Deepwater Oil Spill - Clearing the Relief Well to restart

The work in the Gulf that is moving toward a more permanent solution to the leaking well beyond the current cap on the well is moving forward at a slow and cautionary pace. In his briefing at 2 pm this afternoon, Admiral Allen noted that the riser has now been connected between the Development Driller III and the BOP on the relief well. When that pipe is put into place it is full of seawater, and for a variety of reasons it is best that this is replaced with drilling mud of the required density before proceeding any further. (You may remember that it was the reverse of this process that led, in part, to the Deepwater Horizon disaster). Once this process was completed, then the pressure holding the packer in the well so that it sealed against the walls of the well, has been released. This allows flow down the drill pipe in the well, and then back up through the gap between the drill pipe and the steel and concrete casing of the well that is known as the liner. This gap that the mud will flow through is known as the annulus, and mud will be pumped down the pipe and up the annulus in a process known as circulation, which, because the mud will leave the drill pipe at the bottom of the well is known as “bottoms up.” According to Mr Wells in his later brief once everyone is sure that the well is in good condition, they will pull the packer. This will likely occur tomorrow, and once that is out of the way and the well recleaned, the final length of casing for the relief well will be run down to the bottom of the well and cemented in place.

Normally this is a job for which Halliburton would be subcontracted (as they would have been for the earlier cementing of the casings higher in the well bore. However, in the brief Admiral Allen became a little coy in regard to who would actually be doing the work.

You know I don’t know off ha(n)d but we can find that out and get it to you. You know a lot of these things are done by subcontractors and there are a lot of them that are out there. And they aggregate together to do what their specialty is and we will get that and pass it to you. I just don’t know off hand.

The casing should be in place and cemented by the weekend, at which time the preparations for the static kill will move into performance, with Mr. Wells anticipating that the process could even start late on Sunday night.

Going back to the animation that was used the first time that the top kill was tried, the flow will, this time, include a vessel holding the mud, as well as a vessel with the high pressure mud pumps needed to inject the mud into the well through the choke and kill lines. Here is the initial animation from BP:


I expect that this operation will follow much along the same lines, only the relative locations of the choke and kill lines may be relatively displaced by the changes in circuitry that happened during the oil collection phase of the effort.

There is increasingly less concern over the likelihood of there being an additional leak of oil from this well, into the Gulf, though that does not preclude other accidents from happening elsewhere. As Admiral Allen noted:

the Coast Guard received a report that the uninspected towing vessel, Pere Ana C pushing the barge Captain Beauford collided with an oil and natural gas rig in the northern part of Barataria Bay south of Lafitte.

The structure itself is called C117 and that is a state owned well. We have about 6,000 feet of boom around the facility right now, there’s an over flight in progress with Admiral Paul Zukunft and Governor Jindal right now and they are assessing the issues on scene, and will be available to report updates on that later today and out of the JIC and so forth.

Subsequently the well was reported to be spouting a mixture of fluids into the air from the unplugged well. Fortunately there are enough resources in the area to deal with the developing problem.

With the time since oil was flowing into the Gulf getting longer, the amount of oil that can be collected from the Deepwater Horizon well is significantly reduced, and so some of the fleet could more easily be made available if needed. The dispersal of the oil does seem to be justifying the decisions of both BP and the various agencies to rely on the dispersant at the beginning of the spill. The longer term effects of the process will not, however, be available for some time.

And in the meanwhile, BP, having agreed to pony up the $20 billion for compensation payments, is making a business charge of $32 billion for the spill, so that, it appears that it will not have to pay taxes on those funds, which will thus cost the taxpayer somewhere around $10 billion. It is, after all, a business cost. But there are also going to be questions raised about how long the funds should pay for damage, if the oil is dissipating, the sands are clearing and the fishing is returning. Obviously, for example, the sand islands being raised along the coast will not be installed in time to be of much benefit for the current problem, given the speed with which the oil is dispersing so does the $0.36 billion being spent on that project reflect the best use of funds? These issues are likely to remain very contentious as we move into the election cycle.

Deepwater Oil Spill - the Dispersant Meeting Report

Concerns about the use of dispersant by the Rapid Response Teams (RRT) working on the Deepwater Horizon spill led to the ”Deepwater Horizon Dispersant Use Meeting” that was held on May 26 -27, A report of that meeting is now available (h/t NatResDr). After a brief review of the current status at the well, with inclinometer readings going on, nuts apparently removed, and the apparent tear of one of the seals in the cap, we’ll get back to that report. First the status:

For the first 12 hours on June 10th (midnight to noon), approximately 7,630 barrels of oil were collected and 15.3 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

On June 9th, a total of approximately 15,800 barrels of oil were collected and 31 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

And here is the apparent seal that has torn, and slipped out of the cap.

View from the Skandi ROV 2 at 10 pm 10th June 2010.

And so on to what the report says.

The panel included experts from a variety of universities and agencies. To justify the use of dispersants the report provides a background.

To prevent landfall of the oil, mechanical recovery techniques were used, including skimming and booming, as well as in situ burning. However, when poor weather conditions limited the effectiveness and suitability of mechanical recovery and burning, dispersants were applied to disperse surface oil and prevent landfall. In early May, responders began injecting dispersants at the source of the release in order to prevent oil from reaching the surface. These techniques have largely been successful, and have reduced the amount of oil reaching the nearshore.

The meeting was divided into four breakout groups that addressed (1) Efficacy and effectiveness of surface and deep ocean use of dispersants; (2) Physical transport and chemical behavior of dispersants and dispersed oil; (3) Exposure pathways and biological effects resulting from deep ocean application of dispersants; and (4) Exposure pathways and biological effects resulting from surface application of dispersants.

What follows are direct quotes from the report.

As background they were also told that:
1 Surface dispersant operations have only been conducted in pre-approved zones (> 3miles offshore, >10 m water depth).
2 Most dispersants have been applied 20-50 miles offshore where the water is much greater than 100 ft deep;
3 The footprint of surface dispersant application is relatively small;
4 The body of water in which the dispersants are applied is constantly changing; and
5 This meeting focused on oil effects and dispersants in general.

Group One (Effectiveness of dispersants)
They stated that the current state of knowledge was:
 Oil emulsion (> 15 – 20% water) is non-dispersible
 Plume is between 1100 – 1300 m deep moving SW direction
 DWH oil high in alkanes, and has a PAH composition similar to South Louisiana reference crude
 Lighter PAHs (< C15) are likely volatilizing
 Viscosity of emulsified oil is between 5500-8500 centistoke
 Emulsion may be destabilizing (50-60%)
 Primary detection method, C3 (fluorometer), only gives relative trends – does not accurately measure concentration of total oil or degree of dispersion

Their conclusions included the following.
For surface applications
1. Surface application of dispersants has been demonstrated to be effective for the DWH incident and should continue to be used.
2. The use of chemical dispersants is needed to augment other response options because of a combination of factors for the DWH incident (i.e., continuous, large volume release).
3. Winds and currents may move any oil on the surface toward sensitive wetlands
4. Limitations of mechanical containment and recovery, as well as in situ burning.
5. Weathered DWH oil may be dispersible. Further lab and field studies are needed to assess the efficacy and efficiency and optimal dispersant application (e.g., multiple dispersant applications).
6. Spotter airplanes are essential for good slick targeting for large scale aerial applications (e.g., C-130), so their use should be continued.
7. In order to most effectively use the assets available, the appropriate vessels or aircraft should be selected based on the size and location of the slick and condition of oil.

Dispersing the oil reduces surface slicks and shoreline oiling. The use of chemical dispersants enhances the natural dispersion process (e.g., the smaller droplet size enhances potential biodegradation). Dispersing the oil also reduces the amount of waste generated from mechanical containment and recovery, as well as shoreline cleanup.

For underwater applications
1. The subsurface dispersant dosage should be optimized to achieve a Dispersant to Oil Ratio (DOR) of 1:50. Because conditions are ideal (i.e., fresh, un- weathered oil) a lower ratio can be used, reducing the amount of dispersant required. The volume injected should be based on the minimum oil flowrate, however an accurate volumetric oil flowrate is required to ensure that the DOR is optimized.
2. If we assume a 15,000 bbls/day oil rate and a 1:50 DOR, then actual dispersant flowrate is roughly similar to the current application rate of 9 GPM.
3. To further optimize dispersant efficacy, the contact time between dispersant and oil should be maximized. Longer contact time ensures better mixing of oil and dispersant prior to being released into the water, and should result in better droplet formation.
4. Contact time can be increased by shifting the position of the application wand deeper into the riser, optimizing nozzle design on the application wand to increase fluid sheer, and increasing the temperature of the dispersant to lower viscosity.
5. Effectiveness should be validated by allowing for a short period of no dispersant application followed by a short time of dispersant usage to look for visual improvements in subsurface plume.

Dispersants are never 100% effective. The flow rate of oil out of the damaged riser is not constant, and significant amounts of methane gas are being released. Because the effective DOR is a function of oil flow rate, changes in the oil flow rate may significantly impact the actual DOR. If the DOR is too low, dispersion may not be maximized, while if it is too high, dispersant will be unnecessarily added to the environment. Assumptions are based on knowledge at standard temperatures and pressures (STP), while conditions at the riser are significantly different. Group members suggested that the oil escaping the damaged riser may be in excess of 100°C, and it is unclear what effect this has on the dispersant, or the efficacy or effectiveness of droplet formation. These conditions may drastically alter fluid behavior. Finally, there is an opportunity cost of changes to application wand position and development and deployment of a new nozzle. When optimized, subsurface dispersant application may reduce or eliminate the need for surface dispersant application, and will reduce surfacing and resurfacing of oil.

Group 2 (Transport and behavior of dispersed oil)
The current state of knowledge is:
 Surface models are effective and continuously improving
 SMART protocols are improving  Increase of sampling at depth
 Well researched region (oceanographic and ecological studies)
 Well established baseline data
 Airborne application protocols are established

Their conclusions included the following:
1. Create an on-scene environmental review committee to advise SSCs that will be responsible for providing immediate operational and scientific advice, and aid in dispersant decisions.
2. Clearly define geographic area/water volume of concern.
3. Establishment of a more comprehensive sampling and monitoring program to understand transport of oil on the surface and potential for long-term increases to TPH, TPAH, oxygen demand, or lowering of DO with continued dispersant application. This could be done by implementing off-shore water (first 10 m) monitoring stations (e.g., fixed stationary positions such as other drill rigs).

Continued dispersant use trades shoreline impacts for water column impacts. This increases the uncertainty of the fate of the oil, and potentially increases the oil sedimentation rate on the bottom.

Continued dispersant use reduces the threat distance, protects shorelines, likely increases the biodegradation rate of the oil, inhibits formation of emulsions, reduces waste management, and potentially reduces buildup of VOCs in the air.

Group 3 (Biological Effects of Dispersants)
The current state of knowledge is:
 Minerals Management Services, Gulf of Mexico deep water studies/reports:
 Natural hydrocarbon seepage in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 40 million gallons per year
 Some knowledge and past studies on deep water species in the Gulf of Mexico
 Preliminary modeling
 Preliminary monitoring data (Fluorometry data, Particle size analysis, Temperature, Salinity, D.O., Hydrocarbon, Acute toxicity, Acoustic data, sonar, Genomics)

Their conclusions included the following:
1. Dispersant risk assessment should consider volume of DWH incident relative to natural seepage
2. There is a net benefit to continued subsurface dispersant use and application should continue, these include:
 Surface water column and beach impacts vs. vertical water column impacts
 Observed reduction in volatile organics at surface
 Enhances the interaction between oil and suspended particulate material
 Accelerated microbial degradation through increased bioavailability
 Rapid recovery of downward sulfate diffusion and upward methane diffusion related to shallow sediment geochemistry
 Based on current knowledge, subsurface dispersant use confines the aerial extent of impact
o Current impact zone is less than 50 km radius
 Reduction in emulsified oil at the surface
 Reduction of phototoxic impacts

Group 4 (Biological Effects of Dispersant on surface water species)
The current state of knowledge is:
 The oil is being dispersed in the top ten meters of the water column from surface dispersant application (fluorescence methods)

Their recommendations included:
1. Surface application of dispersants is acceptable. Transferring the risk from the surface to the top 10 m is the lesser of the many evils.
2. Additional monitoring is required to better model where dispersed oil is going. Long term (monthly) monitoring is required at a minimum, and should be conducted in a grid formation inshore to open ocean. Passive samplers (i.e., SPME) should be used in selected areas, while a active water sampling program should be implemented to measure dispersant and dispersed oil, dissolved oxygen, and standard CTD + chlorophyll concentrations, as well as selected bioassays.

The report has 26 references, some of which are web accessible, and several appendices, listing the agenda, those present, and those in each group.

If you have further questions the report is available.

Deepwater Oil Spill - of plumes, and drillships, FPSOs and the ASJ

The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has now tested water samples from oil plumes at three sites in the Gulf of Mexico, at varying distances from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco said that the tests conducted at three sites by a University of South Florida research vessel confirmed oil as far as 3,300 feet below the surface 42 miles northeast of the well site. Oil also was found in a sub-surface sample 142 miles southeast of the spill, but further tests showed that oil is "not consistent" with oil from the spill.

Lubchenco said the water analysis "indicate there is definitely oil sub surface. It's in very low concentrations" of less than 0.5 parts per million. Additional samples from another research vessel are being tested, she said.

To place these samples in context, consider first the locations at which they were taken.

Locations of the oil sampling sites reported by NOAA The red star is the well, and the oil from the well was found at the two sites (surface and sub-sea) North of the well, while the green spot which marks the site South of the well which was contaminated with oil from another source.


The oil in the southern location may potentially come from a source which also generated the tar balls on the Florida keys recently. This was the map of natural seeps that I put up the other day.

Reported natural seep locations in the GOM.

It is germane to also note that the concentrations of oil in the plume are at a level of 0.5 ppm. In context that means that there is 0.5 cc (or roughly 0.4 gm) of oil in a cubic meter of seawater. This is not discernable to the naked eye. Thus when a news report (such as that from Sam Champion on the ABC World News) talks of the oil plume and shows the blobs of oil that he saw subsurface in a dive some weeks ago, it is effectively deceptive, since the correlation of the plume with that visual conveys the impression that the plume contains a high concentration of oil. In fact the water appears clear, and were this fresh water and the oil were instead Benzene, EPA would let you drink it. At this level, if it takes 3.43 grams of oxygen to biodegrade a gram of oil, then it will only require about 2.7 gms of oxygen to treat the cubic meter of seawater. Since oxygen is somewhat scarcer deeper in the ocean it may much slower that the 100 gm/cu m/day that I mentioned as the top rate in an earlier post But on the other hand it is not likely to take months.

This relatively short-life for the oil after it is dispersed contrasts with the remnants of the oil that was not dispersed, in the colder waters of Alaska, after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Remnants of that oil still remain 21 years later, and can be found as emulsions, tar balls, and trapped liquid. The suggestion by Jean-Michel Cousteau that the oil should have been left untreated, so that it could rise to the surface and be collected by skimmers, does not recognize that in many conditions skimmers are only able to collect about 15% of the oil, and that in large volumes (as with the Alaskan example) oil, once it reaches the shore, can survive for decades. Better surely to break it into small droplets that are degraded and disappear. And in that regard one of the benefits of adding Corexit to the oil is that it both breaks it into these small droplets, and that in the process it reduces their chance of floating on the surface and contaminating surface dwelling fauna. Corexit even works in cleaning marshes.

In other current developments, the flow of oil from the LMRP and cap over the well, continues to increase.

For the first 12 hours on June 8th (midnight to noon), approximately 7,850 barrels of oil were collected and 15.2 million cubic feet of natural gas was flared.

That increased flow (achieved by reducing the choke on the outflow pipe) can be seen indirectly by comparing the current picture from the Skandi ROV 2 with that earlier.

The small triangular pieces at the bottom of the cap are now well clear of the plume, showing the reduced flow.

As a result this increased flow is exceeding the capacity of the existing fleet sitting over the well. Upstream Online is reporting that as a result BP is bringing a Floating, Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel and a shuttle tanker, the Loch Rannoch, from its station off Shetland to the Gulf. (The Loch Rannoch was involved in another BP accident, a collision that stalled production at the Schiehallion field at the end of last year.

“The crash happened when the 130,000 tonne tanker was docking to take oil from the 144,000 tonne BP platform for transfer to the Sullom Voe terminal, off Shetland. Its only hose-reel used for exporting the oil was damaged in the collision,” the newspaper reported.

And a BP spokesman was quoted as saying that the Schiehallion FPSO was not back in production yet. (November 3rd).

The Loch Rannoch is an 850,000 barrel shuttle tanker, that carried oil from the FPSO at Schiehallion to Sullom Voe in Shetland.


The FPSO is a different sort of vessel. This is the one at Schiehallion (And I don’t think it is coming since it still has an oilfield to service).

The Schiehallion FPSO

At a top speed of 14 knots, and having left last Wednesday, with a stop in Rotterdam, it may still be a while. That will free up the drillship to move on to other things, providing they have an FPSO by then.

And one last point in this series of shorter items that has filled the news today, I had mentioned using an ASJ to cut outwards from the inner pipe of a series of casings, but the illustration I gave earlier had the pipe cut from the outside. This one (the outer casing diameter is 26 inches) was cut from the inside.

(Courtesy ANT)

And this shows the relative sizes and where the cut was made. It is needed as one of the final steps in the abandonment of the well.

(Courtesy ANT)

Perhaps BP might use it when they finally abandon the well.
.

Deepwater Oil Spill - the end of Top Kill

BP and Admiral Landry just held a Press Conference in which they said that, based on a decision 90 minutes ago, by the “best and brightest minds” that it was time to move on the next option, the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP). BP was unable to block sufficient flow out of the well to make the injection of cement possible, and thus to kill the well. They had made, I believe he said three attempts to inject material (the junk shots) without being able to get that material to block the passages through the Blow-Out Preventer (BOP) . (Unfortunately I missed a large part of his opening remarks, and thus have only the question response to go on at present). The volume of mud used did not appear to have changed from earlier reports at some 30,000 barrels.

Mr Suttles said that they had given the technique every chance, but could not get it to start to provide an effective seal. They had, however, determined that the majority of the pressure restrictions to the flow of oil was coming from some resistance within the well itself, and from the BOP. Since the riser above the BOP was not contributing much to the resistance, and thus to control of the oil flow, the next plan is to remove it, using a band saw device (of which pictures will be available) and then to lower the LMRP onto the existing BOP. They intend cutting the surface that the LMRP will sit on flat, so that it will give a good, but not perfect seal. Thus there will be some leakage around the joint, and they will monitor that and use dispersant as appropriate.


The new change should take somewhere between 4 and 7 days to implement. The assembly, which has been constructed, and is not the Top Hat assembly built earlier, to fit on the bottom of a riser. Flow of oil from the LMRP will rise up a 6 7/8 inch drill pipe within the riser (the same size as the one currently fitted to the RIT). The riser will also carry hot water down to the LMRP to protect against the formation of hydrates.

He noted that their inability to stop the well “scares everybody” but is reasonably confident (no success percentage estimates) that this will collect the majority of the oil and gas. Because they do not know the flow path of the oil below the seabed it is difficult to estimate what is actually going on in terms of oil path below the BOP. Thus they are, again, trying something that has never been done before, but expect, based on the RIT, that it will work.

On being asked about the cleanup of the dispersed oil – he pointed out that the reason that the dispersant was used was to break the oil into small droplets. These are small enough to be consumed by the microbes in the sea, and thus there is no plan to do other than let nature take its course. For the oil on the surface, they are getting better at spotting oil pools and sending skimmers to deal with them.

The Admiral drew attention to the article on Hurricanes and the Oil Spill which is available at the Unified Command We site.

The relief well is about half-way through the rock it must drill (about 6,000 ft below sea level) but progress will slow as the well deepens.

The Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) option

The Gulf oil spill, recovery and cleanup - Monday's Press Conference

Today’s press conference in Louisiana began with an update on the use of the riser insertion tool. However Coast Guard Admiral Landry cautioned that this only treated part of the spill, and that they were looking forward to the “top kill” program that would follow. The weather is now good enough that four controlled burns are planned, as well as a strong skimming program. To date there has been a minimal impact on the shore from the spill, but teams are in the field ready to react as this becomes more severe. Further the high flow rates from the Mississippi River are helping keep the larger volumes of the spill out in the Gulf. Both NOAA and the EPA are monitoring the use of dispersants recognizing the tradeoff between its use and the damage that it is mitigating.

The Admiral drew attention to the statement by Jane Lubchenco, the head of NOAA, who had said, in regard to the many reports of large underwater oil plumes and their causes and likely effects

"Media reports related to the research work conducted aboard the R/V Pelican included information that was misleading, premature and, in some cases, inaccurate," Lubchenco said in a statement. She was referring to research, including water sampling, done by the National Institute for Undersea Science and Technology.



Lubchenco said those scientists have clarified that (in regard to the plumes) they have not reached "definitive conclusions ... about the composition of the undersea layers they discovered. Characterization of these layers will require analysis of samples and calibration of key instruments. The hypothesis that the layers consist of oil remains to be verified."

This has been later qualified by Vernon Asper, one of the scientists involved who said, among other things:

1) We are not 100% sure that the plumes are oil. We have NOT analyzed the samples yet and won’t know what’s in them until we do. That will take at least a few days or even a week or more and we don’t want to rush these results. The sensor we used is not definitive for oil and other compounds do respond in a manner that is similar to oil and could be confusing us.

2) I NEVER said that these “plumes” could cause a dead zone! It’s really important that you correct that! Consider:

a. We don’t even know if there is any oil in the plumes so the oxygen signal we’re seeing could be due to something else that is going on near the well and, if so, it could disappear overnight (we just don’t know

b. The oxygen levels we saw are lower than “normal” but are no where near the danger zone! For the most part, they are not even as low as the layer above them that we call the “oxygen minimum zone.”)

The NOAA Administrator was also on PBS where she again said that it was too early to speculate on what was in the plumes, and that there was a light oil sheen on the surface that might reach Florida in 9 – 12 days, but that it would be very dilute, and may just show up as tar balls, with little prospect of significant damage to distant beaches. She noted that the threat sounds scarier than it is.

MMS confirmed that the permit for the second well has been approved, and is in process. They pointed out that any procedure being carried out has first to be reviewed and permitted by MMS after ensuring that it will have minimal environmental impact and be safe. They also emphasized that the monitoring and regulatory side of MMS will be strengthened.

For their part Doug Suttles of BP noted that at the time of the briefing on the afternoon of the 17th, they were getting a little over 1,000 bd up through the Riser Insertion Tube (RIT). And they are now slowly opening the choke to ensure no hydrate formation.

Later this week they will run the top kill procedure, that will start to close out the well sealing process. The use of the RIT and of dispersant has reduced the size of the oil slick appearing on the surface.

In response to questions from the floor Mr Suttles said that if the RIT could recover more than half the flow out of the riser (which he characterized as a 2,000 bd target) that they would all be very pleased. He stressed that they did not want to draw too much fluid into the system, since that would lead to hydrate formation and another blockage of the line. And later he noted that they hadn’t decided yet what to do with the oil that they are capturing. (Though he also ducked a more definite confirmation of the actual volume that is leaking).

Admiral Landry said that the oil had not entered the Loop Current at this time. The larger volumes of oil are several miles from it, while there is a surface sheen that is getting closer.

Doug Suttles further explained the top kill by pointing out that the mud will be introduced at high velocity through the two 3-inch diameter choke and kill lines into the BOP. However he also clarified the position of the RIT, which I had thought was close to the BOP. It is, however, almost 5,000 ft up the riser, at the open end. The top kill is anticipated to stop the flow, after which cement will be injected. That will stop the flow, but BP will go ahead with a relief well to reach, and then pump cement into the bottom of the well which will finally secure it. He stressed that there was no intent ever to produce oil from this well. (Because the oil-bearing formation around the well is now degraded into a condition that is no longer controllable). The final decision as to whether to use “top kill” or “junk shot” first has not been made, but the inclination is to use top kill since it has less risk of precluding the alternate technique if it should not work.

Before they committed to the top kill they had to know the pressure on both sides of the BOP. They now have that data, and found that the pressures were quite low, less than expected, and were falling. They then had to remove the “yellow pod” on the BOP sine this carries the controls for the valves to the choke and kill lines, and these controls had to be modified to allow the top kill to take place. The pod has been prepared, but has not yet been taken underwater and replaced. That will happen soon.

The Admiral also emphasized that even though the oil may stop flowing out of the well at the end of the week, the studies and investigations of what is going on will continue for a long time. Further all the steps that are being made are being reviewed at several levels in different government agencies to ensure that they do what is needed, with minimal impact, while working out where all the oil and dispersant has gone.

Charlie Henry of NOAA clarified the comments about the “oil plumes” noting that the samples were so clear that you could not, by eye, see anything in the water. To find out what really is in the water will require an analysis, that has not yet been done, of what is actually there. There is also a lot of research and monitoring to see where the oil is going, and in what condition. This is the adaptive management of the process which must change as results come in on what is going on.

Threading the needle at the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill site

Late on Friday night BP began to try inserting a narrow pipe into the remnant of the riser lying on the sea bed at the site of the Deepwater Horizon site in the Gulf of Mexico. Because there is a better illustration of the process that they are using, I am adding this as a separate post, rather than an addendum to the last one on this topic.

Source Deepwater Horizon Response

UPDATE: The pipe was apparently successfully inserted, but an accident with a couple of ROV's knocked it back out, so that it will be another nine hours before it can be reconnected. (H/t lowtech architect.)

UPDATE 2: The pipe has been reinserted successfully

Technicians have fully inspected the system and have re-inserted the tool.

The tool is fashioned from a 4-inch pipe and is inserted into the leaking riser, from which the majority of the flow is coming. While not collecting all of the leaking oil, this tool is an important step in reducing the amount of oil being released into Gulf waters.

The procedure - never attempted before at such depths - involves inserting a 5-foot length of the specifically-designed tool into the end of the existing, damaged riser from where the oil and gas is leaking. In a procedure approved by federal agencies and the Federal On Scene Coordinator, methanol will also be flowed into the riser to help prevent the formation of gas crystals, known as hydrates. Gas and oil will then flow to the surface to the Discoverer Enterprise drillship.

The initial attempt to get the "needle" into the pipe was called off when the equipment shifted in the supporting frame. It is, however back on the seabed, and the attempt to insert it, collect the oil and gas and bring it to the surface, should start later this evening. The problem arose because the pipe that will carry the oil and gas back up to the ship at the surface (which they confusingly also call the drill pipe) has to mate with the insertion tool which is held in the frame (I imagine this includes the buoyancy module shown) at the seabed. It was the connection to the drill pipe to the ship that could not be made, so they took the assembly back to the surface, and fixed the problem. They are now (late Saturday afternoon) getting ready to make an insertion into the broken riser. The drill pipe is to be "stabbed into" the frame, and the intent is to eliminate any water getting into the connection, to eliminate the hydrate problem.

At the moment they have also started a continuous injection of dispersants underwater, after the three tests were judged to be successful. This has reduced the work needed to control the oil spread on the surface. They pointed out today that the dispersants that they are using were pre-approved before the spill and this had been approved in a more limited application, but after the tests were successful, is now approved for use underwater - which actually reduces the amount needed since it is injected into the heart of the spill, rather than spread over the surface after the oil has migrated upwards. They are, however, becoming a little more concerned about the weather, since changing conditions have made it more difficult to control the spill, since it is currently too rough for skimming and controlled burns - though that may improve in the next couple of days.

They are running the riser and BOP on the first relief well today (it is already about half-way down to TD), and they should spud the second relief well almost immediately. (And I note that in the press briefing Secretary Salazar repeated the line used by Secretary Chu in the past, that his folks are "the smartest people on the planet!" Sigh! Even if they are, you cannot bring folks up to speed on all the ramifications and complexities of deepwater oilfield technologies in a couple of days, it is a blindness to reality I have commented on before, but let me get off that soap box).

The API Telecon on the Deepwater Horizon fire and oil spill

On Thursday API hosted a conference call to review the status of the Deepwater Horizon fire and oil spill. There were some 14 bloggers taking part in the call, which I could not attend since I was flying at the time. The transcript is now available, but I thought I would briefly review some of the points that came up, and give some links to some of the points that were brought up.

The experts that API provided included:

Richard Ranger, Upstream/Industry Operations, API
Holly Hopkins, Upstream/Industry Operations, API
Robin Rorick, Group Director, Marine & Security, API
Allison Nyholm, Oil Spill Response Veteran, API
John Felmy, Chief Economist, API
John Wagner, Upstream Consultant, API


Holly Hopkins began by noting the scale of the effort (that data can be updated by going to the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command site which lists:

Total Vessels (including tugs and skimmers): 188

Boom deployed: 855,855 feet

Boom available: 831,553 feet

Oil and Water Mix - Recovered: Approximately 2.1 million gallons

Dispersant Used : 274,465 gallons

Dispersant available: 185,892 gallons

Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV): 4

Overall Personnel Responding: 4,520

One of the first questions asked related to the toxicity of the dispersant that BP is injecting over the spill from aircraft and underwater into the plume as a way of breaking the oil into smaller droplets to increase the rate of disintegration and dispersal. ABC News had reported that BP had stopped using the chemical, while awaiting toxicity tests. However Allison Nyholm noted that while the dispersant had been approved for aerial use, where it would not be concentrated but spread out and thus diluted, the use subsea was in a more concentrated form as it went into the plume. Since this was a new use, there were two trials of the technology, and that having completed these, the agencies and those involved had stopped the injections, while the data is reviewed.

The discussion noted that the end of the leaking pipe was sawn off, prior to a valve being attached to close the end leak of the three. (There is a Youtube video of this) .

Richard Ranger noted that the speed of the response to the disaster showed that there was a contingency plan in place, and the fact that there was such a relatively rapid response to what turned into a major disaster, showed that the plan existed and involved both industry and the federal government. Obviously, given the particular geometry that the box to plug the second leak had to fit, this had to be built after the leak became evident, but the fact that it could be built and fielded as fast as it was, speaks to the commitment to solve the problem.

Discussion switched to a letter from BP to its contractors and that had been reported in the Houston Chronicle. The letter said:

In light of the recent tragedy involving the Transocean Horizon Rig in the Gulf of Mexico, and as part of BP's overall commitment to safe and reliable operations, we are asking all our drilling contractors to review personal and process safety practices on their rigs.

Our mutual goal is to provide an environment that is safe for all personnel involved in offshore drilling and one that protects the environment. Since Blowout Preventers (BOPs) are an integral part of a safe and successful drilling and completion operation, we request that you specifically confirm that the subsea BOP and associated equipment used on your deepwater drilling rigs current intended to drill fro BP have been inspected and are routinely inspected, tested and maintained to industry standards and in compliance with applicable regulations.

Additionally, if the BOP or associated equipment has been modified from the original design in any way, please confirm: (1) that such modification were made in consultation with the original manufacturer; (2) used OEM parts; (3) pursuant to a formal management of change process; (4) and in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.

The article notes that the BOP in question was over 10 years old. (I have heard that it was uprated from operating at 15,000 psi to 20,000 psi but have no confirmation of that).

Richard Ranger noted that the move to drilling in deeper water came about as the state of knowledge and equipment improved, based on experience in shallower waters, and that it is through this gain in knowledge that deeper drilling becomes practical.

And while the topic cannot be completely ruled out, the participants did point out the great difficulty that would be faced if anyone had tried to sabotage the rig in this way.

Recently there have been tests of a fire boom to burn some of the oil in place. There was a question on why it took so long to get this process started. Alysson Nyholm noted that it took a couple of days to get the permit, and then the proper equipment had to be mobilized. (Note that a fire boom is a relatively specialized boom, and there was only one available at the time.

The "In-Situ Burn" plan produced by federal agencies in 1994 calls for responding to a major oil spill in the Gulf with the immediate use of fire booms.

But in order to conduct a successful test burn eight days after the Deepwater Horizon well began releasing massive amounts of oil into the Gulf, officials had to purchase one from a company in Illinois.

When federal officials called, Elastec/American Marine, shipped the only boom it had in stock, Jeff Bohleber, chief financial officer for Elastec, said today.

The extended use of this new tool can be effective in relatively calm water, but the waves at the site were over 4 ft high for a period, and this would wash the oil over the boom. But when the sea is calmer, then the tool can be more effective.

A single fire boom being towed by two boats can burn up to 1,800 barrels of oil an hour, Bohleber said. That translates to 75,000 gallons an hour, raising the possibility that the spill could have been contained at the accident scene 100 miles from shore.

The discussion moved on to the assessment of risk. The question was raised as to how many deep water wells have been drilled, and how many incidents there had been in contrast to how many oil tankers would be needed to replace that oil, and the risk of spills from their hulls. John Felmy responded that there are 500 discoveries in more than 1,000 ft of water (the current limit is 10,000 ft) and that at present some 30% of the offshore oil comes from the Gulf. And this is the worst incident in the past 40-years, so that it is somewhat uncommon.

However they did discuss the incident in the Timor Sea last year where in August there was a leak on a well under a mile and a half of water, leading to a rig fire. It took months to drill the relief well and stop the leak. While that investigation continues, Roger Ranger said that there is acceptance that the cause was, in part, a problem with the cement completion of the well.

There were additional discussions on the timing of future inquiries, and on the development of new technologies, recognizing that the industry itself is looking for ways to improve the safety and productivity of the offshore drilling rigs.
Hopefully I have captured the sense of the discussion, but the entire transcript is available for those interested.