industry itself, even while it seeks to draw investors into putting up money to drill more wells. And in that activity, as the articles note, industry has been very successful.

If I can re-iterate some of the concerns, they begin with the cost of the drilling and completion operation. Both parts of this are expensive, the initial cost to drill a vertical well, and then turn it horizontal and run it out thousands of feet within the shale costs millions of dollars, as then does the subsequent series of events that includes fracturing the horizontal well a number (perhaps 30) times and using expensive suspension fluids to force small particles into those cracks so as to prop them open and allow gas to migrate from the rock into the well. The costs as a rough initial marker, run around $5 million dollars per well, though they can go considerably higher.

This sort of investment requires a significant return on investment, and in the best wells initial flow rates of over 10 million cubic feet per day can be achieved. However, as the industry has long known, but likely not the general public, those wells are proving to drop in production very quickly. As I quoted back in that earlier piece:
The Day Kimball Hill #A1 is located in Southeast Tarrant County, Texas, and produced an average of 12.97 million cubic feet of natural gas per day in October 2009. Since shale gas wells decline sharply during the first few years, this Barnett Shale well has seen its production fall to 8.66 million cubic feet in November and 6.79 million in December.
The initial high yields from these wells fall by as much as 85% in the first year, and while this may still make the producers such as the Day Kimball profitable, that was the most successful well Chesapeake had drilled until then. For the less successful payback is lower and may not cover costs.

Part of the problem comes in that the companies seeking investors suggest that the wells will continue to produce for up to 50 years. I would not deny that were the wells to remain open that long that some gas would be still coming out of the wells at the end of that period. However natural gas is a lot less valuable cubic inch for cubic inch than oil, and whereas a simple pump can raise a fractional barrel of oil a day and be profitable, this is much harder to do with a marginal gas producer.

The reason for this is that, unlike oil and coal, natural gas is usually carried (after cleaning to remove water oil and any other contaminants) through a pipeline that often runs (via additional pumps) directly to the customer. They, in turn, don’t usually store it, but burn it as needed, drawing the supply straight from the pipe. The problem that this gives the marginal producer is that the gas in the line must be at a certain pressure if it is to move down that pipe to the customer, and then come out of the nozzles at sufficient flow to be useful. That pressure has to be achieved, at the well once the natural pressure of the gas in the well has fallen over time and production, with a compressor, which cost money to install, run and maintain. At a certain point in the well life the gas being produced falls below the point at which it becomes economic to pay for that compressor (which is only a part of the total costs that an operating well will incur). It may even be (at the rates of decline being seen in many current wells) that the decline is so swift that as soon as the natural pressure falls below that needed for the pipeline, that the well closes and a compressor is never economical. In these cases the well life may well only be three or four years, rather than the fifty of the company model.

There is another concern that the NYT articles raise, and that deals with the change in reserve estimates that are now being made for new wells. I commented on this back when the changes were made in January 2009. To simplify the explanation of the changes before then a company had to physically prove that it had the reserve, and the volume over which it could estimate that the reserve existed was restricted to a relatively short distance from the validation point (usually a well). Investors thus had some degree of certainty about the size of the reserve that they were investing in. (And those who followed the reality Coal series on Spike this season will have seen how the geology changes rapidly, having an immediate impact on production in even a short distance underground - thereby illustrating why the original rules were realistic as a way of protecting the investor).

The change removed the requirement for physical proof, and allowed the company to make an estimate based on the geological data, as established remotely, and without the need for physical validation. As the NYT article notes, this allowed companies to revise their estimates and some did by up to 200%, with the rationale for doing so no longer as clearly visible and verifiable. As the wells are now brought into production those estimates are not always proving valid, according to e-mails within the industry and which the NYT obtained for their stories. The conclusion of monitors in the EIA, as evidenced by similar e-mails released by the agency, is that many of the companies will go bankrupt.

In some ways the response of the industry reminds me a little of what happened after the climate change e-mails were released to the web in what became known as Climategate. Very little specific focus on the criticism, rather moves to obfusticate the issue, and change the subject. In this regard it is sad to note that in the response that Aubrey K. McClendon, Chesapeake's Chief Executive Officer, released on the story his major defense seemed to be
If the Times was interested in reporting the facts and advancing the debate about the prospective benefits of natural gas usage to energy consumers, it could easily have contacted respected independent reservoir evaluation and consulting firms that annually provide reserve certifications to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or contacted experts at the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Colorado School of Mines' Potential Gas Committee, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Navigant Consulting and others who would gladly have gone on record to confirm the abundant resources that have been made available thanks to the horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques that Chesapeake and other industry peers have pioneered in deep shale formations across the U.S.
As I noted in my comment on the EIA report there is a huge difference between a reserve (which is economically realizable) and a resource, which is not necessarily economic. The response did not address, in sufficient technical detail, the points that the NYT and released e-mails make, about the decline rates and thus long-term viability of the wells in production. Nor did it highlight in sufficient detail how, outside of the sweet spots such as the Day Kimbell well site, the less productive wells can be expected to remain economically competitive when their production costs could well be over 50% higher than the current price of natural gas as it is sold to the pipeline. Bear in mind also that the gas from shale is competing against natural gas produced from more conventional wells (at lower cost) and against Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) which is available on the world market. The response by Michael Levi was similarly disappointing, since it tried to diminish the number of operators who might have problems along the “much ado about nothing,” line. While that by Christopher Helman tries to change the subject a little by suggesting that some wells also produce oil that helps with the economics, (this largely relates at the moment to the Eagle Ford shale) rather than the reality that it is the oil that is driving the well production, not the natural gas. And this was covered in these pages last December.

As I mentioned at the top of the post there is little in the NYT stories that is not well known within the industry. The e-mails bear that out. But it will be interesting to see how many papers pick this story up and also to see whether it acquires legs, or is allowed to quietly fade back into the noise. It isn’t after all as though we were betting our economic future on this, is it?

(Wonder if Andrew Montford is going to be tempted to write a new book?)

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Sunday, April 19, 2009

P62. Pick Points

Well after being told that we had to “Drill, Baby, Drill,” a Federal appeals court has" Just Said No!” It ruled that permits for off-shore drilling, whether in Alaska or the Gulf, must give greater consideration to environmental impacts of such oil exploration.
The lawsuit was brought by three environmental groups that want to protect the ecosystem and the Native Village of Point Hope, Alaska, a tribe that lives off the wildlife on the Chukchi Sea coast.
It is of particular concern down in Louisiana where it might have significant impact out into the Gulf.
Don Briggs, president of the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association, was dismayed by the court's ruling. "We have so much science to prove that in the Gulf of Mexico, the environment is protected. Wildlife actually flourishes around offshore production facilities," Briggs said. "I believe that this is just politics."

The appeals court ordered the Interior Department, now run by President Barack Obama's appointee Ken Salazar, to analyze the areas to determine environmental risks and potential damage before moving ahead with the program.
However the story is a little different up in Alaska, and in this particular case, since among other things it impacts the subsistence living of the local tribes.
Eskimos living along the coastline worry that drilling noise may disturb migrating bowhead whales, walruses and seals, which they depend on for food. They've also questioned whether Shell is prepared for a potential oil spill in the Beaufort Sea, where moving ice can make a cleanup difficult.

"Americans are looking for a clean energy future, and trading animals and their habitat for massive oil company profits is the way of the past," said Charles Clusen, director of the Alaska project for the Natural Resources Defense Council, in a statement.

The Manifa oilfield in Saudi Arabia has gone through a number of “on again, off again” cycles. While it has the potential to produce over a million barrels of oil a day, the chemical content of the oil is such that it cannot be economically refined by existing facilities. Thus Aramco have planned to build a couple of refineries in Saudi Arabia to allow them to usefully bring the field into production. Well it now looks as though work is going to start again on building some of the on-shore crude handling facilities. (The oilfield is just offshore). Last year plans were announced for a new refinery at Jubail that would process the oil, with initial production scheduled for 2011, and the refinery was supposed to be up and running in 2012. Well it has now slipped to 2013, and will only process 400,000 bd, of the Manifa production, but the work is going forward, though the economic downturn is anticipated to have lowered the overall cost. The other refinery planned to take the remainder of the Manifa oil has been planned to go into Yanbu. The partnership this time is between Aramco and ConocoPhilips, and current plans are for initial bids to be solicited this summer, with contracts awarded before the end of the year. Production is again anticipated for 2013.

Gazprom has just successfully raised $2.25 billion in bonds, and Gazprom Neft (the oil branch) is going to go ahead this week to raise some 10 billion roubles ($299 million) in a domestic sale this week. They may need some of the money to recompense Turkmenistan, who is still claiming that the blast in the gas pipeline the other week, was Gazprom’s fault. Given that Gazprom was hoping to get more gas from Turkmenistan, this is not good for them, since it continues to delay pipeline expansion.

The third summer of drought in California is causing additional tensions in that state as water restrictions are reimposed, at the same time that water supplies to farms are being cut.
"Up to 19 million southern Californians this summer will feel the impact of a new water reality that has been in the making for years, if not decades," said MWD board chairman Timothy Brick in a statement.
In the Central Valley, meanwhile, tens of thousands of farmers, farm workers, and local officials protested federal and state water cuts during a series of marches this march.

Between 70,000 and 80,000 farm workers are out of work this year as a result of water shortages, according to a study from the University of California, Davis. California ordinarily supplies America with half of its fruits and vegetables
.
Some 100,000 acres of agricultural land will not be planted.

At the same time the state is praising the success of the re-flooding of Owens Lake as a way of both stopping regional dust storms from the lake bed, and coincidentally providing a wetlands for migrating birds. The only problem?
As it stands, each year the project uses about 60,000 acre-feet of water worth about $54 million -- enough to supply 60,000 families.
There are no easy choices, although, as is noted:
"We're beginning to get to the real cost of water," says Colin Sabol, vice president of marketing for ITT Corporation, the world's largest provider of pumps and water equipment. He notes that US consumers pay on average only one-third of what Germany pays for its water.

Germany "charges a price that allows them to reinvest in their infrastructure," Mr. Sabol says.
Some $250 million in stimulus funds are going to be directed at helping with the problem. Perhaps they could learn from the “grey water” controversy out there. Back in the early 1990’s the State carried out an experiment that allowed homeowners to use grey water (that from showers and dishwashers) for irrigation. The project at the time was a success, with great things predicted. Unfortunately bureaucracy stepped in and made the regulations so complex that the benefits never officially happened and there are only 200 legal systems in the State – maybe this could be changed, since it is estimated that up to 16% of the state consumption could be saved and reused.

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Monday, January 19, 2009

SEC Rules Changes for Oil & Gas Reserves

Yesterday I was talking about the calculation of reserves for coal mines, and the calculation of what a reserve holds is a critical part of raising the capital to put a mine in place. The same holds true about oil and gas wells, as their price rises above $5 million a well, and at the end of last year the SEC changed the rules on Oil and Gas Reserve Reporting. It is interesting to read the rationale for the changes. Part of the problem has been that the industry has been developing technologies that make it easier to economically extract oil from tar sands, and also to get natural gas from coal seams and from shales that had previously been uneconomical to develop. However, where the rules that define reserves do not allow a full accounting of the volumes that can be recovered, then it becomes harder to raise capital for the operation. The rules were last written in the time that most extraction came from the historic vertical wells that drilled down into a deposit and extracted the gas. With both coal and shale extraction the new technologies have advanced considerably beyond this, and to make the situation more realistic the rules had to be changed.

In the extraction of gas from shale beds, for example, the rock is normally made up of very fine grains, which provide very poor permeability (or passageways) for the gas to work through the rock to get to any well that is there. Rates of flow to the well would thus be too slow to be economic. To enhance the flow operators therefore drill long horizontal holes along the layer of rock holding the gas. Pressure in the well is then raised, until cracks are created in the wall of the well, and with more pressure these are extended out into the rock providing a path for the gas to flow back to the well. While this technique (of which more some future Sunday) creates passages through the rock that allow the gas to flow to the well in larger volumes, and makes the well potentially economically viable it has put artificial connections into the rock. Part of the old definition of reserves was that the oil/gas already had the connections in place in the rock to ensure that the fluid could flow to the well if it was drilled. Further the presence of oil had to be proved by drilling a well into the rock and actually showing that it was there. Thus the term “proved oil and gas reserves.”

To recognize that there are more sophisticated tools that can now tell much more about the presence of oil/gas in a rock without needing to drill that proving well, the SEC have changed the rules to read:
The proposed revisions to the definition of “proved oil and gas reserves” also included provisions for establishing levels of lowest known hydrocarbons and highest known oil through reliable technology other than well penetrations. We are adopting those revisions as proposed.

We also are adopting, as proposed, revisions that permit a company to claim proved reserves beyond those development spacing areas that are immediately adjacent to developed spacing areas if the company can establish with reasonable certainty that these reserves are economically producible. These revisions are designed to permit the use of alternative technologies to establish proved reserves in lieu of requiring companies to use specific tests. In addition, they establish a uniform standard of reasonable certainty that applies to all proved reserves, regardless of location or distance from producing wells.
Of course having written such a statement, one has to clarify what is meant by “high degree of certainty” (since there is no longer the physical evidence of oil on the end of the “dipstick”). This they have done by definition:
Therefore, we are adopting the “high degree of confidence” standard that exists in the PRMS. We also are clarifying that having a “high degree of confidence” means that a quantity is “much more likely to be achieved than not, and, as changes due to increased availability of geoscience (geological, geophysical, and geochemical), engineering, and economic data are made to estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) with time, reasonably certain EUR is much more likely to increase or remain constant than to decrease” to provide elaboration to the definition of reasonable certainty.
The other change that I want to highlight comes in the estimation, knowing that an existing site has oil/gas, as to how far out from that point the field can be considered to extend, and this is known as the “undeveloped reserve.” Here the decision is based on the degree of certainty that the field actually extends into that space. And the language has been loosened to make it easier to include those more distant reserves.
In the Proposing Release, we proposed a significantly revised definition of the term “proved undeveloped oil and gas reserves.”

The most significant aspect of the proposed revision was the replacement of the existing “certainty” test for areas beyond one offsetting drilling unit from a productive well with a “reasonable certainty” test. Currently, the definition of the term “proved undeveloped reserves” imposes a “reasonable certainty” standard for reserves in drilling units immediately adjacent to the drilling unit containing a producing well and a “certainty” standard for reserves in drilling units beyond the immediately adjacent drilling units.104 All commenters on this issue supported the proposal. Three commenters noted that a single standard—reasonable certainty—should apply to all proved reserves. We are adopting this aspect of the definition as proposed.

Since the companies no longer have to actually drill into a formation and prove the oil is there the old fashioned way, the big question transfers to the reliability of the technologies that are used to determine that oil is actually present. And here, since technologies continue to change, the words have been generalized
We also proposed to define the term “reliable technology,” expressed in probabilistic terms, as technology that has been proven empirically to lead to correct conclusions in 90% or more of its applications. Several commenters expressed concern that this proposed 90% threshold would be difficult to verify and support on an ongoing basis. We agree that a bright line test would be difficult to apply to a particular technology or mix of technologies to determine their reliability. Therefore, we are not adopting the 90% threshold as part of the definition.

And while changing the rules to include production from tar sands can be readily easily accomplished:
Our current definition of “oil and gas producing activities” explicitly excludes sources of oil and gas from “non-traditional” or “unconventional” sources, that is, sources that involve extraction by means other than “traditional” oil and gas wells. These other sources include bitumen extracted from oil sands, as well as oil and gas extracted from coal and shales, even though some of these resources are sometimes extracted through wells, as opposed to mining and surface processing. However, such sources are increasingly providing energy resources to the world due in part to advancements in extraction and processing technology. Therefore, the rules we adopt today revise the definition of “oil and gas producing activities” to include such activities.

However it does require a definition of bitumen, which they provide
We are defining the term “bitumen” as “petroleum in a solid or semi-solid state in natural deposits. In its natural state, it usually contains sulfur, metals, and other non- hydrocarbons. Bitumen has a viscosity greater than 10,000 centipoise measured at original temperature in the deposit and atmospheric pressure, on a gas free basis.”

And to address the point that I began with about accumulations of gas in unconventional places the regulations will change:
Although we agree conceptually that the focus of reserves disclosure should be on the final product, we also recognize that the production of oil and gas from varying sources can have significantly different economics. Extraction of oil and gas from continuous accumulations can be much more labor and resource intensive than extraction of oil and gas from traditional wells. They often require greater ongoing efforts and expense after the initial extraction equipment is in place, making such operations more sensitive to price fluctuations.

We agree with the commenters that disclosure based on the end product sold would provide a more effective basis for distinguishing reserves that disclosure based on the type of accumulation in which the reserves are held. Therefore, we have revised the disclosure to be based on the end product that is sold by the company However, with respect to the end product, new Item 1202 makes a distinction between oil and gas, on the one hand, and synthetic oil and gas, on the other. Synthetic products require processing of the raw resource material, either while it is still in the ground (“in situ”) or after it is extracted, before it can be used as refinery feedstock or as natural gas. Such processes currently include bitumen upgrading as well as coal liquefaction and gasification. However, resources from some continuous accumulations, such as coalbed methane, do not require such processing and therefore are not associated with the same level of ongoing costs once a well has been drilled because the in-ground resource is already oil or gas (in the case of coalbed methane, the in-ground resource is methane, trapped in a coalbed). Thus, coalbed methane would not be considered a synthetic product.

I think it is a fair comment to note that these relaxations of the rules will allow companies to claim significantly larger reserves, than heretofore allowed, although it should be born in mind that it actually won’t change the actual volumes of oil and gas in the ground by one molecule.

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