Tech Talk - A Dickensian Situation revisited

Back in March 2005 I posted my first offering to the new site that Kyle and I had agreed to call “The Oil Drum.” Now, some eight years later, this will be my final Tech Talk to appear on that site, and it is perhaps appropriate to go back to that first post, and make a couple of comments on how it panned out. It read as follows:

When I was young I was fascinated by a small china statuette that my Grandparents had of Mr Micawber. He is a character, and a sympathetic one, in Charles Dickens's book "David Copperfield", in the course of which he goes into debt, His explanation of his financial condition can be compared to the coming world experience as we now live through Hubbert's Peak. You might, in today's phraseology, call this the Money quote:

'My other piece of advice, Copperfield,' said Mr. Micawber, 'you know. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen and six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery. The blossom is blighted, the leaf is withered, the god of day goes down upon the dreary scene, and - and in short you are for ever floored. As I am!'.

In this case consider that our expenses, i.e. the world use of oil, went up last year to around 83 million barrels every day (mbd). (A barrel is 42 gallons). Now as long as our supplies (income) can match this outlay then we are in happiness. This was, in relative terms, where we ended last year.

However this year our expenses are going to go up. It is a little difficult to predict exactly how much but current predictions are for this to be around 2 mbd. Let us equate this to the old English sixpence (which was back then worth about a dime. Twenty pounds being worth about $100).

If we follow the Micawber example if our income, world oil supply is equal to or greater than our expenses then we can stay happy. But here is the rub.

When world oil production is just about as high as it can be (non-OPEC countries are now producing just about as fast as they can) and OPEC spare capacity is down to around an additional 1.3 mbd. then our income this year will likely not be much above 85 mbd, if it gets there. (In a later post I will explain why it probably won't).

So we are at the point where within the next few months income and expenditures will be in balance (Micawber's twenty pounds). Except that the industry being a big one there are always things going wrong. In the latter part of last year for example we had:
• the hurricanes in the Gulf that closed down about 0.5 mbd of production for several months,
• oil production in Iraq, which should be around 3 mbd, but because of pipeline bombings etc dropped below 2 mbd,
• there were frequent threatened strikes on the oil platforms in Nigeria,
• and Russian production declined more drastically than had been anticipated.

Some of these are still with us, some have been resolved. And other problems, such as the complete employment of the world tanker fleet, have yet to make an impact. But any one can drop supply.

Yet while our supply (income) is about at a peak (twenty pounds), our expenses (demand) are still going up by this sixpence a year. So that some time this year expenses will have gone from twenty pounds to twenty pounds and sixpence. A number of economists had been predicting that there would be a reduction in the rise in demand to keep us below that figure, but it is already clear that they do not adequately recognize the considerable needs in China and India that drive this increase (and they only have to read the papers to see it).

The big question is when will we reach the point that we cross over the balance point. Right now with the Saudi Arabian government saying that they can increase production by up to 1.5 mbd one might think we could get through to just about the end of this year. Unfortunately some of us are a little cynical about that number, and I'll explain why in another post.

One final gloomy thought - production in other countries (such as the UK) is falling, and the countries that used that supply must find another source. And if we are now at the peak of production, then our income cannot increase above twenty pounds and and may indeed fall back below twenty pounds, while our expenses will continue to increase to twenty pounds and sixpence. It is not the absolute size of the market that will now drive, but the relatively small fluctuations that take us out of balance.

The result is misery, and we are for ever floored.

Looking around it is reasonable to note that we don’t see the level of misery that, from reading that post, one might have expected to happen. We have gone through a major recession, yet demand has, overall, increased and production has risen to meet that demand. Yet looking at how this has been met is instructive.

Figure 1. Changes in liquid supply sources from 2000 to 2040 as anticipated by Exxon Mobil, with lines added to show 2005 and 2013. (The Outlook for Energy: A view to 2040)

I have added lines to show the situation in 2005, when the piece was written, and for this year. It is worth noting that, using the definitions that Exxon Mobil give, conventional crude and condensate production has, indeed, declined since I wrote those words. And if one includes Oil Sand and Deepwater then production has remained fairly stable at the levels back in 2005, and will (according to EM) likely stay so into the projected future.

The three sources that I had underestimated, in terms of production growth were in Biofuels (which is now at around 2 mbd), the growth in Natural Gas Liquids (which for OPEC alone is now projected to reach 6 mbd by next year up from around 3 mbd in 2005, and the growth in tight oil. This latter development, particularly with the use of long horizontal wells that are artificially fractured and injected with a slick-water suspension of a proppant, has been very successful in developing resources which were otherwise at best marginally economic. However the relative contribution that this is expected to make in overall supply is not that great, and I expect that, because of the high decline rates in individual wells, that this will only contribute on the margin of the problem.

When I began writing at The Oil Drum I was concerned that there was a lack of understanding of the impact that reservoir decline rates would have on long-term supply. As larger fields are depleted, so the world turns to smaller fields and these drain more rapidly, so that more and more are needed. (The Red Queen situation that Rune Likvern and others have so aptly described.

Deepwater resources have proven to be more difficult to bring on line than originally estimated and thus, for example, in the case of Brazil OPEC now anticipates that the production from the Lula field (originally Tupi) will only offset declines from wells in the rest of the country, with perhaps only a gain of 10 kbd overall from the addition of the 100 kbd expected from wells now coming on line. And thus, while this is a resource getting more attention (there are expected to be 60 Deepwater rigs in the Gulf of Mexico by 2015) the slow pace of development may not fill the increasing gap left as conventional oil production continues to fall, as Exxon Mobil suggest.

In retrospect, therefore, I was wrong in anticipating a relatively immediate impact from an anticipated imbalance between oil supply and demand. But, within the time frame the price of oil has risen, and the future looks no happier than it did back in 2005. The threats have changed – we seem to be in a quiescent period for major Gulf Hurricanes, for e.g. – but the threat of growing and spreading turmoil in MENA makes it less certain that we can count on much increase in production from Iraq, among others. Russian production rebounded more than I expected, but whether that can be sustained is still in doubt. The hope, at the beginning, was that the threat would spur increased looks into alternate sources of liquid fuel. But while there was a flurry of activity into biofuels (and I myself saw algal work that held a great potential, - though funding has now disappeared for that effort) there is less of a feeling of urgency in the air. Wind and solar sources have reached a point where they are no longer novel, and there is not much else in the near term that holds much potential.

Oil production takes money and resources, but most critically it takes time. Without that investment, particularly in viable alternatives, the oil “income” (supply) will likely soon start to fall short of the oil “expenses” (demand) and as Mr. Micawber so aptly said “we are forever floored.”

When these posts began, technical blogs, such as TOD, posed the potential for mass education in a way that had not been seen before. Readers have been kind in regard to the quality of the posts themselves. But the contributions from those interested, and those in industry who took the time to comment and debate ended up making this much stronger than the initial words in any post. Expertise came in many forms and informed me as well as the rest of the readers in what turned into a wonderful opportunity for many people to understand some of the complexities of supplying the world with hydrocarbon energy. I was thus able to help bring a little understanding of the energy business to vastly more folk than I had in the entirety of my academic career.

I will always be grateful to Kyle for giving me the opportunity to make this contribution, and to his efforts which led to its great success. I can illustrate that with some numbers – as an academic I took persuasion to allow my class size to rise much above 20, and at Bit Tooth Energy I see about 300 readers on a typical good day – Kyle had us above that number in a very few months, and at its peak TOD was handling 200 times that number. The site would not have continued too long as it grew in size without the indefatigable SuperG, who kept the site up under wide ranging pressures, and took care of the technical side of the house. Leanan brought and kept us readers, and provided many of the topics that we needed to create the posts on site, and Gail kept me going with encouragement and support in more difficult times. Nate orchestrated the closing posts and that was not easy.

The folks Kyle brought in to build an international forum were formidable and highly productive, and so to them, and to all of the gentle readership I say again a heartfelt “Thank You!”

(Heading Out – Dave Summers in the mundane world – will continue to write Tech Talks at Bit Tooth Energy, though he writes on a wider range of topics at that site).

OGPSS - Gulf of Mexico production, and hurricanes

The summer brings back Hurricane season, with the threat that such storms bring to the oil and gas well operations in the Gulf of Mexico. And the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has noted that

The Atlantic basin is expected to see an above-normal hurricane season this year, according to the seasonal outlook issued by NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center . . . . 3 to 6 major hurricanes (Category 3, 4 or 5; winds of 111 mph or higher)

The lessons of this vulnerability were, perhaps, more than most years, evident in 2005. The first sign of problems came with the arrival of Hurricane Dennis in July. It was a storm which severely damaged the BP deep water Thunder Horse drilling platform.

Thunder Horse after Hurricane Dennis (Prof Goose)

As that season wore on, the vulnerability of the platforms in the Gulf, and the refineries that border it, were exposed in more intensity with the passage of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These threats and their analysis were one of the factors that helped, in that formative year, to bring an audience to the pages of The Oil Drum. The Gulf is now home to thousands of wells, which, as the evidence from the Deepwater Horizon disaster last year reminded us, has moved further and further away from shore. That vulnerability is perhaps illustrated by a map, showing the path of Hurricane Rita through the oil platforms off the Texas and Louisiana coasts.

Path of Hurricane Rita through off-shore Gulf production facilities (The Oil Drum) (Each dot is a production unit)

Back in the 1930’s and ‘40’s it was the very gradual deepening of the seabed in the Gulf, that allowed the first oil drillers to venture, through the swampy regions of the Mississippi Delta and then on out into the waters of the Gulf. There had been some drilling from piers out in California and similar constructions were also tried along the Louisiana shore, as the prospects for success tempted companies away from the coast. However, as they did so the rigs faced the challenge, as they do today, of surviving in regions where Hurricanes are not uncommon. The industry was helped in this development since there were no major hurricanes that moved through the regions of most intense drilling, from the first wells in 1945 until 1964 when Hurricane Hilda arrived. And even when that hurricane struck on October 3rd, it only damaged three locations, at Eugene Island and Ship Shoals 149 and 199, with a total of some 11,869 bbl of oil being spilled due to the storm.

Gulf of Mexico showing regional features (Geoexpro)

The first pier-based platform had been built out into the Gulf of Mexico at McFaddin Beach, south of Port Arthur, Texas after having been approved by the Secretary of War, on July 8, 1937. The pier was a mile long, with three rigs at the far end, but it only drilled dry holes and was destroyed in a hurricane in 1938. More widely recognized was the first well to be drilled out of sight of land. This was the Creole platform near Cameron, which was a mile out-to-sea, an hour-an-a-half trip by shrimp boat at the time. The water was only 18 ft deep and the well, initially drilled by Pure Oil and Superior Petroleum, (later Kerr McGee, and then Anadarko) sat some 15-ft above the water level. Initial production was 600 bd from a depth of 9,400 ft. It was damaged by a hurricane in 1940, but survived and produced more than four-million barrels since through directional drilling.

Kemnac Rig 16 drilling the first offshore well in the Gulf of Mexico (Kerr-McGee via Penn Energy)

As was the case with California there was initially some controversy over who owned the rights to minerals off-shore and in 1953 Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, which gave the rights to the states for the first three miles offshore, (the range of a smooth bore cannon at one time) and then the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which gave the rights for the more offshore land to the Federal Government. This settling of the disputes encouraged further drilling and while there were already 70 rigs, drilling at depths up to 70 ft of water, the years after 1953 saw the development of a variety of different rigs for drilling in ever deeper water. Designs to cope with hurricanes also progressed, so that by the time of Hurricane Flossy in 1956 rigs were relatively safe. It was followed by Audrey in 1957, ranked as the sixth deadliest hurricane in US history, which came ashore at Cameron, and killed 416 people, but caused $16 million in damage offshore, with no fatalities.

Path of Hurricane Flossy in September 1956. (Note I have referenced the web pages showing the storm paths under the Hurricane name in that which follows).

Technology was, however, allowing rigs to work in ever deeper water, 100 ft of water in 1957, 225 feet by 1965, and 300 ft in 1969. With this increase in range came increased production, which had reached 2 mbd, but it also exposed more rigs to the threat from larger storms. Hilda, formed in 1964, caused $100 million in damage and effectively destroyed 18 platforms,; Betsy in September 1965 had the distinction of financially impacting a future President of the United States.

On September 9th, the day Hurricane Betsy struck, MAVERICK was located 20 miles off the Louisiana Coast in 220 ft of water. The following day an inspection showed Zapata’s three other rigs were undamaged, but the MAVERICK had vanished. This was the largest single loss that the domestic offshore drilling industry sustained in this or any other hurricane. . . . . .The MAVERICK loss was a substantial one for Zapata. This was our newest rig and one of our very best contracts. . .

(George H.W. Bush, “My Life in Letters and Other Writings.”) (The insurance check was for $5.7 million).

Camille in 1969 was the largest storm to hit the USA in the 20th century. It did about $100 million in offshore damage, including sinking three up-to-date rigs designed to survive those storms. (Camille was a Category 5). Onshore the damage exceeded $1 billion. This was the hurricane that taught the industry that they had to design rigs that could not only withstand waves more than 70-ft high, but has also to consider that the seabed itself might move under the force of the storm.

Fortunately such storms have proved to be relatively rare, and the “three strikes” of Dennis, Katrina and Rita in 2005 have not been repeated since. Yet the industry remains highly vulnerable to such storms. As the second figure shows, the Gulf has become increasingly filled with production platforms. In 2008 this region was hit by hurricanes Gustav at the start of September and Ike two weeks later. Even though these were weaker storms their impact was significant.

Effective August 2008, there were more than 3,800 production platforms in the Gulf, ranging in size from single well caissons in 10 feet of water up to a large, complex facility in 7,000 feet of water. The MMS estimates about 2,127 production platforms were exposed to hurricane conditions from Gustav and Ike, carrying winds greater than 74 miles per hour.

Final results of the agency’s assessment of destroyed and damaged facilities from these two storms indicate that 60 platforms were destroyed. These included some platforms that had been reported earlier to have extensive damage.

In comparison, 115 platforms were destroyed by the Rita-Katrina wallop in 2005.

The platforms designated as destroyed following Gustav and Ike produced 13,657 barrels of oil and 96,490,000 cubic feet of gas per day, or 1.05 percent of the oil and 1.3 percent of the gas produced daily.

Part of the reduction in damage came from lessons learned from Katrina/Rita.

Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) that previously had to have eight mooring lines were now required to have 12 and, in some cases, 16 mooring lines,” Angelico said. “In ’08, 18 moored MODUs were in the path of hurricane force winds, and two went adrift, which represented 15 percent of the rigs out there. In Katrina and Rita, 63 percent of the rigs went adrift.’

There are additional impacts from these storms. The Gulf continues to produce about 27% of the nation’s oil, and 15% of the natural gas. Those fuels must be brought ashore and, in the case of oil, refined. Refineries lie inshore all along the Gulf Coast, and if flooded can take months to be brought back on line. Given the growing reliance that the country places on production from these regions makes us all vulnerable to the season.

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Crude and Condensate as an annual volume and percentage of national production. (BOEMRE)

Last October OCS crude and condensate production averaged 1.52 mbd, which comprised 28% of the estimated US production.

Offshore Natural gas production as an annual volume and percentage of national production (BOEMRE)

Last October natural gas production averaged 5.6 bcf/day which was 8.9% of estimated national production.

There is a significant production from smaller, older wells, while the new fields are found in deeper waters further into the Gulf, and so that is where I will venture next time.