Tech Talk - Optimism is becoming harder to sustain

For some time the nations of OPEC have been suggesting that demand for their oil will remain relatively stable in the near future, as increased production from the non-OPEC nations is expected to more than meet demand increases. Thus, for example, in the May Monthly Oil Market Report OPEC anticipates that global oil demand will increase by 1.14 mbd this year, while non-OPEC production will increase by 1.38 mbd, allowing a slight reduction in the volumes OPEC market, which continues to fluctuate around 30 mbd. In the longer term, however, as previous annual oil company prognostications of future supply have emphasized, the MENA countries are going to be pulling an increased weight in supply. For example ExxonMobil has noted:

The Middle East is expected to have the largest absolute growth in liquids production over the Outlook period — an increase of more than 35 percent. This increase will be due to conventional oil developments in Iraq, as well as growth in NGLs and rising production of tight oil toward the latter half of the Outlook period.

At the same time BP pointed out that in just a couple of years demand for OPEC oil is likely to start to steadily increase.

Figure 1. BP view of the increased demands to be made on OPEC oil with time. (BP Energy Outlook 2035)

A large part of that increase has been expected to come from Iraq. With the end of the Iraq war, and the government encouraging development there were some claims that production might eventually rise to over 13 mbd (ahead of both Russia and Saudi Arabia). But those optimistic views had to be measured against the reality that the country has taken a long time to recover back to the 3 mbd levels of exports that it had achieved before conflict.

Figure 2. The fall and recovery of Iraq’s oil production. (EIA)

At present OPEC reports that Iraq was producing at 3.298 mbd in April, making it second only to Saudi Arabia (at 9.579 mbd) among the OPEC nations. There still seemed to be some chance that the country might be able to reach some lower target figures, such as those suggested in the OGJ.

Figure 3. Anticipated Iraqi exports and their market region (OGJ)

Regrettably violence is now significantly increasing in the country, with Mosul being over-run by Sunni militants. This puts them in charge of the main pipeline to Turkey, as well as giving them potential control of some of the adjacent oilfields.

Figure 3. Known Iraqi oilfields in 2010.

Euan Mearns has written of the potential for oil from the Kurdish regions and Turkey has just allowed a second tanker to sail from Ceyhan carrying oil from that region to the market, without Bagdad’s permission. The oil is being delivered through a new pipeline capable of carrying 100 kbd from Kurdistan into Turkey. The main pipeline (shown in Figure 3) can carry as much as 600 kbd and runs from Kirkuk and perilously close to Mosul. The new pipeline runs through Kurdish territory until it reaches Turkey.

The declining influence of the central government over the northern territories of Iraq does not bode well for future production gains. Conflicts are getting worse, and the country is approaching the point where it could well be partitioned, since the government forces seem unwilling to take on the insurgency. Violence has already spread to the Al-Bayji refinery some 130 miles north of the capital. This is the largest refinery in the country, and currently produces below its 300 kbd capacity, all of which is used for domestic consumption.

The problems that this reveals are unlikely to be resolved soon, it is much more likely that they will continue to escalate over the next months, if not years. The impact on Iraqi oil production should not be underestimated. While the oil in the Kurdish region can make its way through the smaller pipeline that is under Kurdish control, the greater flow rates needed to sustain future growth in supply cannot be met by that pipe.

In the South developments in the Mesopotamian region around Basra from the fields of Rumaila and Majnoon will likely continue, with production being shipped out from the new facility offshore, although this is already quite significantly behind schedule.

Figure 4. Oil fields of Southern Iraq (IEA )

One has only to look at the degrading situation in Libya, where production has fallen from 1.6 mbd to a current level of less than 200 kbd, with no path forward now evident for production levels to be restored. Those familiar with the region doubt that there will be much improvement in the situation this year, and if the country follows the Iraqi path (figure 1) then it is unlikely that the world will see significant Libyan production for this decade.

That loss of a million barrels a day is likely to become increasingly evident as world demand continues to grow at greater than that level each year. When this is combined with the increasingly inability of Iraq to increase production as it moves back into more vicious internal strife, then one has to ask from where can future gains in oil production be anticipated?

The major oil companies have urged complacency having bet on Iraq and OPEC coming through (and in the process assumed that Saudi Arabia would also increase production significantly above 10 mbd, something that they have consistently declined to commit to doing). As Libya and Iraq remove that surplus from the table then the question becomes where else can it come from?

It is increasingly unlikely that US increases in production can be sustained for long, given the very short high-level life of the new wells completed in shale, and as the sweet spots in the current fields are consumed. Thus within a couple of years we are now likely to see an increasingly desperate search for new reserves. But those reserves take years to find and develop (as well as large amounts of money), and if the crisis comes at a faster pace than most now expect, then $100 a barrel oil may seem an absurdly cheap price to have had to pay. It may even have an effect on the next Presidential election.

OGPSS - Some thoughts at the end of the year

For most of this past year these posts have reviewed, and then discussed data on the state of different reservoirs of oil and gas that ultimately provide the power that we need and use every day. However, as we come to the end of 2011, it seems as though there is a gloss, or spin, being applied to stories about the state of global energy supply, which implies that concerns about future energy supply are overstated. Instead the impression is left that there will be, in the immediately foreseeable future, no return to shortages. So this post will be a more general view of the topic, less concerned with absolute numbers and references but rather seeking to suggest that these perceived words of wisdom are, like the promises of a return to $30 oil that we heard only three or so years ago, likely to fade into oblivion once they have served their immediate purpose.

It should be noted up front that there are considerable differences between the supplies of natural gas that are becoming available, and those of crude oil. Natural gas reserves are still increasing, I wrote just recently of the realization that exists in Azerbaijan that the gas being produced from the Shah Deniz field will have a hard time competing in the global market-place in three years, because of the arrival of natural gas from the Levant Basin. The relatively low prices for natural gas in the United States brought about by the development of wells in the gas shales, such as the Barnett, Haynesville and Marcellus and their initial high productivity will continue to make it difficult to see much increase in price. Yet this is at a time when the price that the natural gas is being sold for in America is around $3.50 per thousand cubic feet (kcf) ($124 per thousand cubic meters (kcm)). That price is often insufficient to totally cover the costs of its production and return a profit to all the investors, with some indications that such a price would need to be closer to $6.00 per kcf. The low price of natural gas however, relative to world prices, means that it helps to keep American industry competitive, since fuel costs are usually significantly lower here than elsewhere.

China continues to show foresight in acquiring fuel, since their agreement with and the creation of the pipeline from Turkmenistan now gives them natural gas at a competitive price ($280 per kcm - $7.93 per kcf) relative to the $400+ per kcm that Russia is charging Western Europe, though that price too will be vulnerable to supplies made available as the Mediterranean fields come on line.

The bent of the stories that have recently appeared seem to imply that the United States is moving toward significantly greater crude oil production, and thus a greater independence from foreign suppliers than will actually be the case. Folks such as Dr Yergin are projecting production of oil from the shales around the country as rising to some 2.9 mbd by 2020 and being sustained through time – neither of which is likely since the Bakken in North Dakota may well start declining and be significantly below 600 kbd within four years, and the likelihood of new developments bringing in more than this on a sustained basis are not great.

The emphasis on such a possibility, however, removes some of the pressure and concern in the short term over the health of the global supply situation, and the concurrent dependence of the United States on foreign fields and suppliers. One need not be (as perhaps the argument goes) so worried about the time to bring Libyan production back to 1.6 mbd. Optimistic reports talk of Libya reaching 1 mbd, yet still leave a concern that without a stable government and infrastructure that it will be a little difficult to reach those earlier production levels. And the promises that Iraqi production will rise to levels far above 3 mbd may be more dependant on political stability in a country that at the moment isn’t showing much. Any thought that the Arab Spring would bring swift changes in the governance of the countries involved, and leave oil exports to the world sustained at previous levels appear also to be less than realistic as countries such as Egypt begin to head into the second cycle of that revolution. The Syrian government is currently blocked from exporting (and thus producing) a third of their normal levels, which has taken 100 kbd or so from the market, and the situation with Iran continues to fluctuate.

Now there are some political benefits to being able to project that the world is going to have more than sufficient oil for the next few years, among them it distracts from the less than totally healthy state of the alternate fuels and energy industry. Exxon noted in their recent annual report that they see little significant impact from solar and wind energy on the overall global supply of power over the next forty years. Were the nation still fixated on where we were going to get our power over the next decade, then the collapse of Solyndra due to poor market support, and the bankruptcy of Range Fuels, because they could not produce cellulosic ethanol at the scale needed to have any impact at all, would raise worrying questions as to how we are planning to cope with shortage. The current optimistic state of mind, of course, also makes it less of an imperative to approve the Keystone pipeline, which may now not be approved.

Because of this lack of concern we see the Administration moving ahead to restrict further the use of coal fired power stations, through EPA enforcement of tougher emissions standards, the corn ethanol subsidies appear to be very rapidly on the way out, which may impact the volumes of ethanol (now over 900 kbd) that comes to the market in the future. But if the United States has become a net exporter of fuel, though mainly diesel, why should we worry? Perhaps it might be because that is such a small fraction of the overall total that it is really insignificant, even though it makes a nice headline.

The overall picture of crude oil supply to the United States, in reality, has hardly changed at all. Yes, demand for gasoline is down as cars are being driven less these days, and fuel economy changes have some small effect, but the economy is not robust (nor is that of Western Europe) and sustained high fuel prices are not going to help with recovery. At the same time demand in Asia continues to increase, and more nations in the Middle East and elsewhere are shipping oil to China in agreements that will still be in place were the United States to continue to recover and suddenly need additional oil to sustain that recovery of growth.

Current complacency and spin will not make those agreements go away, nor – by magic –will additional oil appear to assuage American demand. The only question that I have is whether the current spin can be maintained through 2012. It is certainly unsustainable through to 2014, and what impact the realization of reality might have, were it to become obvious by say September of this year, as the election enters its final phase is an ongoing puzzle.

We live in interesting times indeed, and I hope that you all have a Prosperous and Happy Year, as we sail into that future, and I look forward to commenting on some of these issues as we move through those times.

Nabucco, or is the Great Gas Game turning into a waltz?

It seems as though, whenever things are relatively quiet in the energy world, which they currently seem to be, then all one has to do is type Gazprom into Google search box, and there will be some interesting snippet.

And lo, it appears that Gazprom is looking into a take-over one of the Hungarian gas pipeline networks. Now that is not what the initial part of the post says, where it notes that the Hungarians are switching their gas purchases from a company (RosUkrEnergo) (RUE) that purchased Russian gas through Ukraine, to a company known as Rosgas AG. As part of the fallout from the January dispute between Russia and Ukraine RUE lost that business, and now Hungary has found a new middleman, Rosgas.

The immediate suspicion is that RosGas AG is yet another in a long line of shadowy intermediary companies created by Firtash and Gazprom. However, in the case of RosGas this may mask a possible attempt by Gazprom to cut gas supplies to Firtash's Emfesz, as a precursor to a company takeover - vastly increasing its share of the Hungarian domestic gas distribution network.

This becomes of some importance when one looks at the relative prospects of the two alternate paths for new gas to reach Western Europe – South Stream and Nabucco. South Stream is being increasingly pushed by Gazprom. The pipeline will bring gas under the Black Sea, and pass through Serbia and Slovenia before reaching Austria. However Eni, who is a 50% partner with Gazprom in this stage of its development, is upset that Gazprom is keeping it out of the negotiations with Serbia and Slovenia. Both countries are anticipated to sign agreements with Gazprom in the near future, without Eni, for gas supplies from South Stream.

And this may be where Hungary comes in, since the competing Nabucco pipeline goes through Hungary to get to the Austrian hub. So that if Gazprom controls the Hungarian pipelines, and can stop competitors’ gas flowing through them (a fact they used to get TNK-BP out of the rich Kovytka field after TNK-BP had developed it.) It is yet another couple of nails in the Nabucco coffin.

Earlier this week, with a fanfare celebrating the coming signature of the Nabucco agreement to run gas through the pipeline across Turkey it looked as though the pipeline was moving rather rapidly forward. However, buried within the story is the backing off of European funding

The European Commission is proposing to scale back its support for the Nabucco project to 200 million euros ($268 million) from 250 million euros, Tarradellas said in February. The aid would be channeled through the European Investment Bank.

At the same time, the last paragraph is interesting.

Friday's statement, signed by leaders of the EU, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Egypt, also said the EU and Egypt should "agree on specific projects in developing Egypt's gas reserves and export potential for the EU." It said it was signed "in the presence of the representatives of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan."The statement also called for a memorandum of understanding on energy between the EU and Iraq "as soon as possible." Barroso said a preliminary energy accord with Iraq was "imminent."

There are nuggets in that paragraph – first the pipeline cannot be effective without the gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. But none of them signed the document. Further Azerbaijan does not think that the project is feasible without Turkmenistan. The Turks will get paid for their trouble

The Turkish government has been driving a hard bargain, insisting on collecting a "tax" on the gas being pumped and demanding 15 percent of the transit gas at discounted prices. These requests have been rejected by the European Commission, the executive branch of the 27-nation bloc, delaying the 9 billion-euro project. More than half of the pipeline is to be located in Turkey.

But getting them on board helps negate the pressure that Russia (read Gazprom) is applying to discourage the “stans” from selling Nabucco their gas.

So as steps in the Great Game you could say that Europe took the first by planning Nabucco, then Russia took the second by stopping an adequate supply availability through pressure on Turkmenistan etc. Europe now gets the third, since with the pipeline running through Turkey they can (if politics allows) run connections into Iran, Egypt and Iraq. And before the step is completed Russia moves to step on their toes and gain control of the Hungarian section, thereby taking the fourth.

With Austria involved, maybe this part of the game is turning into a waltz – but with constantly changing partners - we shall see.