Showing posts with label natural gas production. Show all posts
Showing posts with label natural gas production. Show all posts

Sunday, August 3, 2014

Tech Talk - fracking tight sand and shales

The recent news that Saudi Arabia has not found natural gas to be as available as it had thought from its shale deposits, and is shifting to exploring for gas in their tight sand formations has not caught a lot of attention. But it is worth considering some of the aspects of this – and hence this post.

The Oil and Gas Journal define tight sands in this way:
The term tight gas sands refers to low-permeability sandstone reservoirs that produce primarily dry natural gas. A tight gas reservoir is one that cannot be produced at economic flow rates or recover economic volumes of gas unless the well is stimulated by a large hydraulic fracture treatment and/or produced using horizontal wellbores. . . . . . . . . Tight sands produce about 6 tcf of gas per year in the United States, about 25% of the total gas produced.
The production of natural gas from tight sands is different to that from shale sources, for, as the Canadian Center for Energy notes:
Initial production rates are low; however, productivity is long lived.
To understand why this is, and why this differentiates from shale production requires a little bit of an explanation.

Back in the time that the plants were growing that went on, over time, to produce the oil and natural gas we now extract, the surrounding ground was typically soil, with intrusions of sand as the tides and rivers shifted. As succeeding layers of ground covered these layers, so the soil turned into shale and the sands into sandstone. Sand particles tend to be more round, and so as the particles packed together the gaps between the grains provided space for the oil and gas to collect. Clay particles, that went on to form the shales, on the other hand are flatter and pack together more tightly. Further, while the sand formed continuous layers of material, with relatively few cracks, the shale, on the other hand cracked as it was compressed, dried and was squeezed – simplistically in the same way as the lake beds crack when they are exposed to the sun after a drought has driven off all the water.

The result of this is that the fine sands that formed into the tight sands have relatively low permeability – fluids within them find it difficult to get through the very narrow passages and driving pressures have to be high to overcome the frictional forces along these passages. At the same time, because there are relatively few natural fractures in the rock, artificial cracks have to be driven through the rocks, in order to provide enough large passage ways for the gas to escape. It still flows relatively slowly through the rock around these cracks before it reaches them, and this is why the production is relatively low, but continues over time.

On the other hand the shale structure holds much of the oil/natural gas in a different way. Firstly there are the natural fractures within the rock, which tend to run into one another, and which hold much of the fluid that is released early in the production of these formations. Secondly the rock immediately around the fractures has been itself fractured somewhat during the formation of the layer, and has a higher porosity (i.e. holds more fluid) and permeability than the central segments of each of the larger pieces.

To simplify the situation therefore, prior to hydro-fracking the natural gas in a tight sand is permeated relatively evenly throughout the rock (given the variety of the conditions that control rock structure over even relatively short distances). On the other hand the natural gas in a shale is preferentially concentrated in the natural fractures and the rock adjacent thereto.

So now a horizontal well is drilled along the rock, and, at intervals pressurized to drive fractures into the surrounding formation. The rock structural differences mean that the sandstone and the shale will respond differently. And a slight qualification at the beginning of the explanation, because of the length of the feed lines to the injection point where the fracture will start, the pressure rises relatively slowly on the rock, rather than with the sharp pressure spike from an explosive blast, which produces multiple fractures. (The use of a small shaped charge to induce the fracture by driving a small hole into the rock, will similarly only produce a single fracture extending out from the well bore for each charge).

Contrary to the pictures that are shown by oil and natural gas companies on how fracking cracks grow out into the rock, the cracks will not branch out under their own normal development. Crack splitting only occurs at relatively high energy transfer rates, when the crack speed reaches the maximum, and the crack has to bifurcate to absorb the input energy, those conditions normally will not exist at any distance from the wellbore.

What happens in the case of the shale formations is that the pressure opens the natural fractures in the rock and as these link together the pressure can open them over a significant volume of the rock, giving the equivalent spread of fractures away from the wellbore as the initial pressurized joints intersect others as the sand and fracking fluid migrate along the joints into the rock. Opening up these passages and giving access to the relatively higher porosity rock along their edges allows a relatively high rate of flow for the initial volume of natural gas which is found in these zones. But as they deplete, and the natural gas has to travel from the more central part of the shale blocks, so there is the dramatic drop in production which has been remarked by many (around 65% drop within the first year in some cases). Production continues to fall as the more easily produced volumes drain through the intersected fractures, and the residual production falls to a slight fraction of its initial value.

In contrast, the tight sand formation will flow in a different manner. Because of the low number of natural fractures and the lack of permeability changes along the joints, much of the channeling through the rock has to be put in place by the fracking process itself. Because there is much less collection of fluids into natural fractures (though there is still some) the initial production rates are not as high as they are from the shale formations, since the overall induced fracture density and dispersed penetration is not as pervasive. On the other hand once the fractures are in place, although permeability is low, if the formation does initially produce at an acceptable rate, it is more likely that the well will continue to flow with a lower, but steadier flow, than the shale well, and for a considerably longer time.

Thus the news that Saudi Arabia is now moving to try and develop their tight sand fields suggests that they will need to carry out much more extensive development in order to get the initial volumes of natural gas that they will need, but that once these wells are producing, that they will last longer than they would in the shale fields.

Read more!

Friday, June 6, 2014

Tech Talk - what the EPA Plan neglects

One of the problems, I suspect, with predictions of future energy use and production is that physical reality can become entangled in the politics of the day. Thus news that tends to negate the optimistic views of future American oil and natural gas production is subsumed by the need to keep the level of those predictions hecause of other political needs.

President Obama has now announced his decisions on a new incentive to combat his perception of the future as it sits threatened by the increased carbon dioxide produced by the burning of fossil fuels, particularly coal. As announced by the EPA, the Clean Power Plan “will maintain an affordable, reliable energy system, while cutting pollution and protecting our health and environment.”

The proposed rule has the intent of lowering carbon dioxide emissions by 30% from the levels of 2005, by 2030. As with many energy-related plans this one will take some time to implement, particularly since individual states have some input to the final program that will be put in place. More to the point, it will influence the thinking of power generators and legislators over the next few years.

Beyond the actual implementation, the real impact will be in the planning departments of the utility companies around the country. There is at least an even chance that, at some time in the future, these will become the regulations that must be followed, and as future power plant construction is planned, so the options that will be considered will now be changed to accommodate these likely regulations.

Realistically the closure of coal-fired plants will likely be followed by the construction of more natural gas plants, since the overall electrical energy needs of the country are unlikely to fall significantly. In the short term this is unlikely to be a problem. However as one moves into the intermediate term (say more than 5 years out) the old plants will have gone, and the country will become increasingly dependent on natural gas, in the same way as Europe is at present. As the old coal plants are demolished, they, and the coal mines that supply them, cannot be resurrected within a five-year period given the amount of permitting, financing and overall planning that is now required for such construction.

Natural gas has advantages over coal, in that it can be supplied by pipeline that makes it less susceptible to weather. But by the same token it is rarely stored on site, but metered along the pipeline as demand rises and falls. As history has shown, this can lead to critical shortages when, at times of high demand, the pipeline cannot keep up with demand.

At present the likelihood of problems seems remote, wells continue to be sunk and production in increasing in fields around the country. But if one goes beyond the picture that is projected as reassurance to those concerned for energy supply in the future the numbers revealed are not that comforting.


Figure 1. The changing picture of natural gas demand (EIA)

One begins with the prediction that the US has about 100 years of natural gas supply with a total extractable volume in reserves and resources of over 2,718 Tcf. It is a reassuring number but, as with the total volumes of either oil or coal in the ground, it does not really give that much information on what will be available as demand continues to rise.

Consider that, increasingly, the volumes of natural gas that are being sought are in shales, where the well must turn and drill along the shale horizon, before being fracked to produce gas and oil within the rock.


Figure 2. Number of rigs defined by type of well (Baker Hughes via EIA and Penn Energy)

The increasing dominance of horizontal well completions brings with it a considerable increase in well costs. You can see this as the technique became of increasing importance after 2005.


Figure 3. Change in the average cost of natural gas wells (EIA )

Well construction prices have continued to rise since that time, with numbers now running up to and beyond $10 million. The rising costs makes it harder to achieve a reasonable return on that investment, particularly as there has been no great increase in the overall price of natural gas to reflect its increased popularity, in large part because of the rush to drill and produce the known reserves.


Figure 4. Recent changes in natural gas prices (EIA )

As a result the number of rigs working in the natural gas fields has fallen, to the lowest levels of the recent past.


Figure 5. Change in the natural gas rig count over the past year. (Baker Hughes )

If you can’t make a profit on the merchandise, then after a while you stop trying to produce it. Despite the optimism that leads folk to anticipate large volumes of low-priced natural gas being able to sustain us into the foreseeable future if the companies cannot make a profit, after a while they stop. Which means that prices will go up, re-opening the cycle, but on a higher step. In time this will bring natural gas prices back up to around $8.00 per tcf, which will make the industry more comfortable.

What it will not do, however, will be to favorably impact the economics of the electricity business, where doubling the cost of fuel has a quite negative effect on prices and overall economics. But concerns over the rising price to be paid has had little impact yet on political decisions on energy in Europe, and one has to presume that a similar blindness to energy price consequences will also prevail in the United States. After all there is lots of natural gas around, it just has to be perceived as remaining a cheap fuel to validate the political plans . . .right ??!!

Read more!

Thursday, July 25, 2013

OGPSS - Of Egyptian Bread and Oil

The turmoil in the Middle East shows little sign of ending in the near future, and the potential lack of enough cheap fuel for the population is a warning that the levels of unrest may continue and even get worse. There is, however, some hope for enough local supply in the near term to help with some of the indigenous problems. Consider, for example, Egypt which has the largest population of the countries in its immediate vicinity, a population that has grown 200% in the last 50 years.


Figure 1. Growth in Egyptian population (Trading Economics )

By last December Egypt was populated by some 83.66 million folk, with little sign of change in the growth rate. Over that time, energy demand has grown, while domestic supplies of fuel have not kept up. The most significant change, perhaps, is in oil consumption, with recent data, as previously noted, showing that the country has now switched to one that must import oil to meet demand.


Figure 2. Egyptian oil statistics (Energy Export Databrowser )

The EIA puts consumption at 811 kbd, set against a production of 555 kbd of petroleum products and, for natural gas, the country produced 2.1 bcf , which can be set against a consumption of 1.8 bcf, but the balance there also is trending downwards as recent levels of discovery and development have failed to match the increase in domestic demand.


Figure 3. Trends in Egyptian natural gas statistics (Energy Export Databrowser)

The developing need for oil imports is made more difficult by the subsidies that have become an accepted part of the Egyptian economy, including not only fuel, but also bread. Fuel subsidies are reported to be at around $17.4 billion and about a fifth of total state spending. Bread subsidies though a similarly critical part of picture, run only at about 20% of the fuel cost. To help manage costs and encourage domestic production, the Morsi government had cut back on foreign purchases of wheat, but this has now been reversed with the take-over even as the new government works to transition away from the subsidy burden. With the change, foreign governments are now also more willing to provide fuel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will send around a million barrels of oil this month, and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are promising more aid packages.

This may help with the short–term problem, which has too many political entanglements to allow any solid predictions for longer term help from outside the country, but there are potential sources of increasing domestic supplies from both the Western Desert and the Nile Delta itself.

Egypt has been supplying natural gas to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel through the Arab Gas Pipeline with flow starting in Arish, and the leg to Ashkelon being underwater.


Figure 4. Route of the Arab Gas Pipeline with projected extensions. (hydrocarbons technology)

Because of the connection to Israel the pipeline has been the subject of a number of terrorist attacks (the latest a couple of weeks ago) . However these more often affect the flow of gas to Jordan, rather than to Israel, because of the pipeline locations, with the pipeline being vulnerable in the Sinai where it is flowing south to Taba. This problem has led Jordan to consider importing natural gas from Israel and the recently found offshore natural gas deposits being developed in that country. Flow from the Tamar field started on March 30th tapping into the estimated 8 Tcf therein, while flow from Leviathan is anticipated in 2016.

The possible presence of oil-bearing strata at a lower depth in the Levant Basin has led Noble to plan an offshore well to go down 31,200 ft to a potential field holding perhaps as much as 1.8 billion barrels of oil. However Noble estimates the chance of success at 25%.

The recent success in finding these resources within the Levant Basin suggests that the potential for other discoveries in future years, with significant possible impacts on the local economies.


Figure 5. Location of some of the discoveries and developments in the Levant Basin (USGS)

The problems limiting future exploration in the region tie in with the conflicts and internal disruption that seems to spread to most of the countries in the above map. But in the more immediate short term Egypt is reducing exports in order to meet the growth in domestic demand, while importing natural gas, currently as a gift, from Qatar.

In the longer term, as the Israeli fields come on line, it might be possible to change the direction of flow of the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline to carry Israeli gas into Egypt. There are thus potential technical solutions to getting fuel to Egypt to meet their growing need.

However this does not address the underlying problem of how Egypt is going to be able to pay for that fuel (not to mention the bread). Even with a potential glut in global natural gas prices, without a stable economy Egypt is not going to be able to pay its import bill. This was evident towards the end of the Morsi government, when a lack of cash, or hard credit made it more difficult for the country to assure itself of enough imported oil to meet demand. The continued turmoil will keep away the tourists that could provide the economy with enough funds, while the lack of international recognition of the current regime is currently keeping the IMF from providing any help.

A couple of hundred years ago deriding the people’s need for bread reputedly led one ruling family to the guillotine. In the time since the people have also come to expect that they can also get fuel. Until both demands are satisfied it may be more likely than not that rule in Egypt will remain unstable, with the presence and influence of the competing mobs making rational decisions less achievable and the situation worse. (And they are also blowing up pipelines in Iraq.)

Read more!

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

OGPSS - The BP look into the future

So I suspect I should apologize. Here I am talking about the future projections for energy production that have been made by companies such as ExxonMobil and Shell, as though they were still the key and only players in the world. Yet, in reality, Saudi Aramco (12.5 mbdoe); Gazprom (9.7 mbdoe) and National Iranian Oil (6.4 mbdoe); appear in the list before ExxonMobil arrives (at 5.3 mbdoe), and then there is PetroChina (at 4.4 mbdoe) before BP arrives (at 4.1 mbdoe) and it is only then that we find Shell, which lies 7th at 3.9 mbdoe.

So the projections of the ExxonMobil’s of the world are of somewhat lesser value than they might, at one time, have been. (For those curious the list continues with Pemex (at 3.6 mbdoe); Chevron (at 3.5 mbdoe) and Kuwait Petroleum Co (3.2 mbdoe). This not only rounds out the top ten, it also closes out the list of those producing more than 3 mbdoe. (Abu Dhabi comes next at 2.9 mbdoe).

Yet, with those caveats, and recognizing that Saudi Arabia now produces only slightly less than ExxonMobil, Shell and BP combined, let me review the BP forecast, having already completed that for ExxonMobil and Shell. And while the latter two looked sufficiently far into the future as to obfuscate a little their shorter-term projections, BP is still focusing on the relatively short-term that runs to 2030.

Within that time frame BP expects overall energy demand to grow by 36%, though, as with the ExxonMobil projection, BP expects that a “tremendous increase” in energy efficiency will continue to develop, thereby slowing the need for future resources. They point out that, without this improvement in efficiency, global energy supply will need to double by 2030 in order to sustain economic growth.

This is particularly true for the United States, which BP sees approaching self-sufficiency in Energy, while it is the continued growth in demand from countries such as China and India and the Asian Pacific countries that provide most of additional need. Comparing their view from 2 years ago with the present there does not appear to be much change in the overall forecast. (Note that after the first two figures all the remainder come from the 2030 BP Energy Outlook).


Figure 1. Comparison of BP data and projections for population growth between their 2011 report (left) and that for 2013 (right)


Figure 2. Comparison of current and anticipated energy demand through 2030, from 2011 (left) and 2013 (right) BP reports.

There is a small increase in the overall demand from non-OECD countries in the more recent projection, but not a great difference. But this increase in demand reduces from a growth averaging 2.1% in the 2010-2020 time frame, to a growth of 1.3% in the following decade.

Within the period to 2030 BP anticipates that all major energy sources will continue to see an increase in overall energy production.
The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels) with growth averaging 7.6% p.a. 2011-30. Nuclear (2.6% p.a.) and hydro (2.0% p.a.) both grow faster than total energy. Among fossil fuels, gas grows the fastest (2.0% p.a.), followed by coal (1.2% p.a.), and oil (0.8% p.a.).

Figure 3. Growth in different energy sources through 2030

However, there is a change in the ranking of the different fossil fuels from the earlier projection. For while, two years ago, BP were projecting that coal, oil and natural gas would virtually tie in terms of market share by 2030, coal is now given a more dominant role, with natural gas falling below oil.


Figure 4. Change in market share for the different energy sources.

Coal is, within this time frame, not really bounded by available supply, though BP anticipate that more will be produced indigenously in the Asian Pacific than at present. Partly one assumes that this is necessary for financial reasons, although it will also be a need-based growth as the countries increasingly need electric power.

In terms of natural gas and oil supply questions are more urgent, and BP provide the following answer.


Figure 5. BP anticipated sources for the anticipated growth in demand for energy.

By far the largest production from the tight oil and gas shales will come from North America, where the current growth in production is anticipated to continue.


Figure 6. Anticipated production of tight oil and shale gas by region in 2030

One of the drivers that BP see, in the fall in oil demand, comes from its continued high price. This has already significantly lowered the use of oil as a power generating fuel, and the continued high price will drive the move to vehicles of increasingly greater efficiency. Thus, although global liquid fuel demand will continue to grow, it will only be at the rate of 0.8% pa, reaching 104 mbd by 2030. The sources to meet this are various:


Figure 7. Liquid fuel supplies through 2030

With the conventional supply of crude from non-OPEC countries diminishing, OPEC crude levels can be seen to increase over the next seventeen years, while the major increase in production from tight oils is anticipated to come from North America. In 2030 it will provide 9% of overall demand, providing almost half of the 16.1 mbd of overall increase in production. The increase will, however, slow post 2020, as the costs of production and the limits of the resource base. BP make the following prediction:
The US will likely surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2013 as the largest liquids producer in the world (crude and biofuels) due to tight oil and biofuels growth, but also due to expected OPEC production cuts. Russia will likely pass Saudi Arabia for the second slot in 2013 and hold that until 2023. Saudi Arabia regains the top oil producer slot by 2027.
Other than tight oil, BP anticipates some increase in biofuel production, and from the oil sands, with significant increase in Iraqi production, and some gain from the remaining OPEC countries (one suspects Venezuela is included here) and from NGL production.
The largest increments of non-OPEC supply will come from the US (4.5 Mb/d), Canada (2.9 Mb/d), and Brazil (2.7 Mb/d), which offset declines in mature provinces such as Mexico and the North Sea. The largest increments of new OPEC supply will come from NGLs (2.5 Mb/d) and crude oil in Iraq (2.8 Mb/d).
In this regard BP believes that currently OPEC has a spare capacity of around 6 mbd, but will continue to cut production to sustain prices over the decade.

BP see roughly a 7% p.a. increase in shale gas production with most coming from the United States, Mexico and Canada. This will bring total natural gas production to 459 bcf/day by 2030. Of this North America will see a growth in production of 5.3% pa and by 2030 will be exporting roughly 8 bcf/d. In other countries the biggest growth will be in more conventional natural gas production, coming from the Middle East (31 bcf/d), Africa (15 bcf/d) and Russia (11 bcf/d).

This increase in supply, and the greater use of LNG tankers is likely to keep natural gas prices relatively stable.

Read more!

Friday, September 28, 2012

OGPSS - An introduction to Iran

The theme of these posts, over the past eighteen months, has been to look at the leading producer nations that provide crude oil to the world, and see whether it is realistic to anticipate significant increases in their production. Posts have now looked at North America, Russia, Saudi Arabia and China based on the original list of rankings produced by the EIA in 2009. And, as I noted before beginning the China posts the interesting question at the moment relates to a) how much oil is Iran currently producing and b) how much, realistically, can it be expected to produce.

These are not questions with the same answer, since the current sanctions that have been imposed on the country have clearly already had an impact on the amount of oil that is being exported from Iran. Nevertheless the volumes produced have fallen below those now achieved by China, and for that reason China was given priority when it came to the order of writing these posts. But back at the beginning of 2011 there was no doubt that Iran was one of the top 5 producers (particularly if one combines the USA and Canada into the new “politically correct” term of North America as a way of dodging questions on long-term US production levels).

If one looks at the latest, September OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) for example, there is now a gap of 1 mbd between the official production claims, which are shown below, and the reports from other sources, which follow.


Figure 1. OPEC production reports, from the originating country (OPEC September MOMR )


Figure 2. OPEC production reports, as provided by secondary sources (OPEC September MOMR )

In passing it should be noted that OPEC is anticipating global oil demand to grow 0.9 mbd in 2012, and 0.8 mbd in 2013. To meet that OPEC anticipates that non-OPEC production gains will be 0.7 mbd in 2012, and 0.9 mbd in 2013, taking some of the pressure away from the OPEC producers. Within OPEC production, the gains from NGL’s are anticipated to further increase by 0.4 mbd in 2012, and 0.2 mbd in 2013. These figures again ease the need for OPEC to show increases in production to meet export demands, at the time that their internal consumption continues to rise.

Iran is thus, by the original criterion, the last of the Big Five to be looked at, although, in light of current production numbers it has clearly fallen into the second tier, and with current production below 3 mbd it joins others (Mexico and Veneuela, for example) who have fallen through from upper second tier into the lower second tier of nations that produce below 3 mbd, though this is likely transient, depending on how long sanctions last and, more critically, are effective.

If there is little likelihood of major increases in production from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China, and that I take some of the optimism over North American production gains with a considerable grain of salt, then global increases in production must come from nations that are now producing below 3 mbd. With that size of an industry it is difficult to anticipate spectacular increases from a single producer. Rather individual country gains (with the exception of Iraq, which could increase production to 4 mbd) will likely only be perhaps on the order of 100 kbd. As a result, if global needs are to be satisfied, there has to be a whole series of overall gains in a multiplicity of countries. For it is only in this way that the total can combine to sustain the optimism of those who see a cornucopia of oil flooding our future through at least the next ten years.

That Iraq has moved into the second tier above 3 mbd this month (by both their own and other counts) makes it a separate point of discussion. But first there is Iran. And with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad giving a more subdued speech before the UN this week as sanctions continue to bite, the role of crude in the Iranian economy may be becoming more evident to their government. Domestic consumption runs at about half of production, but the country needs the income from exports.


Figure 3. Iranian Oil statistics (Energy Export Databrowser )

Euan Mearns illustrated the range of Iranian oil facilities in his post last December prior to the embargo.


Figure 4. Iranian oil and gas fields and infrastructure (Euan Mearns at TOD)

Oil production in Iran has increased since the days in 2005 when, for a while, it appeared that the country had reached a point of declining oil production, and where natural gas injection was being debated as the possible answer. At that time as the debate over Iran “going nuclear” was beginning to build there was already a rationale for the development of nuclear power in the country.

Jump forward seven years and that debate is now at a much more intense level. The Israeli Prime Minister is seriously concerned over the development of nuclear weapons in Iran, as are other countries in the region, and around the world. The relative need for Iran to establish a nuclear-based electricity program, while used as a justification of the program by their government, has been largely neglected in the concern over the potential for weapons development. Sharing the largest gas field in the world (the South Pars: North Field) with Qatar, Iran has a resource that is being used at an increasing rate internally, with slight amounts being imported in the remote northern part of the country, where it is easier to use gas from abroad than to lay the delivery lines in country.


Figure 5. The South Pars: North Field Gas field shared by Iran and Qatar. (petroleum reports via The Encyclopedia of Earth)


Figure 6. Iranian natural gas statistics (statistics (Energy Export Databrowser )

And so, with the above as background, the next couple of posts will look at the Iranian situation in a little more detail.

Read more!

Sunday, February 19, 2012

OGPSS - Russian natural gas production

It has been bitterly cold in parts of Europe over the past few weeks, and this has had an impact on power with Russia seeing the highest demand yet for electricity at 156.96 Gigawatts, while, at the same time, having to reduce the volumes of natural gas that it is supplying to Europe. To put the Russian power level in perspective, while there has been an increase in power generated from natural gas in the United States the capacity to generate more than 1,000 GW. still relies considerably on coal and nuclear power although renewable sources are becoming more prominent.

Sources of Electrical Power in the United States (EIA)

The above plot, however, shows capacity rather than actual contribution, and I am grateful to Gail who took the time to develop a plot of actual use, which shows how the different sources actually contribute. I am putting in both since each addresses a different point in comparison with Russian production.

U.S. Electricity as supplied, by source (Gail Tverberg)

In contrast to the US, in Russia some 56.2% of the electrical energy comes from natural gas, oil produces some 18.3% coal 14.4% nuclear power is 5.3% and hydropower is at 5.6%. This high demand for natural gas, is compounded by the sales which Russia makes to Europe where it provides about 25% of the market supply, down from the 27% levels of a couple of years ago. And Gazprom is marketing its product further to India (through LNG sales) as well as to China, where it will now be in competition with natural gas being piped from Turkmenistan (which used to have Gazprom as its only customer).

Russian natural gas production, consumption and exports (Energy Export Databrowser )

Natural gas is more often supplied on demand, rather than from large storage facilities, and so when local demand in Russia recently rose due to the severe cold spell, there was less available for Europe, and supply fell, for example, by 30% in Italy, though having been that route before, European nations have learned to keep some reserve available for these situations. Gazprom has also seen the need for more storage and now plans on investing some 2-300 million euros to double the volume available in gas reservoirs around Europe. During the peak cold spell Europe was using around 17 bcf per day up 20% from the average demand during 2011.

The problems that Gazprom faces are two-fold, the first is to produce the gas, and then the second is to ensure that the customer has enough available when needed. And at the moment (to address the latter problem first) one of the critical issues is that the gas must pass through Ukraine.

Major routes of gas pipelines feeding Europe from West Siberia (RIANovosti)

Unfortunately Ukraine and Russia have an uncomfortable history in regard to the passage of natural gas through the country, and this year, because of the cold, is no different, with disputes over volumes contracted for and used still continuing. However the Nord Stream pipeline has now completed the first pipeline to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, with the second lacking only one section, which will be installed this year. The twin pipelines will carry the equivalent of 5.3 bcf/day into Lubmin in Northern Germany, with delivery from Portovaya Bay in Russia, already flowing through the first pipeline, starting last November 8th.

Nord Stream pipeline path through the Baltic, showing remaining construction (Nord-Stream )

Landfall operations in Germany (Nord-stream November 2011 newsletter)

On the Russian end of the pipeline, it connects into the Gryazovets-Vyborg pipeline which brings the gas from the producing fields.

The Gryazovets-Vyborg pipeline bringing natural gas from Western Siberia (Gazprom)


The gas that is coming through the pipeline comes from Novy Urengoy in Western Siberia, which is where, at present, some 74% of Russian natural gas is being produced. This is where the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field is located, with current estimated reserves of 21 Tcf of natural gas. The gas is currently coming from some 142 wells spread over an area of 424 sq miles, with the field producing 2.6 bcf a day. It takes 10 days for the gas to make the trip. The gas field came on line in 2007.

Fields feeding into the supply pipeline to Germany (Gazprom)

It should be noted that the pipelines going up into the Yamal Pensinsula are still being developed and the gas fields of that region are not therefore fully available, though drilling is taking place.

Drilling at 70deg00’01.85” N 70deg00’02.05”E (kim46 at Google Earth)

There are a number of fields in the Peninsula, including Bovanenkovo, that are still to be fully developed, and which will provide some of the reserves that Russia will need as their current main producing fields start to run down. There has been some considerable progress, however, since the last time that I tried to find evidence of activity in the field.

It is one of 11 natural gas and 15 oil and gas condensate fields in the Peninsula, with aggregate reserves, for just the three largest fields (Bovanenkovo, Kharasavey and Novoportovskoye) of 208 Tcf of natural gas, 730 million barrels of condensate, and 1.6 billion barrels of oil. At present the first 1.5 bcf/day production is scheduled to begin operation in the 3rd quarter of this year. A railroad is being connected into the region in order to maintain supplies and provide equipment for further construction.

Current Gas flaring at 71deg03’32.30” N 67deg25’23.41 E (DDS7 at Google Earth)

New construction at Bovanenkovo (Gazprom)

With the growing prospects of additional natural gas from Yamal, and with further facilities being built in Europe to allow storage to get through inclement weather, it does appear that Russia will be able to supply Western Europe with natural gas for at least the next 30-years that they are predicting – although should demand rise, (as it well might with the closure of nuclear and coal-fired power stations) then the reserves will be drawn down considerably faster. At present the current storage has only been run down by about 48% of that available according to Gas Infrastructure Europe.

Natural gas stored in the UK (on 19 Feb 2012) (Gas Infrastructure Europe) (as an example).

This is while Russia is still flaring considerable volumes of natural gas that cannot be otherwise used. And while the trend is going down (by about 15%) it still has a way to go. There just aren’t that many folk in Siberia that appreciate the slightly warmer air that is being generated. And while that part of the news is good, the failure to date of the Polish trials to find commercial reserves of natural gas in domestic shale deposits may mean that Gazprom’s market will continue, since the presence of as much as 187 Tcf of natural gas in the Polish shales does not do anyone any good if it cannot be viably recovered.

Global gas flaring volumes (The World Bank)

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Tuesday, February 7, 2012

OGPSS - The oil and natural gas of Sakhalin Island

The EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) for February 2012 included a chart for anticipated changes in production for countries outside OPEC over the next two years.

Changes in liquid fuels production from NON-OPEC nations (EIA ) (Note the change from January moves Mexico past Sudan where over 200 kbd have been shut-in through conflict, and that Russia is showing negative and is towards the back of the pack).

The January STEO commented, in regard to Russian production:
EIA expects Russia's crude oil and liquid fuels production to fall by about 190,000 bbl/d in 2012 and an additional 12,000 bbl/d in 2013. These declines follow production of 10.3 million bbl/d in 2011, a post-Soviet record-high that positioned Russia as the world's top producer. Russia's government introduced tax decreases on some petroleum exports, which seems to have affected total exports in the last quarter of 2011. Additionally, production in the eastern part of the country offset the Western Siberia declines to some extent. EIA expects, however, that absent meaningful tax structure reform, investment will remain scarce, contributing to the projected drop in Russia's production in 2012 and 2013.
Having discussed the production declines in the Western Siberian Basin, and the increasing production from the smaller Eastern Siberian region, it’s time to move further East, as Russian exploration has, to find and discuss the oil and gas resources found around Sakhalin Island. The Island lies just north of Japan and off the Amur River, within the Sea of Okhotsk.

Location of Sakhalin Island (Rational Preparedness)

At the time that we first began writing about the island, back in 2005, it was still being developed and could only produce and ship product for six months a year when the weather allowed. The first phase of development, Sakhalin 1 began production of natural gas in 2005, with oil production being ramped up from the seasonal production at the start in 1996 to 250 kbd by 2010. The major gas production came with Sakhalin 2.

The locations for the fields for Sakhalin 1, and the pipeline to the mainland (Exxon Neftgas Ltd)

At present production from the Chayvo and Odoptu fields are feeding the Chayvo Onshore Processing facility, which can handle up to 250 kbd of oil, and 800 million cu ft of natural gas per day. As Chayvo declines into 2014 then Arkutun-Dagi will be brought on stream to sustain production levels. The oil feeds through the pipeline to an ice-free terminal where it is loaded onto dedicated Aframax tankers each moving 100,000 tons (720 kb) of oil at a time, and with the terminal it is possible to load year-round. A new pipeline is also being installed to carry natural gas to Vladivostok. However it is being run by Gazprom, who have found that it cannot be filled with the natural gas supplied from Sakhalin 2 and Sakhalin 3, and so Gazprom is negotiating with Exxon Neftgas to purchase all the natural gas (which will, in time, include more from Chayvo in Phase 2) that is produced from Sakhalin 1. Exxon, on the other hand, would prefer, because of the profit, to sell the natural gas to China, rather than to domestic Russian consumers, but they are going to be over-ruled. The fields of Sakhalin 1 are considered to have reserves of 2.25 billion barrels of oil and 17 Tcf of natural gas.

Location of the main production and transport facilities for Sakhalin 2 (hydrocarbons-technology)

As with other regions of Russia, the interplay and conflict between the government and their agencies and the Western oil companies brought in to develop the reserves has also been evident over the past few years. By 2006, when development of the total estimated 45 billion barrels of oil and natural gas oil equivalent, was moving into the second phase of production, Shell, who was running this part of the program, ran into an environmental problem. It had actually started with the initial agreement signed back in 1996.:
most observers agree (it) was inherently unfair to Russia - a deal signed in 1996, when oil was $22 a barrel and Russia was on its knees, that gave the Shell-controlled Sakhalin Energy Investment Corp. the right to recoup all its costs plus a 17.5% rate of return before Russia would get a 10% share of the hydrocarbons coming out of the ground.

Then there was the cost of the second phase of the project, which ballooned from $10 billion in 1997 to $20 billion in 2005, fueling a perception that the company was profligate while Russians picked up the tab. The chapters in between include a calamitous safety record, a failure to meet local expectations for new roads and schools, a fuel spill in Sakhalin's third-largest city, and environmental concerns that caused anger and resentment toward Shell's leadership, earning it a reputation for stubbornness and for consistently misreading political realities.
The end result was that while Shell had initially 55% of the shares, with Mitsui and Mitsubishi having 25% and 20% each, Gazprom stepped in to buy, for a total of $7.5 billion, half the shares of each partner so that Sakhalin Energy is now owned by Gazprom (50%) Royal Dutch Shell (27.5%), Mitsui (12.5%) and Mitsubishi Corp (10%).

The LNG terminal, supposed to come on line in 2008, was targeted to supply 156 tankers a year, with the output pre-sold for the next 20-years. The terminal did not come on stream until 2009 when the first 67,000 tons of LNG were shipped to Sodegaura, Japan. Japan is taking some 60% of production, with the remainder initially going to South Korea and the United States. This was followed by shipments to Tohuko in May 2010, and while production still lagged the original delivery volumes, it was increased in 2010 to a total volume of 10 million tons of LNG. Additional volumes are now being shipped to South Korea and the shortfall appears to have been abated. However, such is the demand for LNG in the Pacific that the partners are now considering the addition of a third gas train for another 5 million tons/yr at the terminal in order to meet the increased demand from Japan, following the closure of some nuclear plants following last year’s tsunami. The reserves in the Piltun-Astokhoye and Lunskoye fields (Sakhalin 2) are estimated at 1.3 billion barrels of oil, and 33 Tcf of natural gas.

First LNG shipment to Japan, April 7, 2009 (Japan Times )

There will be additional projects carried out over time, going all the way up to Sakhalin-7, with Gazprom having the largest share of Sakhalin-3. That project contains an estimated 3.3 billion barrels of oil and 25 Tcf of natural gas with the natural gas estimated to come into the pipeline in 2014. (Note that the reserve figures come from the Minister of Investment and Internal Affairs of the Sakhalin Region on Jan 30, 2012).

The phases of Sakhalin Island (EIA)

Even with those phases included, and they reach far into the out years, it is difficult to see much increase being achieved over the 310 kb of production that was achieved in 2009. There will be increases in natural gas production, and this will be of benefit to Japan and South Korea, being a resource that it not that far away, but with a declining crude oil production from Western Siberia it is hard to see how Sakhalin Island production will do much to sustain overall Russian production, let alone increase it.

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Friday, December 16, 2011

The 2012 Exxon Mobil view of the future

Each year the major oil companies publish their projections on fossil fuel supplies as they foresee them developing over future decades. Last year I reviewed those for BP; Exxon Mobil; and the projections from Shell. Exxon Mobil (EM) has just released their new set of projections. With this publication they have also stepped a little further into the future, looking to an end point in 2040, rather than the shorter 2030 time frame of last year’s report.

One of the immediately striking effects of the change in end date is the highlight on the growth of the global population. In last year’s document the global population was expected to reach 7.9 billion by 2030, now the projection is for the population to increase to nearly nine billion by 2040. We are at roughly 7 billion today, and the acceleration in the future growth rate of the population will make it more difficult to improve the average global lifestyle. This is particularly true when the locus of that growth is defined as coming largely from India and Africa.

Anticipated growth in population in various parts of the world (EM Outlook for Energy 2012)

More tellingly EM anticipates that the number of households will increase by 50% over the next 30 years, and with that growth comes the demand for electrical power. EM looks at both industrial and domestic energy demand growth, tying it in with this population growth, and expects that, while OECD GDP will more than double, it will do so with only a small amount of growth in energy demand, with the somewhat smaller growth in GDP in the rest of the world using a considerable amount more of the growth in energy demand that EM foresees. In countries such as China the increased demand for space and energy come as, with greater affluence, families will no longer remain crowded into multi-generational dwellings but will move more to single family occupancy.
(As an update and an illustration how two different folk can view the same document, you might find Gregor's post on the same topic of some interest).

Where the growth in demand will come from (EM Outlook for Energy 2012)

With the rising affluence of the developing countries, EM still continues to see continued improvements in energy efficiency lowering the overall average household demand for energy through the next three decades. It is an argument that I believe requires more justification than they provide. It is interesting, apropos my recent interest in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, that EM do not see much change in the fortunes of those who like around the Caspian Sea. It is perhaps a cynical, but realistic view of where that energy wealth will end up.

Change in domicile, and the energy demand for the average home (EM Outlook for Energy 2012)

The most important part of the Review however, since it deals with energy, is how EM decides where this future energy will come from. They see a large movement towards diesel in the transportation industry as hybrids and electric vehicles reduce gasoline demand, and increased fuel efficiency with lighter vehicles combine to stabilize the overall levels of gasoline required.

Change in the fuel mix needed for transportation.

Overall the amount of oil needed for transportation will continue to increase, overall by about 80%, and when this is combined with other needs, EM sees that global demand for oil will increase, by 2040 to around 110 mbd at a steady rate of increase overall from today, although the way in which the mix is put together is anticipated to change considerably. (And as an aside this projects less than a 1 mbd per year increase in demand, which falls below the levels which others, such as OPEC, foresee. OPEC anticipate a growth in demand of 1.1 mbd in 2012, according to the December MOMR).

Anticipated sources for oil through 2040 (EM Outlook for Energy 2012)

There are many features of interest in this summary chart. Given the decline rates that are now evident in conventional wells around the world, I do not see the discoveries being made that will justify the production levels that EM are predicting. The plot which is included, showing the production history from discoveries of different ages, is telling in this regard.

Production for well discoveries of a certain time (EM Outlook for Energy 2012)

EM notes that modern wells are more likely to be drilled with long laterals, rather than the simple vertical or slightly deviated wells of little more than a decade ago. But these new wells carry with them a much higher decline rate at the end of their lives than do the conventional wells (often more than double). Thus, as production declines from the older wells, so reliance must pass to new-found deposits, and that particular reserve is, as the above graph shows, somewhat thinner than volumes from the past, which are now starting to decline.

The savior of the next decades is foreseen to be the offshore Deepwater deposits, and certainly as one looks along the shores of Africa, South America and the Gulf of Mexico, to name but three, there is a considerable potential for some gain. Whether it will provide the sustained volumes needed to balance other declines and also produce enough to match increased demand is going to be a continuing question. With that in mind it is worth revisiting last year’s review to see where EM expect this Deepwater oil to come from.

Deepwater oil production (EM Outlook for Energy 2011)

As befitting an oil and gas company, perhaps, EM expects that oil production will remain a major part of the energy mix through 2040, with natural gas rising to carry an increasing burden of the overall picture at the expense of coal, and biomass whose shares of the global market are expected to decline starting somewhere about now.

Change in natural gas demand over the next 30 years. (EM Outlook for Energy 2012)

Composition of the fuel mix according to EM over the decades

Even though they project that coal will still be the cheapest fuel to buy and while solar will remain a luxury item, nevertheless EM anticipate that coal’s share of the electricity generating market will fall to less than 30% by 2040, and to less than 20% of the overall energy supply. This remains consistent with their opinions from last year. However they are now projecting a larger role for oil than they expected last year (when it was around 26% of total supply by 2030 and falling).

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