It is perhaps an odd time to be writing about oil shortages. The price of gas in our town has just moved above $2 a gallon up significantly from the $1.64 it was at its recent lowest point, but still very reasonable. Debate still rages as to whether the global price of a barrel of oil has found a bottom, although there are signs that the price is beginning to increase, in part due to other issues than overall availability of crude. So why be concerned?
There are several issues, and perhaps the first is that of industrial inertia. Despite the daily fluctuations in oil price, many of the events that occur between the time that oil is found in a layer of rock underground and the time that some of it is poured into your gas tank take a long time to initiate, and similarly can’t be turned off overnight. It takes, for example, roughly 47 days for a tanker to travel from Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia to Houston.
One response to the drop in oil prices has been to reduce the number of rigs drilling for oil in the United States. Again this is not an immediate response, but rather one that grows with time. This is particularly true with the number of oil rigs that are used to gain access to the oil reservoirs. As the price for this oil falls, so rigs are idled and the potential for additional oil production also declines. This drop is particularly significant in fields that are horizontally drilled and fracked because of the very rapid decline in production with time in existing wells and the need for continued drilling to develop and produce new wells to sustain and grow production. The most recent figures show a fall of 98 rigs in the week from the 6th to the 13th of February, with the overall count now standing at 1,358. This rate of decline has held at nearly 100 rigs a week now for the past three with no indication of any immediate change in the slope of the curve. At the same time the number of well completions in the Bakken is falling, as producers hold back on the costs for producing oil that would be sold at a loss.
The impact from this will take time to appear, North Dakota has reached a production rate of 1.2 mbd in December and the DMR estimates that it will need around 140 rigs to sustain that production level this year, with the most recent rig count being 137. This number is likely to continue to fall through the first six months of the year.
The impact is not just in the immediate loss of production. Rather, once the rigs are idled it will take time, even after the markets recover, for the companies to adjust their planning and finances, and to re-activate the rigs. What this effectively does is to shift the production increment into later years, when the production base from existing wells will have declined beyond current levels. This means that the peak level of production will likely also be lower than would otherwise be the case, and the period over which this peak production is sustained will also be shorter.
The problem that this all presages is that lower levels of production against an increasing world demand will induce a faster rise in price than many now anticipate. There is a complacent feeling that oil prices won’t reach $100 a barrel for some considerable time - perhaps even years. If the current difference between available oil supply and demand is below 2 mbd, Euan Mearns has suggested that roughly half of this might be eaten up by increased demand, while the other half would disappear as production levels drop, although he doesn’t see this bringing the two volumes into rough balance until the end of 2016.
I rather think that it will happen faster than that, and that the price trough will steepen faster than currently anticipated, and likely before the end of this year. The problem (if you want to call it that) with the perceptions of the ability of global production to meet demand is that it is all tied to the production of the United States and Canada. I have noted, over the past two years, how future projections of increasing global oil demand have been met, in models, by increased production from the United States, and that this was anticipated to continue. (Increased production from Iraq, if sustained, is more likely to be needed just to balance declines in production from other countries).
Yet the US industry is going into a relatively rapid decline because of the way that it is structured that is going to be hard to stop, and much slower to reverse than anticipated. (In a way it is similar to the intermittent traffic congestion one finds on roads which result because we brake a lot faster than we then accelerate). This will not only stop the growth in production that is currently anticipated, but will go further and before the end of the year will lead to a drop in overall volumes produced. Yet demand is expected to increase. Where will the supply come from, if not the United States?
While Saudi Arabia can produce more, one gets the sense that they are quite comfortable where they are, thank you and won’t be increasing their contribution, and while Russia may bemoan the price they are getting for their oil, if the price goes up they are not going to be able to meet an increased demand, nor are there likely to be others with spare capacity that they can bring to the table. And because of the inertia in the system the United States will still be in a mode of declining production.
So I rather suspect that what we can anticipate is that prices will start to recover through the summer, and then, as the full impact of the rebalanced situation starts to become evident, will move higher at an increasing rate. Because if, in fact, we are reaching the period of a tighter balance between demand and available supply, then the market will change its perceptions quite quickly and be driven by a totally different metric.
Showing posts with label oil supply. Show all posts
Showing posts with label oil supply. Show all posts
Monday, February 16, 2015
Sunday, August 31, 2014
Global oil supply and Bárðarbunga
Some time ago magma started rising in the rocks near the Bárðarbunga volcano in Iceland, and after weeks of increasingly intensified earthquake activity, the first signs of eruption were found to have occurred under thick ice within the last week. These were not that visible to the general public. That eruption was followed by a second, where there were some streamers of magma across the surface, without causing any significant airborne dust to interfere with aircraft.
The delays in dramatic eruption footage, and the early decay in immediate activity has led a number of folk to anticipate that the risk has declined and for some the risks from the eruption are over, with one scientist commenting::
Figure 1. The eruption at Bárðarbunga (from the first webcam) at 5:40 pm Aug 31.
Figure 2. The eruption at Bárðarbunga (from the second webcam) at 9:00 pm Aug 31.
The eruption is continuing and will likely continue, and potentially significantly worsen, over the next several months. Yet, in the world of instant highlights, headlines and Twitter the risks from the long-term eruption (which can be horrendously severe) are immediately glossed over as the eruption fails the “dramatic event” test.
This is uncomfortably similar to the situation that one sees when writing about “Peak Oil”. One can, on any individual day, find comforting headlines that tend to gloss over the longer-term problem that is being written, in increasingly large letters on the predictive wall of our future. But that does not hide the potential disaster that it presages, it merely conceals it from the general public.
The headlines are those that are short-term, and deal with the drivers for the daily fluctuations in oil price, rarely do they back off to look at the overall threat that the situation may presage. Similarly the eruption in Iceland looks relatively tranquil at the moment, but may be of a similar nature to that of 1783, which created, over a period of months, an absolute disaster in Europe, and may have been one of the contributing causes to the French Revolution. The problem with the oil crisis is that there is no similar history to look back on. (Not that this would matter to those “editors of the moment” who control the daily press).
If one were to step back from concerns over daily price fluctuations for oil and gasoline, and consider the import of the trend in international politics one could very easily be aghast at the situation. Not that one might tell this from the headlines.
Consider that, of the three international leaders in oil production, one – Russia – is currently set on a course that may well lead the rest of us into World War 3. As a consequence is likely to be unable to attract the financing that will allow it to even approach the current levels of oil production that it need to retain current production levels in the years to come.
The second of the three is Saudi Arabia. Glossing over any problems that the Kingdom may run into in the next couple of years with the terrorism that is sweeping though its neighbors, it is a country that has realized that today’s cornucopia is about over, and it must seriously invest in exploration and development. The KSA recognizes that if it is to have a chance at being able to even meet the bills for domestic consumption, let alone export income, as the years move onward, it must find new oil. Again it would seem that global commentators fail to realize that, while KSA is recognizing the problem, any finds of “elephantine fields” would require huge investments of money and time, given that they are now likely to be off-shore and sour (as with Safaniya and Manifa, even if such fields exist, which is very doubtful).
The Kingdom has repeatedly stated that it will not increase its production over current levels, despite the assumption of many commentators that they will have to, if global balance is to be retained between supply and demand. Put bluntly, their analysts have realized that, without new reserves that are currently still to be found, they will be unlikely to be able to meet even current targets without major new field finds. Yes, they have fields that are found and available, but in relative terms they are tiny when set against the current levels of production. (Bearing in mind that a 5% reduction in production per year from existing fields, a level now increasingly found to be overly optimistic, would still cut existing production by 450 kbd).
And so, gentle readers, as we have so often in the past, we return to prognostications of future American production. This should, realistically, be focused on the production from the USA, since that in Canada is tied to production from the oil sands and that is only likely to change at a slow (one might suggest geological, but that would be a little harsh) time frame.
And in the United States hope continues to focus on an assumed linear increase in production, month on month, from the Bakken and Eagle Ford Shales. That this is denied by even the local authorities (who also note that the Bakken is named after a local farming family). Their current estimate (assuming more than 200 drilling rigs, and there are currently only 192 is that the fields will peak in 2017, and will start to decline in around 2026. The problem with that estimate relates both to the number of rigs employed (which have to be higher) and the quality of the remaining reserve (which is highly unlikely to be of equivalent value to that which is now, or has been, developed in the past.
I would venture into the second tier producers, but they include those that lie in the MENA (such as Iraq and Libya) and are in even worse condition than KSA, and yet, as documented here repeatedly, these states seem increasingly unlikely to meet projections and thus are an ongoing and significant threat to a balance between global production and demand.
The global economy, and particularly the economies of the Western countries, are tied to a cheap source of energy and power – on which their industrial clout is based. Remove that underpinning, and the writing is clear on the wall about this, and current levels cannot be sustained.
But, as with the wish of the press to get “beyond” the “yesterday’s story" of Bárðarbunga, so the reality of the energy situation is unlikely to be recognized until, as with the Iceland volcano. its effects become too evident to ignore.
The delays in dramatic eruption footage, and the early decay in immediate activity has led a number of folk to anticipate that the risk has declined and for some the risks from the eruption are over, with one scientist commenting::
"If this eruption persists it could become a tourist attraction, as it will be relatively safe to approach, although the area is remote,"
Figure 1. The eruption at Bárðarbunga (from the first webcam) at 5:40 pm Aug 31.
Figure 2. The eruption at Bárðarbunga (from the second webcam) at 9:00 pm Aug 31.
The eruption is continuing and will likely continue, and potentially significantly worsen, over the next several months. Yet, in the world of instant highlights, headlines and Twitter the risks from the long-term eruption (which can be horrendously severe) are immediately glossed over as the eruption fails the “dramatic event” test.
This is uncomfortably similar to the situation that one sees when writing about “Peak Oil”. One can, on any individual day, find comforting headlines that tend to gloss over the longer-term problem that is being written, in increasingly large letters on the predictive wall of our future. But that does not hide the potential disaster that it presages, it merely conceals it from the general public.
The headlines are those that are short-term, and deal with the drivers for the daily fluctuations in oil price, rarely do they back off to look at the overall threat that the situation may presage. Similarly the eruption in Iceland looks relatively tranquil at the moment, but may be of a similar nature to that of 1783, which created, over a period of months, an absolute disaster in Europe, and may have been one of the contributing causes to the French Revolution. The problem with the oil crisis is that there is no similar history to look back on. (Not that this would matter to those “editors of the moment” who control the daily press).
If one were to step back from concerns over daily price fluctuations for oil and gasoline, and consider the import of the trend in international politics one could very easily be aghast at the situation. Not that one might tell this from the headlines.
Consider that, of the three international leaders in oil production, one – Russia – is currently set on a course that may well lead the rest of us into World War 3. As a consequence is likely to be unable to attract the financing that will allow it to even approach the current levels of oil production that it need to retain current production levels in the years to come.
The second of the three is Saudi Arabia. Glossing over any problems that the Kingdom may run into in the next couple of years with the terrorism that is sweeping though its neighbors, it is a country that has realized that today’s cornucopia is about over, and it must seriously invest in exploration and development. The KSA recognizes that if it is to have a chance at being able to even meet the bills for domestic consumption, let alone export income, as the years move onward, it must find new oil. Again it would seem that global commentators fail to realize that, while KSA is recognizing the problem, any finds of “elephantine fields” would require huge investments of money and time, given that they are now likely to be off-shore and sour (as with Safaniya and Manifa, even if such fields exist, which is very doubtful).
The Kingdom has repeatedly stated that it will not increase its production over current levels, despite the assumption of many commentators that they will have to, if global balance is to be retained between supply and demand. Put bluntly, their analysts have realized that, without new reserves that are currently still to be found, they will be unlikely to be able to meet even current targets without major new field finds. Yes, they have fields that are found and available, but in relative terms they are tiny when set against the current levels of production. (Bearing in mind that a 5% reduction in production per year from existing fields, a level now increasingly found to be overly optimistic, would still cut existing production by 450 kbd).
And so, gentle readers, as we have so often in the past, we return to prognostications of future American production. This should, realistically, be focused on the production from the USA, since that in Canada is tied to production from the oil sands and that is only likely to change at a slow (one might suggest geological, but that would be a little harsh) time frame.
And in the United States hope continues to focus on an assumed linear increase in production, month on month, from the Bakken and Eagle Ford Shales. That this is denied by even the local authorities (who also note that the Bakken is named after a local farming family). Their current estimate (assuming more than 200 drilling rigs, and there are currently only 192 is that the fields will peak in 2017, and will start to decline in around 2026. The problem with that estimate relates both to the number of rigs employed (which have to be higher) and the quality of the remaining reserve (which is highly unlikely to be of equivalent value to that which is now, or has been, developed in the past.
I would venture into the second tier producers, but they include those that lie in the MENA (such as Iraq and Libya) and are in even worse condition than KSA, and yet, as documented here repeatedly, these states seem increasingly unlikely to meet projections and thus are an ongoing and significant threat to a balance between global production and demand.
The global economy, and particularly the economies of the Western countries, are tied to a cheap source of energy and power – on which their industrial clout is based. Remove that underpinning, and the writing is clear on the wall about this, and current levels cannot be sustained.
But, as with the wish of the press to get “beyond” the “yesterday’s story" of Bárðarbunga, so the reality of the energy situation is unlikely to be recognized until, as with the Iceland volcano. its effects become too evident to ignore.
Read more!
Friday, March 22, 2013
OGPSS - The EXXonMobil future - a review
It is the time of year when the major oil companies issue their predictions for the future, and h/t Art Berman, ExxonMobil just released their view of the world, looking forward to 2040. And this is downloadable. If I remember correctly, I first viewed their future projections back in 2011, and with a 2-year step it might be more interesting to see how differences in their world view have evolved in that period.
By 2040 EM anticipates that the global population will be approaching 9 billion, up by around 25% from current numbers. Of that nearly 2 billion additional folk most are expected to be born in the developing countries such as India and in Africa, with the former gaining 300 million and the latter 800 million. Because the majority of the growth occurs in these countries, and the improvement in living standards and working conditions are more energy intensive, (whether air conditioning or iPhones) from a lower base and demand growth is concentrated more in electrical energy demand than that of transportation fuels.
EM continues to believe that, while the economies of the OECD nations will contribute significantly to global growth, with economic output increasing by 80% over the 27-year period, energy demand will remain stable. Growth in demand for power will come from the rest of the world, powering an average 2.8% growth in the global economy over that interval.
Perhaps the greatest change has been in the amount of energy that the company anticipates will not now be needed in that future, as improving energy efficiency cuts back the amount that must be supplied. If we look at the energy projections through 2030 that were made by BP and EM back in 2011, the total growth was expected to continue in an almost linear mode through 2030.
Figure 1. Projections of growth from BP and EM in 2011, looking to 2030.
If one now looks at the shape (the units differ) of the new EM curve there is a dramatic emphasis on a continued improvement in energy efficiency particularly as we get further into the out years. (Note the remaining illustrations all come from the EM document “The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040”).
Figure 2. Current EM projections for global energy demand in the years to 2040.
The report breaks down the growth in demand into several sectors. And this, at first, is a little irritating. The reason is that, in describing, for example, the growth in residential/commercial energy demand, the track-back on the power sources stops at the point where electric current comes out of the wall. Given that it is the growth in electricity consumption, projected to grow overall by 85%, that is the greatest contributor over the period this is a little disingenuous. Now it is true that there is a whole section devoted to electricity generation, but the lack of the source fuel portrays a little bit of sleight of hand.
Figure 3. Projected residential/commercial energy growth through 2040, by power source.
There is a similar restriction in source categories for the suppliers of industrial power:
Figure 4. Projected residential/commercial energy growth through 2040, by power source.
However, as recognized, the document does have a chapter that deals with the generation of electrical power. EM anticipate that coal will continue to gain market until 2025, but from that point forward, its share will decline as the main competitors, renewables, nuclear and natural gas take an increasing part of the supply.
Figure 5. Change in the source of electrical power and its growth.
Figure 6. The breakdown of electric power fuel sources between OECD and non-OECD countries
One of the reasons for the change, particularly the change to natural gas from coal, comes with the increasing burden of carbon costs, as EM projects.
Figure 7. Anticipated fuel source costs for electricity in 2030.
The low price that is anticipated to continue for natural gas makes it therefore the growth fuel, as figure 5 suggests. When this is combined with the anticipated changes in liquid fuels for transportation, which will see a 40% growth overall, with heavy duty transportation showing the greatest growth, investors in oil and natural gas should be reassured. Cars are expected to achieve an average performance of 47 mpg, which is achieved with the anticipated mix being:
Figure 8. The anticipated growth in automobile performance through the years
Nevertheless the increasing growth of personal transportation in the developing countries is expected to continue to increase demand for oil. With the growth in power generation from natural gas, the two combine to paint a glowing picture of the future of the hydrocarbon industry.
EM project that overall the demand for liquid fuels will rise to 113 million barrels of oil equivalent (mboe) per day by 2040, a 30% growth over 2010 with most of the demand remaining with the transportation needs. The company seems comfortable with industry being able to achieve that level of supply, although the mix will change considerably from that which currently prevails.
Figure 9. Change in the liquid fuel sources that are anticipated over the coming years.
And it is here that I fear that the report becomes overly optimistic. By looking at the relative size of the remaining resource, relative to the production achieved to date, EM foresee no problem in providing the supply targets that are shown in the above figure. EM expect that technical innovation will continue to dramatically improve production from the United States and North America in total. Supply growth is anticipated from tight oil in places such as the Bakken, Deepwater from the Gulf and the tar sands. They project that these will combine to lift North American total liquids production by another 40%. When the production from the offshore Brazilian fields and the heavy oil sands of Venezuela are added, then this reinforces the view that they hold of an achievable target.
Figure 10. Growth in supply of liquid fuels in North America
Yet it is in the Middle East, a region they hardly discuss, that they see the largest growth.
Figure 11. Sources of future growth in liquid fuel supply.
EM don’t actually say where that great growth is likely to come from, but it is very likely heavily weighted towards the most optimistic of estimates for the future production of Iraq, with the ongoing turmoil of the “Arab Spring” being totally discounted.
Well it makes a nice pipe dream, as, I’m afraid, is their anticipation that industry will be able to produce and distribute the target volumes of natural gas that they anticipate will come to save us all from the increasingly higher costs of power. Dare one gently cough and mutter "decline rates"?
If I can put it another way. At the beginning of the report, after projecting a reasonable estimate of global growth over the next 25 years, EM put in a very optimistic level of improvement in energy efficiency in order to significantly lower energy demand. Then, to balance supply to that lower level of demand, they seem to have picked the most optimistic of assumptions about potential growths in that supply. I rather suspect that they are seeing the writing on the wall, but obfuscating it with optimism beyond the bounds of realistic expectation.
By 2040 EM anticipates that the global population will be approaching 9 billion, up by around 25% from current numbers. Of that nearly 2 billion additional folk most are expected to be born in the developing countries such as India and in Africa, with the former gaining 300 million and the latter 800 million. Because the majority of the growth occurs in these countries, and the improvement in living standards and working conditions are more energy intensive, (whether air conditioning or iPhones) from a lower base and demand growth is concentrated more in electrical energy demand than that of transportation fuels.
EM continues to believe that, while the economies of the OECD nations will contribute significantly to global growth, with economic output increasing by 80% over the 27-year period, energy demand will remain stable. Growth in demand for power will come from the rest of the world, powering an average 2.8% growth in the global economy over that interval.
Perhaps the greatest change has been in the amount of energy that the company anticipates will not now be needed in that future, as improving energy efficiency cuts back the amount that must be supplied. If we look at the energy projections through 2030 that were made by BP and EM back in 2011, the total growth was expected to continue in an almost linear mode through 2030.
Figure 1. Projections of growth from BP and EM in 2011, looking to 2030.
If one now looks at the shape (the units differ) of the new EM curve there is a dramatic emphasis on a continued improvement in energy efficiency particularly as we get further into the out years. (Note the remaining illustrations all come from the EM document “The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040”).
Figure 2. Current EM projections for global energy demand in the years to 2040.
The report breaks down the growth in demand into several sectors. And this, at first, is a little irritating. The reason is that, in describing, for example, the growth in residential/commercial energy demand, the track-back on the power sources stops at the point where electric current comes out of the wall. Given that it is the growth in electricity consumption, projected to grow overall by 85%, that is the greatest contributor over the period this is a little disingenuous. Now it is true that there is a whole section devoted to electricity generation, but the lack of the source fuel portrays a little bit of sleight of hand.
Figure 3. Projected residential/commercial energy growth through 2040, by power source.
There is a similar restriction in source categories for the suppliers of industrial power:
Figure 4. Projected residential/commercial energy growth through 2040, by power source.
However, as recognized, the document does have a chapter that deals with the generation of electrical power. EM anticipate that coal will continue to gain market until 2025, but from that point forward, its share will decline as the main competitors, renewables, nuclear and natural gas take an increasing part of the supply.
Figure 5. Change in the source of electrical power and its growth.
Figure 6. The breakdown of electric power fuel sources between OECD and non-OECD countries
One of the reasons for the change, particularly the change to natural gas from coal, comes with the increasing burden of carbon costs, as EM projects.
Figure 7. Anticipated fuel source costs for electricity in 2030.
The low price that is anticipated to continue for natural gas makes it therefore the growth fuel, as figure 5 suggests. When this is combined with the anticipated changes in liquid fuels for transportation, which will see a 40% growth overall, with heavy duty transportation showing the greatest growth, investors in oil and natural gas should be reassured. Cars are expected to achieve an average performance of 47 mpg, which is achieved with the anticipated mix being:
Figure 8. The anticipated growth in automobile performance through the years
Nevertheless the increasing growth of personal transportation in the developing countries is expected to continue to increase demand for oil. With the growth in power generation from natural gas, the two combine to paint a glowing picture of the future of the hydrocarbon industry.
EM project that overall the demand for liquid fuels will rise to 113 million barrels of oil equivalent (mboe) per day by 2040, a 30% growth over 2010 with most of the demand remaining with the transportation needs. The company seems comfortable with industry being able to achieve that level of supply, although the mix will change considerably from that which currently prevails.
Figure 9. Change in the liquid fuel sources that are anticipated over the coming years.
And it is here that I fear that the report becomes overly optimistic. By looking at the relative size of the remaining resource, relative to the production achieved to date, EM foresee no problem in providing the supply targets that are shown in the above figure. EM expect that technical innovation will continue to dramatically improve production from the United States and North America in total. Supply growth is anticipated from tight oil in places such as the Bakken, Deepwater from the Gulf and the tar sands. They project that these will combine to lift North American total liquids production by another 40%. When the production from the offshore Brazilian fields and the heavy oil sands of Venezuela are added, then this reinforces the view that they hold of an achievable target.
Figure 10. Growth in supply of liquid fuels in North America
Yet it is in the Middle East, a region they hardly discuss, that they see the largest growth.
Figure 11. Sources of future growth in liquid fuel supply.
EM don’t actually say where that great growth is likely to come from, but it is very likely heavily weighted towards the most optimistic of estimates for the future production of Iraq, with the ongoing turmoil of the “Arab Spring” being totally discounted.
Well it makes a nice pipe dream, as, I’m afraid, is their anticipation that industry will be able to produce and distribute the target volumes of natural gas that they anticipate will come to save us all from the increasingly higher costs of power. Dare one gently cough and mutter "decline rates"?
If I can put it another way. At the beginning of the report, after projecting a reasonable estimate of global growth over the next 25 years, EM put in a very optimistic level of improvement in energy efficiency in order to significantly lower energy demand. Then, to balance supply to that lower level of demand, they seem to have picked the most optimistic of assumptions about potential growths in that supply. I rather suspect that they are seeing the writing on the wall, but obfuscating it with optimism beyond the bounds of realistic expectation.
Read more!
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
The "Relief of Nome" video
For those interested there is a 10 minute video of the travel of the ice breaker and tanker through the ice to Nome in order to deliver oil that has been posted on:
The Nome Nugget.
The Nome Nugget.
Read more!
Sunday, December 5, 2010
OGPSS - Some limits to oil fungibility
This is the second in a series I am just starting on oil production and consumption around the world. While it is going to focus more on individual nations and oil fields, over time, there are some general remarks that I want to use to preface the series and this is one of those. (OGPSS – Oil and Gas Production Sunday Series).
One of the first things that I was told when I started looking into whether there was a coming crisis in oil supply was that oil is fungible. What that meant was that if, for the sake of discussion, the Saudi Arabian government cut off oil supply to the West, then the West could turn around and buy an equivalent amount from somewhere else (it turned out to be the North Slope and the North Sea) and the world could continue on its merry way. In fact if you go to Merriam Webster oil is cited as an example of a fungible commodity.
One of the reasons for this is that, with some increasingly rare exceptions, one cannot drive up to an oilwell and fill the tank with the flow out of the ground, and then drive happily off. Crude oil is a mixture of different hydrocarbons. (Morgan Downey explains this is more detail in “Oil 101”, and I will refer to that book a number of times as this series progresses, it sits on my desk.) Hydrocarbons are a combination of hydrogen and carbon atoms in different combinations, but with very approximately, twice as many hydrogen atoms as carbon. As the number of carbon atoms increases one moves from the simple light compounds such as methane (CH4) to the more complex heavier fluids that get down to residual oils ( 29 to 70 carbons) and bitumens (above 70). Because the different components of the oil have different uses, the different fractions of the oil are separated out for individual use at a refinery. The quality of the crude is generally expressed by the API gravity, of which more in a later post.
Typical crude oil fractions
Because the different oilfields of the world produce oil with different combinations of hydrocarbon compounds, and with varying levels of other contaminants, such as, for example, sulfur, it is not always easy to switch the oil supply coming into a refinery from one field to that from another. The EIA has plotted the increase in sulfur content coming into US refineries. As the crude becomes heavier and contains higher sulfur content, so the refining process becomes more complex and expensive.
For many years, for example, the heavy, high sulfur, crudes produced in Venezuela were shipped to refineries in the United States that were designed to refine the oil to the desired products. Other refineries, geared to refining lighter sweeter (i.e. lower sulfur) crudes cannot accept very much of the Venezuelan oil and blend it into their process streams, since even to get to an intermediate crude they would need to include a higher quality (and more expensive) lighter crude in the blend. Thus when there was a strike in Venezuela in 2002, and the world lost 3 mbd of oil production, there was only a limited flexibility in the way that the affected refineries in the United States were able to resolve their supply shortfall. (And in those days it was possible to increase Mexican supply to help out).
Venezuela is one of two countries (Canada being the other) with a significant production of synthetic crude from the heavy oil sands in that country. These are a more extreme case of the need for special refineries, since in both the Canadian and Venezuelan case the heavy oil must first be treated at the site to upgrade it to the quality of a conventional crude, before it can be sent to a conventional refinery. (I briefly discusses that refining in an earlier Tech Talk). This established a secondary limit on how much oil can be produced from those deposits at one time. Some time ago I visited the Oil Sand operations in Alberta, and was there on the day that the new Upgrader facility was shut down because of the escape of some of the gases from the process. I could smell a faint odor of “cat pee”, but nothing near the smells from many other processing plants of varying nature that I have visited over the decades. Nevertheless the new section of the plant was shut down for months until the problem was solved, removing over 100,000 bd from the market.
More recently the difference in price between heavy crude and light has reduced, to the point that the Canadians are no longer going to increase the size of the upgraders in the Fort McMurray area, but will instead be shipping the bitumen to eager customers. This does require some additional technology:
The graph from the EIA highlights another consideration as I move to discuss the global trade in oil. That is the rising consumption within the country, a phenomenon that Jeffrey Brown (Westexas) introduced us to as the Export Land Model back in January 2006, since, with declining production it accelerates the reduction in net exports, as the Venezuelan case now illustrates.
I’ll close today with one last point on the limits of fungibility. There are certain oilfields where the contamination of the crude is such that special refineries are needed to process the oil. The most outstanding of these is the oilfield at Manifa in Saudi Arabia, a subject I have been writing about for over five years. The problem with that production, which was initially slated to be in production next year comes from the need for special refineries to process the oil (an extreme case of the earlier condition I described). The plan was that two refineries would be built in Saudi Arabia to handle the initially 1 mbd of planned production, which by last March had dropped to 900,000 bd. One of these is being built by Total at Jubail, though it is interesting to note that the refinery is now scheduled – in its 400,000 bd capacity – to also receive oil from the more conventional field at Safaniya. It is now anticipated to open in 2013. A second refinery at Yanbu will also take 400,000 bd. Aramco will then build a new refinery at Jazan, with a capacity of 400,000 bd starting in 2013. But until those refineries come on line, unless the Saudi’s and Chinese work out a deal (not beyond the bounds of possibility) that oil will stay in the ground.
The above is intended to show is that there are constraints outside of just having oil in the ground, and a ready customer, that preclude immediate sales and satisfaction. As this series develops I will be highlighting some others.
One of the first things that I was told when I started looking into whether there was a coming crisis in oil supply was that oil is fungible. What that meant was that if, for the sake of discussion, the Saudi Arabian government cut off oil supply to the West, then the West could turn around and buy an equivalent amount from somewhere else (it turned out to be the North Slope and the North Sea) and the world could continue on its merry way. In fact if you go to Merriam Webster oil is cited as an example of a fungible commodity.
being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced by another equal part or quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation:- oil, wheat and lumber are fungible commodities.But that assumption is not totally true, and in the world where matching production to demand is becoming a somewhat more difficult and expensive operation the limits to the fungibility of oil may soon become more evident.
One of the reasons for this is that, with some increasingly rare exceptions, one cannot drive up to an oilwell and fill the tank with the flow out of the ground, and then drive happily off. Crude oil is a mixture of different hydrocarbons. (Morgan Downey explains this is more detail in “Oil 101”, and I will refer to that book a number of times as this series progresses, it sits on my desk.) Hydrocarbons are a combination of hydrogen and carbon atoms in different combinations, but with very approximately, twice as many hydrogen atoms as carbon. As the number of carbon atoms increases one moves from the simple light compounds such as methane (CH4) to the more complex heavier fluids that get down to residual oils ( 29 to 70 carbons) and bitumens (above 70). Because the different components of the oil have different uses, the different fractions of the oil are separated out for individual use at a refinery. The quality of the crude is generally expressed by the API gravity, of which more in a later post.
Typical crude oil fractions Because the different oilfields of the world produce oil with different combinations of hydrocarbon compounds, and with varying levels of other contaminants, such as, for example, sulfur, it is not always easy to switch the oil supply coming into a refinery from one field to that from another. The EIA has plotted the increase in sulfur content coming into US refineries. As the crude becomes heavier and contains higher sulfur content, so the refining process becomes more complex and expensive.
For many years, for example, the heavy, high sulfur, crudes produced in Venezuela were shipped to refineries in the United States that were designed to refine the oil to the desired products. Other refineries, geared to refining lighter sweeter (i.e. lower sulfur) crudes cannot accept very much of the Venezuelan oil and blend it into their process streams, since even to get to an intermediate crude they would need to include a higher quality (and more expensive) lighter crude in the blend. Thus when there was a strike in Venezuela in 2002, and the world lost 3 mbd of oil production, there was only a limited flexibility in the way that the affected refineries in the United States were able to resolve their supply shortfall. (And in those days it was possible to increase Mexican supply to help out).
Venezuela is one of two countries (Canada being the other) with a significant production of synthetic crude from the heavy oil sands in that country. These are a more extreme case of the need for special refineries, since in both the Canadian and Venezuelan case the heavy oil must first be treated at the site to upgrade it to the quality of a conventional crude, before it can be sent to a conventional refinery. (I briefly discusses that refining in an earlier Tech Talk). This established a secondary limit on how much oil can be produced from those deposits at one time. Some time ago I visited the Oil Sand operations in Alberta, and was there on the day that the new Upgrader facility was shut down because of the escape of some of the gases from the process. I could smell a faint odor of “cat pee”, but nothing near the smells from many other processing plants of varying nature that I have visited over the decades. Nevertheless the new section of the plant was shut down for months until the problem was solved, removing over 100,000 bd from the market.
More recently the difference in price between heavy crude and light has reduced, to the point that the Canadians are no longer going to increase the size of the upgraders in the Fort McMurray area, but will instead be shipping the bitumen to eager customers. This does require some additional technology:
Under the new timeline, which was disclosed yesterday, Syncrude will lift production to 425,000 barrels through debottlenecking, and add a further 115,000 per day of bitumen production. Both expansions are expected by 2020.This will reduce the current bottleneck in production, which lies with the upgrader capacity, since it is only after the crude has passed through them, that it is able to flow easily through the pipelines to the conventional refineries. That change is not yet being considered in Venezuela, where the syncrude is now counted, by the EIA at least, as part of overall production.
(With additions to its mining operations, Syncrude actually plans to extract 600,000 barrels a day of bitumen by 2020, but barrels that go through its upgrading process actually shrink in size, resulting in a total output of 540,000.) Bitumen on its own is too thick to flow through a pipeline: at room temperature, it has the consistency of old molasses. But Syncrude plans to employ a new system that uses a solvent to remove what Ms. Fisekci called the "nasty" part of the bitumen. That system, which Syncrude operator Imperial Oil also intends to use at its Kearl oil sands mine, will allow the bitumen to flow without needing to be upgraded.
The graph from the EIA highlights another consideration as I move to discuss the global trade in oil. That is the rising consumption within the country, a phenomenon that Jeffrey Brown (Westexas) introduced us to as the Export Land Model back in January 2006, since, with declining production it accelerates the reduction in net exports, as the Venezuelan case now illustrates.
I’ll close today with one last point on the limits of fungibility. There are certain oilfields where the contamination of the crude is such that special refineries are needed to process the oil. The most outstanding of these is the oilfield at Manifa in Saudi Arabia, a subject I have been writing about for over five years. The problem with that production, which was initially slated to be in production next year comes from the need for special refineries to process the oil (an extreme case of the earlier condition I described). The plan was that two refineries would be built in Saudi Arabia to handle the initially 1 mbd of planned production, which by last March had dropped to 900,000 bd. One of these is being built by Total at Jubail, though it is interesting to note that the refinery is now scheduled – in its 400,000 bd capacity – to also receive oil from the more conventional field at Safaniya. It is now anticipated to open in 2013. A second refinery at Yanbu will also take 400,000 bd. Aramco will then build a new refinery at Jazan, with a capacity of 400,000 bd starting in 2013. But until those refineries come on line, unless the Saudi’s and Chinese work out a deal (not beyond the bounds of possibility) that oil will stay in the ground.
The above is intended to show is that there are constraints outside of just having oil in the ground, and a ready customer, that preclude immediate sales and satisfaction. As this series develops I will be highlighting some others.
Read more!
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
P34. Pick Points
Half-a-dozen or so stories of interest.
Beginning by perusing the snippets that dribble into the Houston Chronicle blog from CERAweek, Representative Markey admitted there would be some role for coal in the future; while IHS looked to see the recession last through this year, bottom out next and rebound in 2011, in the process demand for oil will fall another 1 mbd this year. In the same session company assets were foreseen as dropping further below real value, according to an IHS analyst; and the imbalance between operating costs and commodity prices would continue to feed increasing supply volatility. The BP Chairman felt that with enough investment (a trillion dollars a year) enough energy will be found to meet global demand. If we can overcome the human problems, the geological problems will be insignificant. He called for a confident relationship between government and companies, since without it investment would not be forthcoming; an open energy market; a heavy investment in conservation and energy efficiency; a program to address global warming, through increasing the price paid for carbon fuels (cap and trade); opening up the reserve areas now off limits including the continental shelf; incentives to encourage CCS and low carbon technology; and more investment in energy research – he bragged about the model program he set up with Dr Chu. In questions he said that the industry must get costs in line so that $40 becomes a good price again; that corn ethanol is not an answer (but cane ethanol is); and before we decide on electric cars we have to decide where the power is coming from.
The Schlumberger Chair reminded the audience that before the economic collapse we were having a hard time meeting supply, and his job is to keep a viable company until those times come back, and that includes keeping R&D going. The Director General of Pemex, said that they plan on producing 2.9 mbd this year, but needs more money for investment in new resources and a refinery. The Vice Chairman of CNPC said that China had a remarkable year and were concentrating on technology, including EOR for mature fields. In questions they saw a role for gas from shale, and a need for a better image for the industry .
The lunch speaker was the Shell CEO and he also pointed out that as the recession ends so the demand for oil will return, and fast. This will require use of all resources and will raise carbon dioxide levels. But it also will require investment, even through these hard times. They are now living on past investments, but fears that in 3-4 years the cost of insufficient investment will be hurting production. They plan on continued investment in R&D, he bragged about the unmanned offshore monotowers that produce gas. He also supported cap and trade, and many of the items listed by the BP head. In questions he said that Europe, having higher taxes was equivalent to a carbon tax, and had led to more efficient cars. In other talks, they admitted Texas was in recession with the country economy expected to continue to contract all year. And then Exxon spoke out against cap-and-trade, preferring a straight tax. Finally the IEA Chair said that they expected to revise this years demand down another notch, before starting to grow next year. But he also said that energy professionals were more optimistic than financiers at this point.
The struggle between water and energy from hydroelectric projects continues to divide Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as the situation turns bad enough that growers are burning their orchards for fuel.
In the United Kingdom the National Grid is planning on sequestering its carbon from 5 coal-fired power plants near the Humber in rock layers under the North Sea which once held natural gas. They feel they can do this within 3 years. On the other hand Brazil’s Energia hopes to trap 1- 15% of the gas from a power plant in algae that can then generate oil. Another UK Power company Centrica has upset shareholders who would rather it invested in natural gas rather than nuclear power. And in the gas business Gazprom which is anticipating a 5% cut in Western European demand is also now expecting a 15% drop in demand from Eastern Europe. But that has no stopped them denying the rumors and pledging to move forward on development of the Shtockman field, starting next year, yielding natural gas in 2013, and LNG the following year. Gazprom is also investing in LUKoil to help it repay some loans. And speaking of LNG the anticipated shipment of LNG from Sakhalin has been postponed until April In the meantime they are making up the contracted amounts by using gas from Abu Dhabi. (Unrelated but they also have a wakening volcano – just like Alaska). Gazprom are also making another move at the UK market, this time trying to sell electrical power.
Russia is considering a tidal power plant near Murmansk. And half-way around the world similar plans are being considered for the Columbia river in the Northwest USA. Rolls Royce, meanwhile are testing turbines in the UK that can generate up to 1 MW, with a sea trial for a 0.5 MW unit scheduled for this summer , they foresee up to 300 MW of tidal power being possible around the UK by 2020.
The power crisis in Bangladesh is likely to continue until at least mid-May when the Monsoon starts, since the current drought has dropped the water levels needed for hydropower and at present they are drawing down the existing gas fields so fast that they risk damaging the rock structure, and still don’t have enough. Chittagong, a major city, now only has power for half the demand.
For more stories see The Energy Bulletin or Drumbeat at The Oil Drum
Beginning by perusing the snippets that dribble into the Houston Chronicle blog from CERAweek, Representative Markey admitted there would be some role for coal in the future; while IHS looked to see the recession last through this year, bottom out next and rebound in 2011, in the process demand for oil will fall another 1 mbd this year. In the same session company assets were foreseen as dropping further below real value, according to an IHS analyst; and the imbalance between operating costs and commodity prices would continue to feed increasing supply volatility. The BP Chairman felt that with enough investment (a trillion dollars a year) enough energy will be found to meet global demand. If we can overcome the human problems, the geological problems will be insignificant. He called for a confident relationship between government and companies, since without it investment would not be forthcoming; an open energy market; a heavy investment in conservation and energy efficiency; a program to address global warming, through increasing the price paid for carbon fuels (cap and trade); opening up the reserve areas now off limits including the continental shelf; incentives to encourage CCS and low carbon technology; and more investment in energy research – he bragged about the model program he set up with Dr Chu. In questions he said that the industry must get costs in line so that $40 becomes a good price again; that corn ethanol is not an answer (but cane ethanol is); and before we decide on electric cars we have to decide where the power is coming from.
The Schlumberger Chair reminded the audience that before the economic collapse we were having a hard time meeting supply, and his job is to keep a viable company until those times come back, and that includes keeping R&D going. The Director General of Pemex, said that they plan on producing 2.9 mbd this year, but needs more money for investment in new resources and a refinery. The Vice Chairman of CNPC said that China had a remarkable year and were concentrating on technology, including EOR for mature fields. In questions they saw a role for gas from shale, and a need for a better image for the industry .
The lunch speaker was the Shell CEO and he also pointed out that as the recession ends so the demand for oil will return, and fast. This will require use of all resources and will raise carbon dioxide levels. But it also will require investment, even through these hard times. They are now living on past investments, but fears that in 3-4 years the cost of insufficient investment will be hurting production. They plan on continued investment in R&D, he bragged about the unmanned offshore monotowers that produce gas. He also supported cap and trade, and many of the items listed by the BP head. In questions he said that Europe, having higher taxes was equivalent to a carbon tax, and had led to more efficient cars. In other talks, they admitted Texas was in recession with the country economy expected to continue to contract all year. And then Exxon spoke out against cap-and-trade, preferring a straight tax. Finally the IEA Chair said that they expected to revise this years demand down another notch, before starting to grow next year. But he also said that energy professionals were more optimistic than financiers at this point.
The struggle between water and energy from hydroelectric projects continues to divide Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as the situation turns bad enough that growers are burning their orchards for fuel.
In the United Kingdom the National Grid is planning on sequestering its carbon from 5 coal-fired power plants near the Humber in rock layers under the North Sea which once held natural gas. They feel they can do this within 3 years. On the other hand Brazil’s Energia hopes to trap 1- 15% of the gas from a power plant in algae that can then generate oil. Another UK Power company Centrica has upset shareholders who would rather it invested in natural gas rather than nuclear power. And in the gas business Gazprom which is anticipating a 5% cut in Western European demand is also now expecting a 15% drop in demand from Eastern Europe. But that has no stopped them denying the rumors and pledging to move forward on development of the Shtockman field, starting next year, yielding natural gas in 2013, and LNG the following year. Gazprom is also investing in LUKoil to help it repay some loans. And speaking of LNG the anticipated shipment of LNG from Sakhalin has been postponed until April In the meantime they are making up the contracted amounts by using gas from Abu Dhabi. (Unrelated but they also have a wakening volcano – just like Alaska). Gazprom are also making another move at the UK market, this time trying to sell electrical power.
Russia is considering a tidal power plant near Murmansk. And half-way around the world similar plans are being considered for the Columbia river in the Northwest USA. Rolls Royce, meanwhile are testing turbines in the UK that can generate up to 1 MW, with a sea trial for a 0.5 MW unit scheduled for this summer , they foresee up to 300 MW of tidal power being possible around the UK by 2020.
The power crisis in Bangladesh is likely to continue until at least mid-May when the Monsoon starts, since the current drought has dropped the water levels needed for hydropower and at present they are drawing down the existing gas fields so fast that they risk damaging the rock structure, and still don’t have enough. Chittagong, a major city, now only has power for half the demand.
For more stories see The Energy Bulletin or Drumbeat at The Oil Drum
Read more!
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