There is a trick that one can learn while a teenager, which comes with the introduction “I so strong that I can blow a brick over!” Upon finding a suitable victim to impress, the brick is placed over a deflated balloon, which is then inflated, raising the brick which then, if suitably placed, topples onto its side – proving the strength of your lungs.
The critical part of the activity is to have the air that you blow be confined within the balloon, and equally exert pressure over the surface of the brick, so that a low pressure translates into a much more significant and powerful force. It is the confinement of the pressure that allows the build-up that moves the brick.
In most cases the use of high-pressure water as a cutting tool does not see much confinement of the water over the cutting process, with the water flowing into the cut, removing some material, and then flowing on out. Yet the water still has considerable energy as it leaves, and this means that the process is usually quite inefficient. How then can the contained energy in the jet be used in a secondary way to improve the removal efficiency of the process?
One answer to the question comes with the use of long-chain polymeric additives. These have recently seen a fair amount of publicity because of their use as the “slick water” components of the “slick-water-fracking” tools that have helped improve the production of oil and natural gas from long horizontal wells drilled into the hydrocarbon deposits in places such as the Bakken fields of North Dakota and the Barnett and Eagle Ford Shales in Texas. The long horizontal wells are separated into short intervals, within which the pressure within the well is raised until the surrounding rock cracks (fracks) with s series of cracks that extend out into the surrounding rock. The crack makes it easier for the hydrocarbons in the rock to escape and reach the well, improving the recovery to the point that the well can be economic to operate. The reason that the “slick water” is used is that the crack would normally close back up after the borehole pressure was lowered back down. In order to stop this happening the fluid in the well during the frack is made up with long-chain polymers and also contains grains of a sand or similar proppant. When the crack is formed the fluid in the well flows into the crack, carrying the sand with it, and this then holds the crack open when the pressure falls.
The polymer thickens the water which makes up most of the fracking fluid, so that it can carry more of the sand, and at the same time, the polymer reduces the friction of the water against the rock, so that it is easier for the water and sand to penetrate deeper into the cracks. Once the proppant particles catch against the sides of the crack they become held in place, while the fluid moves on and eventually returns back out of the well.
Back in the days when I was carrying out the research for my doctorate, I had used the long-chain polymer Polymerized ethylene oxide (Polyox) to reduce the friction in the delivery line from the pump to the nozzle. The increased cohesion of the jet (which I will cover in posts that follow this) meant that it would cut to a greater distance from the nozzle, with less decline in cutting power. However the increased cohesion of the jet had an additional benefit, which was noted by Chapman Young, as part of his development of tools for removing loose rock from around tunnels.
In a typical tunnel excavation, the miners drill a pattern of holes in the face of the tunnel, and then partially fill these with explosive, which is then set off in a controlled pattern of blasting. The central core of rock on the face is broken out by the explosive force, but some portion of the rock at the edge of the blast is only loosened from the solid, and still hangs in place. One of the more dangerous mining jobs (which I have done) is to take a long pry bar and insert this behind the loose pieces of rock around the opening, hoping to be able to wedge these loose, so that they no longer pose a risk to miners who then pass underneath.
Seeking to automate this process Dr Young and his colleagues tried using high-pressure waterjets to blast these lumps free from the wall. Subsequently investigators at Colorado School of Mines have shown that the jets give an improved cleaning of the wall, over other methods – but as normally applied they do not have the confined power to be able to get behind the block with sufficient confined force to be able to pry larger blocks free.
And this is where the balloon analogy comes in, because Dr Young realized that if he could increase the viscocity of the water in the stream sufficiently so that, for a short instance, it would be confined behind the block and could acquire some of the pressure from the following impacting jet, then enough pressure over a large enough area would provide the force needed to dislodge the block. He tried it, and it worked.
It is not, however, a simple process to carry out, since the jet path must be carefully aimed to ensure that there is enough confinement of the water behind the target block for pressure to be built up, and this requires that the jet contain a relatively high concentration of polymer. That in itself brings another problem, which can be anticipated by the “slick water” nickname. Where the water gets onto the floor the friction reduction properties mean that it makes it quite difficult to walk on the wetted rock. Now while that, in turn, opens up a new avenue for business (the chemical is sometimes referred to as Banana water in riot control) it makes it unpopular with those that have to work with it in the confines of a mining tunnel and so the technology has not caught on. But it does provide an introduction to the topic of different cutting fluids, which will be the next topic of discussion.
Showing posts with label Bakken. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bakken. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Monday, February 16, 2015
Tech Talk - enjoy it while you can
It is perhaps an odd time to be writing about oil shortages. The price of gas in our town has just moved above $2 a gallon up significantly from the $1.64 it was at its recent lowest point, but still very reasonable. Debate still rages as to whether the global price of a barrel of oil has found a bottom, although there are signs that the price is beginning to increase, in part due to other issues than overall availability of crude. So why be concerned?
There are several issues, and perhaps the first is that of industrial inertia. Despite the daily fluctuations in oil price, many of the events that occur between the time that oil is found in a layer of rock underground and the time that some of it is poured into your gas tank take a long time to initiate, and similarly can’t be turned off overnight. It takes, for example, roughly 47 days for a tanker to travel from Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia to Houston.
One response to the drop in oil prices has been to reduce the number of rigs drilling for oil in the United States. Again this is not an immediate response, but rather one that grows with time. This is particularly true with the number of oil rigs that are used to gain access to the oil reservoirs. As the price for this oil falls, so rigs are idled and the potential for additional oil production also declines. This drop is particularly significant in fields that are horizontally drilled and fracked because of the very rapid decline in production with time in existing wells and the need for continued drilling to develop and produce new wells to sustain and grow production. The most recent figures show a fall of 98 rigs in the week from the 6th to the 13th of February, with the overall count now standing at 1,358. This rate of decline has held at nearly 100 rigs a week now for the past three with no indication of any immediate change in the slope of the curve. At the same time the number of well completions in the Bakken is falling, as producers hold back on the costs for producing oil that would be sold at a loss.
The impact from this will take time to appear, North Dakota has reached a production rate of 1.2 mbd in December and the DMR estimates that it will need around 140 rigs to sustain that production level this year, with the most recent rig count being 137. This number is likely to continue to fall through the first six months of the year.
The impact is not just in the immediate loss of production. Rather, once the rigs are idled it will take time, even after the markets recover, for the companies to adjust their planning and finances, and to re-activate the rigs. What this effectively does is to shift the production increment into later years, when the production base from existing wells will have declined beyond current levels. This means that the peak level of production will likely also be lower than would otherwise be the case, and the period over which this peak production is sustained will also be shorter.
The problem that this all presages is that lower levels of production against an increasing world demand will induce a faster rise in price than many now anticipate. There is a complacent feeling that oil prices won’t reach $100 a barrel for some considerable time - perhaps even years. If the current difference between available oil supply and demand is below 2 mbd, Euan Mearns has suggested that roughly half of this might be eaten up by increased demand, while the other half would disappear as production levels drop, although he doesn’t see this bringing the two volumes into rough balance until the end of 2016.
I rather think that it will happen faster than that, and that the price trough will steepen faster than currently anticipated, and likely before the end of this year. The problem (if you want to call it that) with the perceptions of the ability of global production to meet demand is that it is all tied to the production of the United States and Canada. I have noted, over the past two years, how future projections of increasing global oil demand have been met, in models, by increased production from the United States, and that this was anticipated to continue. (Increased production from Iraq, if sustained, is more likely to be needed just to balance declines in production from other countries).
Yet the US industry is going into a relatively rapid decline because of the way that it is structured that is going to be hard to stop, and much slower to reverse than anticipated. (In a way it is similar to the intermittent traffic congestion one finds on roads which result because we brake a lot faster than we then accelerate). This will not only stop the growth in production that is currently anticipated, but will go further and before the end of the year will lead to a drop in overall volumes produced. Yet demand is expected to increase. Where will the supply come from, if not the United States?
While Saudi Arabia can produce more, one gets the sense that they are quite comfortable where they are, thank you and won’t be increasing their contribution, and while Russia may bemoan the price they are getting for their oil, if the price goes up they are not going to be able to meet an increased demand, nor are there likely to be others with spare capacity that they can bring to the table. And because of the inertia in the system the United States will still be in a mode of declining production.
So I rather suspect that what we can anticipate is that prices will start to recover through the summer, and then, as the full impact of the rebalanced situation starts to become evident, will move higher at an increasing rate. Because if, in fact, we are reaching the period of a tighter balance between demand and available supply, then the market will change its perceptions quite quickly and be driven by a totally different metric.
There are several issues, and perhaps the first is that of industrial inertia. Despite the daily fluctuations in oil price, many of the events that occur between the time that oil is found in a layer of rock underground and the time that some of it is poured into your gas tank take a long time to initiate, and similarly can’t be turned off overnight. It takes, for example, roughly 47 days for a tanker to travel from Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia to Houston.
One response to the drop in oil prices has been to reduce the number of rigs drilling for oil in the United States. Again this is not an immediate response, but rather one that grows with time. This is particularly true with the number of oil rigs that are used to gain access to the oil reservoirs. As the price for this oil falls, so rigs are idled and the potential for additional oil production also declines. This drop is particularly significant in fields that are horizontally drilled and fracked because of the very rapid decline in production with time in existing wells and the need for continued drilling to develop and produce new wells to sustain and grow production. The most recent figures show a fall of 98 rigs in the week from the 6th to the 13th of February, with the overall count now standing at 1,358. This rate of decline has held at nearly 100 rigs a week now for the past three with no indication of any immediate change in the slope of the curve. At the same time the number of well completions in the Bakken is falling, as producers hold back on the costs for producing oil that would be sold at a loss.
The impact from this will take time to appear, North Dakota has reached a production rate of 1.2 mbd in December and the DMR estimates that it will need around 140 rigs to sustain that production level this year, with the most recent rig count being 137. This number is likely to continue to fall through the first six months of the year.
The impact is not just in the immediate loss of production. Rather, once the rigs are idled it will take time, even after the markets recover, for the companies to adjust their planning and finances, and to re-activate the rigs. What this effectively does is to shift the production increment into later years, when the production base from existing wells will have declined beyond current levels. This means that the peak level of production will likely also be lower than would otherwise be the case, and the period over which this peak production is sustained will also be shorter.
The problem that this all presages is that lower levels of production against an increasing world demand will induce a faster rise in price than many now anticipate. There is a complacent feeling that oil prices won’t reach $100 a barrel for some considerable time - perhaps even years. If the current difference between available oil supply and demand is below 2 mbd, Euan Mearns has suggested that roughly half of this might be eaten up by increased demand, while the other half would disappear as production levels drop, although he doesn’t see this bringing the two volumes into rough balance until the end of 2016.
I rather think that it will happen faster than that, and that the price trough will steepen faster than currently anticipated, and likely before the end of this year. The problem (if you want to call it that) with the perceptions of the ability of global production to meet demand is that it is all tied to the production of the United States and Canada. I have noted, over the past two years, how future projections of increasing global oil demand have been met, in models, by increased production from the United States, and that this was anticipated to continue. (Increased production from Iraq, if sustained, is more likely to be needed just to balance declines in production from other countries).
Yet the US industry is going into a relatively rapid decline because of the way that it is structured that is going to be hard to stop, and much slower to reverse than anticipated. (In a way it is similar to the intermittent traffic congestion one finds on roads which result because we brake a lot faster than we then accelerate). This will not only stop the growth in production that is currently anticipated, but will go further and before the end of the year will lead to a drop in overall volumes produced. Yet demand is expected to increase. Where will the supply come from, if not the United States?
While Saudi Arabia can produce more, one gets the sense that they are quite comfortable where they are, thank you and won’t be increasing their contribution, and while Russia may bemoan the price they are getting for their oil, if the price goes up they are not going to be able to meet an increased demand, nor are there likely to be others with spare capacity that they can bring to the table. And because of the inertia in the system the United States will still be in a mode of declining production.
So I rather suspect that what we can anticipate is that prices will start to recover through the summer, and then, as the full impact of the rebalanced situation starts to become evident, will move higher at an increasing rate. Because if, in fact, we are reaching the period of a tighter balance between demand and available supply, then the market will change its perceptions quite quickly and be driven by a totally different metric.
Read more!
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
Tech Talk - Projections 2
It is the end of another year, or more optimistically the start of a new one. Last year I was tempted to make a couple of predictions for the future. And while I can make the case that they were not too wrong, they did not include the drop in oil prices, which has now taken the price of our local gas to below $1.85 a gallon. China has, in recent months, seemed less belligerent about claiming large sections of the China Seas. Whether this has anything to do with the relative success of rigs that have drilled in those waters is something that still remains an unknown.
But it is the changing price of gasoline, itself reflective of the drop in oil prices that is the big news. WTI closed at $53.56 today, and Brent at $57.50 a barrel. Predictions include some who would suggest that the price will continue to fall, until it reaches $20 a barrel, and there it may stay for some time. Well it certainly grabs a headline, but that is about all the value that particular forecast contains. The futures prices suggest that the price has yet to bottom out, though it may be getting close to that value.
Figure 1. Crude oil futures prices (EIA TWIP)
None of the recent news suggests that there will be a further increase in supply to sustain the current imbalance between available supply and demand. Libya is descending even further into a mess, with the oil facilities at the port of Es Sider now being destroyed. The likelihood of significant increases in production and the return to export levels achieved earlier this summer seems increasingly nonexistent. Neither Russia nor Saudi Arabia are likely to increase production, although the latter are continuing to produce the increased volume that they originally put on the market to replace Libyan losses. And so this leaves Iraq and the United States as the key producers who can significantly change the current supply:demand balance in any significant way.
It is probable that, with the agreement between the Kurds and the Central Government now having generated a second payment of $500 million to the KRG that the agreement may be sustained and grow. At present the Kurds are to supply about 550 kbd, of which 300 kbd will travel through the new pipeline to Turkey and thence onto the world market. The rest will be supplied to Baghdad. Meanwhile production in the south (which gets exported through Basra) has seen some increase.
Whether the Kurdish production can increase to over 1 mbd by the end of next year remains open to some doubt, given the ongoing conflict, and the target 6 mbd by the end of the decade for the entire country will likely require changes that the current conflict, which shows no signs of ending, will inhibit.
One of my responses, when the drop in price first started, was to note that the oil supply system has a certain inertia to it. And here I am not talking about the fluctuations in price that one sees in the stock market, and in the price of the crude, but rather in the time that it takes to stop current drilling, postpone future plans and to reduce the production from existing and new developments.
Thus the drop in investment in new production, whether in Russia, Iraq or the United States takes some time to have an impact. Unfortunately for those expecting the price to continue to fall, in the face of the overabundant supply, the situation has changed since historic times, where well production was relatively stable and the oversupply situation was corrected by shutting in production (mainly by Saudi Arabia). Even then it was the perception of the response that drove price rebounds, rather than the immediate reality of the changes.
The system this time is different. The increase in production in the United States has been sustained, and over the last two years has produced more than 2 mbd more than at the start of that period.
Figure 2. US crude oil production over the past two years. (EIA TWIP)
The rig count in North Dakota has already fallen to 170 rigs compared with 187 at this time last year. Concern about the oil price has led companies to cut their investment plans for next years, in some case by 20% so that the rig count is likely to continue to fall. And with the short life at high production values for most wells that will soon affect production. The North Dakota Oil and Gas Division of DMR shows the consequences of this:
Figure 3. Future production estimates from the ND DMR Oil and Gas Division.
The blue line requires about 225 rigs in continuous action, so that won’t happen. By the same token the black line is with no more drilling, and that won’t happen either. The result will be somewhere in between, probably moving the peak out beyond the current projection, but also lowering it as the existing baseline drops with less wells significantly contributing. (Bear in mind it is taking 11,892 wells to sustain current production levels.) But in the short term the line will likely dip down until the price rebounds.
The question now becomes how soon that drop in US production will become evident, and have some impact. I doubt that it will be before June of 2015.
On which note may I wish all readers a Happy, Healthy, Successful and Prosperous 2015.
But it is the changing price of gasoline, itself reflective of the drop in oil prices that is the big news. WTI closed at $53.56 today, and Brent at $57.50 a barrel. Predictions include some who would suggest that the price will continue to fall, until it reaches $20 a barrel, and there it may stay for some time. Well it certainly grabs a headline, but that is about all the value that particular forecast contains. The futures prices suggest that the price has yet to bottom out, though it may be getting close to that value.
Figure 1. Crude oil futures prices (EIA TWIP)
None of the recent news suggests that there will be a further increase in supply to sustain the current imbalance between available supply and demand. Libya is descending even further into a mess, with the oil facilities at the port of Es Sider now being destroyed. The likelihood of significant increases in production and the return to export levels achieved earlier this summer seems increasingly nonexistent. Neither Russia nor Saudi Arabia are likely to increase production, although the latter are continuing to produce the increased volume that they originally put on the market to replace Libyan losses. And so this leaves Iraq and the United States as the key producers who can significantly change the current supply:demand balance in any significant way.
It is probable that, with the agreement between the Kurds and the Central Government now having generated a second payment of $500 million to the KRG that the agreement may be sustained and grow. At present the Kurds are to supply about 550 kbd, of which 300 kbd will travel through the new pipeline to Turkey and thence onto the world market. The rest will be supplied to Baghdad. Meanwhile production in the south (which gets exported through Basra) has seen some increase.
Whether the Kurdish production can increase to over 1 mbd by the end of next year remains open to some doubt, given the ongoing conflict, and the target 6 mbd by the end of the decade for the entire country will likely require changes that the current conflict, which shows no signs of ending, will inhibit.
One of my responses, when the drop in price first started, was to note that the oil supply system has a certain inertia to it. And here I am not talking about the fluctuations in price that one sees in the stock market, and in the price of the crude, but rather in the time that it takes to stop current drilling, postpone future plans and to reduce the production from existing and new developments.
Thus the drop in investment in new production, whether in Russia, Iraq or the United States takes some time to have an impact. Unfortunately for those expecting the price to continue to fall, in the face of the overabundant supply, the situation has changed since historic times, where well production was relatively stable and the oversupply situation was corrected by shutting in production (mainly by Saudi Arabia). Even then it was the perception of the response that drove price rebounds, rather than the immediate reality of the changes.
The system this time is different. The increase in production in the United States has been sustained, and over the last two years has produced more than 2 mbd more than at the start of that period.
Figure 2. US crude oil production over the past two years. (EIA TWIP)
The rig count in North Dakota has already fallen to 170 rigs compared with 187 at this time last year. Concern about the oil price has led companies to cut their investment plans for next years, in some case by 20% so that the rig count is likely to continue to fall. And with the short life at high production values for most wells that will soon affect production. The North Dakota Oil and Gas Division of DMR shows the consequences of this:
Figure 3. Future production estimates from the ND DMR Oil and Gas Division.
The blue line requires about 225 rigs in continuous action, so that won’t happen. By the same token the black line is with no more drilling, and that won’t happen either. The result will be somewhere in between, probably moving the peak out beyond the current projection, but also lowering it as the existing baseline drops with less wells significantly contributing. (Bear in mind it is taking 11,892 wells to sustain current production levels.) But in the short term the line will likely dip down until the price rebounds.
The question now becomes how soon that drop in US production will become evident, and have some impact. I doubt that it will be before June of 2015.
On which note may I wish all readers a Happy, Healthy, Successful and Prosperous 2015.
Read more!
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Tech Talk - A Gentle Cough!
When I last wrote about the global supply of oil, it was back in October, as the fall in oil prices was developing. Since then the price has continued to fall, with prices now below $60 a barrel. I was doubtful back then that the price would fall as far as it has, and remain cynical that it will remain down for very long. Since this seems to go against much current wisdom, let me explain why I remain pessimistic that the boost to the global economy from access to cheaper fuel will continue for any great length of time.
It depends on whose data you believe credible as to how much more oil is available than that currently in demand. When looking at the numbers in the past I used a number of roughly 1 mbd, but this is hard to realistically quantify. Why – well the problem comes with the regions of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where there are current conflicts. The ones of particular concern are Libya and Iraq, although the fluctuating state of exports from Iran cannot be neglected. When the Libyan conflict first impacted the export of oil from that country Saudi Arabia began increasing its production to offset the loss in Libyan exports.
There came a time in September when Libyan exports, which had fallen to around 300 kbd from a high of over 1.6 mbd, shot back up to around 900 kbd. The EIA has recently shown an inverse correlation between Libyan production and oil price:
Figure 1. Brent Oil Price and Libyan oil production (EIA )
Thus, when an additional 600 kbd suddenly appeared back in the marketplace, it is not surprising that it had an impact on prices. However while there was already some surplus in the market (from increased production in the US etc, as I will comment on below) the volume of the addition had a more significant impact on prices, and when KSA decided not to reduce production this led the market to assume that we had returned to plentiful sufficiency, and prices have continued to fall since.
However, this perception is already unraveling. Libyan conflict has continued to embroil their oil fields. The Sharara field, which produces 300 kbd closed in November as conflict overwhelmed it. At the moment two of the oil export terminals are threatened, and with them another 300 kbd of oil. But it is not possible, at this point, to predict what is going to happen in either location. There is little sign that the conflict is any closer to resolution, meaning the production will continue to be threatened into the foreseeable future. Sadly it it more likely that this will have negative impact on oil production, so that it might be wiser to assume lower rather than higher volumes coming from the country.
The situation is a little clearer and more optimistic in Iraq, where the pipeline through Kurdish territory has lessened the impact of the Islamic State take-over of a large swath of the country. The recent agreement between the Iraqi Federal Government (IFG) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) approved early this month is already raising questions over the volumes that the KRG will put onto the market. The agreement calls for sales of around 550 kbd, but there is an additional 100 kbd that is available, the status of which is unclear. The country is exporting, overall, around 2.51 mbd and the pipeline to Turkey is currently carrying 280 kbd, but is being boosted to carry 400 kbd, with an ultimate throughput of 700 kbd. Part of the problem in assessing the market for this, however, in the short term is that the Iraqi crude is often heavier and of relatively lower quality than the market average. This is currently causing some marketing problems, leading the IFG to lower prices in order to find a market. In neither case, however, is the current conflict likely to impact the production for export, and while it is difficult to anticipate much production above 3.5 mbd. (The December OPEC MOMR suggests that they are producing 3.36 mbd at the moment) we are unlikely to se any significant reduction in production going forward. The significant growth in global production to meet a still predicted rise in demand next year (albeit down slightly from previous estimates) will, therefore, not come from OPEC, who still anticipate that they will produce, on average 400 kbd less than they have this year. It is still expected that American production will continue to rise to meet expectations of increased global demand.
The problem, unfortunately, with that view, is that increases in US production are tied to output from fracked horizontal wells that are expensive to drill, and have a relatively short production life, with the majority of production coming in the first year of operation. Thus, in order to sustain production, more wells must be drilled each month to cover the loss in production from existing operations. The North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources projects that 225 or more drilling rigs are needed to sustain the growth of production from the state over the next three years (at which time it will plateau at around 1.5 mbd). Presently there are roughly 180 rigs operating, with the count falling by the week, as the rewards, at present, do not match the cost. The agency anticipates that the number will fall by an additional 40-50 rigs by the middle of next year. Well completions are also falling by the month, as the industry likely plans to wait out the current hiatus in prices. The impact of this on even short term production should not be discounted. There has already been a slight fall in production, rather than a gain, in October, and that will likely accelerate.
Without any gain in production, and in fact seeing the potential for a drop in US production over the next year, then the anticipated surplus between oil supply and demand will likely disappear. Remember that the MENA nations are seeing a growth in their internal demand for oil (in the KSA this has already passed 3 mbd) so that if they had no impetus to reduce production and exports in the face of falling prices, so they are unlikely to increase production when prices pick up. (They haven’t before).
When will this all happen? Well I got the size of the price fall wrong, so don’t hold me to the exact timing, but I would anticipate that when we see the start of the driving season next year, the oil market will tighten rather quickly. Following that (given the inertia in getting production back in the US) we will (as I have been expecting for a couple of years) see the global concern over supply start to be a significant factor in 2016.
Have a Happy Holiday!
It depends on whose data you believe credible as to how much more oil is available than that currently in demand. When looking at the numbers in the past I used a number of roughly 1 mbd, but this is hard to realistically quantify. Why – well the problem comes with the regions of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where there are current conflicts. The ones of particular concern are Libya and Iraq, although the fluctuating state of exports from Iran cannot be neglected. When the Libyan conflict first impacted the export of oil from that country Saudi Arabia began increasing its production to offset the loss in Libyan exports.
There came a time in September when Libyan exports, which had fallen to around 300 kbd from a high of over 1.6 mbd, shot back up to around 900 kbd. The EIA has recently shown an inverse correlation between Libyan production and oil price:
Figure 1. Brent Oil Price and Libyan oil production (EIA )
Thus, when an additional 600 kbd suddenly appeared back in the marketplace, it is not surprising that it had an impact on prices. However while there was already some surplus in the market (from increased production in the US etc, as I will comment on below) the volume of the addition had a more significant impact on prices, and when KSA decided not to reduce production this led the market to assume that we had returned to plentiful sufficiency, and prices have continued to fall since.
However, this perception is already unraveling. Libyan conflict has continued to embroil their oil fields. The Sharara field, which produces 300 kbd closed in November as conflict overwhelmed it. At the moment two of the oil export terminals are threatened, and with them another 300 kbd of oil. But it is not possible, at this point, to predict what is going to happen in either location. There is little sign that the conflict is any closer to resolution, meaning the production will continue to be threatened into the foreseeable future. Sadly it it more likely that this will have negative impact on oil production, so that it might be wiser to assume lower rather than higher volumes coming from the country.
The situation is a little clearer and more optimistic in Iraq, where the pipeline through Kurdish territory has lessened the impact of the Islamic State take-over of a large swath of the country. The recent agreement between the Iraqi Federal Government (IFG) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) approved early this month is already raising questions over the volumes that the KRG will put onto the market. The agreement calls for sales of around 550 kbd, but there is an additional 100 kbd that is available, the status of which is unclear. The country is exporting, overall, around 2.51 mbd and the pipeline to Turkey is currently carrying 280 kbd, but is being boosted to carry 400 kbd, with an ultimate throughput of 700 kbd. Part of the problem in assessing the market for this, however, in the short term is that the Iraqi crude is often heavier and of relatively lower quality than the market average. This is currently causing some marketing problems, leading the IFG to lower prices in order to find a market. In neither case, however, is the current conflict likely to impact the production for export, and while it is difficult to anticipate much production above 3.5 mbd. (The December OPEC MOMR suggests that they are producing 3.36 mbd at the moment) we are unlikely to se any significant reduction in production going forward. The significant growth in global production to meet a still predicted rise in demand next year (albeit down slightly from previous estimates) will, therefore, not come from OPEC, who still anticipate that they will produce, on average 400 kbd less than they have this year. It is still expected that American production will continue to rise to meet expectations of increased global demand.
The problem, unfortunately, with that view, is that increases in US production are tied to output from fracked horizontal wells that are expensive to drill, and have a relatively short production life, with the majority of production coming in the first year of operation. Thus, in order to sustain production, more wells must be drilled each month to cover the loss in production from existing operations. The North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources projects that 225 or more drilling rigs are needed to sustain the growth of production from the state over the next three years (at which time it will plateau at around 1.5 mbd). Presently there are roughly 180 rigs operating, with the count falling by the week, as the rewards, at present, do not match the cost. The agency anticipates that the number will fall by an additional 40-50 rigs by the middle of next year. Well completions are also falling by the month, as the industry likely plans to wait out the current hiatus in prices. The impact of this on even short term production should not be discounted. There has already been a slight fall in production, rather than a gain, in October, and that will likely accelerate.
Without any gain in production, and in fact seeing the potential for a drop in US production over the next year, then the anticipated surplus between oil supply and demand will likely disappear. Remember that the MENA nations are seeing a growth in their internal demand for oil (in the KSA this has already passed 3 mbd) so that if they had no impetus to reduce production and exports in the face of falling prices, so they are unlikely to increase production when prices pick up. (They haven’t before).
When will this all happen? Well I got the size of the price fall wrong, so don’t hold me to the exact timing, but I would anticipate that when we see the start of the driving season next year, the oil market will tighten rather quickly. Following that (given the inertia in getting production back in the US) we will (as I have been expecting for a couple of years) see the global concern over supply start to be a significant factor in 2016.
Have a Happy Holiday!
Read more!
Sunday, August 10, 2014
Tech Talk - Rig Counts in the Middle East
In recent posts about the situation in the Middle East, I have noted the need for Aramco to increase the number of drilling rigs that it must use, since it is now looking for natural gas in their tight sand deposits rather than finding the large reserves that they had hoped in the shale reservoirs. It is interesting in this regard to plot the number of rigs that have been working in the Middle East.
Getting the overall data from Baker Hughes the rig count can be plotted, over time, to give the following:
Figure 1. Rig Counts in the Middle East (Baker Hughes)
If one looks at the trend for the last twelve months, it has remains on a fairly consistent upward trend, following that of the longer time interval plot of Figure 1.
Figure 2. Recent trend in Middle East Rig count (Baker Hughes)
Back in the days of The Oil Drum, Euan Mearns and I had this concern, which occasionally surfaced, about these numbers. From my early post on the subject which noted that back in 2005 the KSA were running around 20 rigs, which would not be enough to get them the production they were claiming to need in the future, to Euan’s in 2011, the topic was revisited regularly over the time that the count steadily mounted as the Kingdom had to drill an increasing number of wells just to keep production at around the same overall level.
I am using the KSA as the example, given the large volume of its production relative to that of the others in the Middle East, but as the numbers show, the trend toward increased drilling rate to create enough productive wells to sustain production as the larger volume wells dry up is starting to become a steadily more frantic race across the region.
Rune Likvern used the phrase “Red Queen” in discussing the overall long-term need of the companies in the Bakken to have to drill an increasing number of wells, with individually reducing production, in order to remain in place with regard to overall production. As the production from the Bakken now exceeds a million barrels a day it may seem foolish to be predicting this “squirrel cage” view of the future, but the rig count up there is still running at around 190 rigs, which is not enough to sustain future growth for long, given that access to the sweet spots is limited, and they are beginning to run out of new sites.
So it is in the Middle East. The rig count numbers are mounting steadily, it is reported that there were 88 rigs drilling in the country in October 2012. Last year this rose to 170, and the number is expected to rise to 210 by the end of this year.
Aramco have done remarkably well, over the past decade, in developing new technologies to harvest the attic oil left around the tops of the major producing formations such as Ghawar, as the main body of the fields begin to be exhausted. But the problem with these secondary rig operations is that they were directed at the smaller pools around the field, rather than tapping into the major volume, and thus they had an expected and finite life. That life is starting to come to a close. Just as, when sucking a thick milk shake through a single immovable straw, when it stops drawing fluid, there is still a fair amount left in the cup. But as you move the straw around and slide it up and down the sides, the amount that you recover gets less, and it takes greater and greater effort to get it, to the point where you quit and discard the carton. And that is where the Middle Eastern oilfields are beginning to find themselves.
The high-quality light oils of the mainland are rapidly running out, and the remaining fields with the promise for sustaining Saudi production at around 10 mbd for the next few years, are the heavier sour crudes from the offshore fields such as Safaniya and Manifa. At the same time there is a need to reduce the increasing amount of oil (now at 3 mbd) being consumed in country, with the hope that this can be replaced by domestic natural gas. But those hopes are being reduced as the shales are found to be less productive than anticipated, and hopes are now switching to the slower production that can, hopefully, be achieved from the tight sands – but at the cost of an increased number of wells, inter alia.
This is the writing on the wall for global oil production, and in the short-term it will be neglected. Increasing the number of rigs will, in that interval, increase the number of wells that will produce, even though the volume from each well will be less, and the overall life of the wells will similarly reduce, as higher production techniques tap into smaller fields.
But we are now on the treadmill in the squirrel cage, or, as Rune would have it, we have wrapped ourselves in the cape and crown of the Red Queen, and must run faster and faster just to stay in place. (There are additional concerns since, as an example, Manifa could not be brought on line until there were refineries built that could process that crude, and so the options for increasing production beyond the capacity of refineries to absorb that increase is a futile exercise).
There will soon come a time when the gain from the overall increase in new wells will not match the decline in production from older wells, particularly if the effort to “run faster” is restricted to only a few players (Russia for example is not yet putting the effort and investment into increased drilling rates in order to sustain their overall levels of production, and given the age of their major fields are likely now in terminal decline).
Ouch!
Getting the overall data from Baker Hughes the rig count can be plotted, over time, to give the following:
Figure 1. Rig Counts in the Middle East (Baker Hughes)
If one looks at the trend for the last twelve months, it has remains on a fairly consistent upward trend, following that of the longer time interval plot of Figure 1.
Figure 2. Recent trend in Middle East Rig count (Baker Hughes)
Back in the days of The Oil Drum, Euan Mearns and I had this concern, which occasionally surfaced, about these numbers. From my early post on the subject which noted that back in 2005 the KSA were running around 20 rigs, which would not be enough to get them the production they were claiming to need in the future, to Euan’s in 2011, the topic was revisited regularly over the time that the count steadily mounted as the Kingdom had to drill an increasing number of wells just to keep production at around the same overall level.
I am using the KSA as the example, given the large volume of its production relative to that of the others in the Middle East, but as the numbers show, the trend toward increased drilling rate to create enough productive wells to sustain production as the larger volume wells dry up is starting to become a steadily more frantic race across the region.
Rune Likvern used the phrase “Red Queen” in discussing the overall long-term need of the companies in the Bakken to have to drill an increasing number of wells, with individually reducing production, in order to remain in place with regard to overall production. As the production from the Bakken now exceeds a million barrels a day it may seem foolish to be predicting this “squirrel cage” view of the future, but the rig count up there is still running at around 190 rigs, which is not enough to sustain future growth for long, given that access to the sweet spots is limited, and they are beginning to run out of new sites.
So it is in the Middle East. The rig count numbers are mounting steadily, it is reported that there were 88 rigs drilling in the country in October 2012. Last year this rose to 170, and the number is expected to rise to 210 by the end of this year.
Aramco have done remarkably well, over the past decade, in developing new technologies to harvest the attic oil left around the tops of the major producing formations such as Ghawar, as the main body of the fields begin to be exhausted. But the problem with these secondary rig operations is that they were directed at the smaller pools around the field, rather than tapping into the major volume, and thus they had an expected and finite life. That life is starting to come to a close. Just as, when sucking a thick milk shake through a single immovable straw, when it stops drawing fluid, there is still a fair amount left in the cup. But as you move the straw around and slide it up and down the sides, the amount that you recover gets less, and it takes greater and greater effort to get it, to the point where you quit and discard the carton. And that is where the Middle Eastern oilfields are beginning to find themselves.
The high-quality light oils of the mainland are rapidly running out, and the remaining fields with the promise for sustaining Saudi production at around 10 mbd for the next few years, are the heavier sour crudes from the offshore fields such as Safaniya and Manifa. At the same time there is a need to reduce the increasing amount of oil (now at 3 mbd) being consumed in country, with the hope that this can be replaced by domestic natural gas. But those hopes are being reduced as the shales are found to be less productive than anticipated, and hopes are now switching to the slower production that can, hopefully, be achieved from the tight sands – but at the cost of an increased number of wells, inter alia.
This is the writing on the wall for global oil production, and in the short-term it will be neglected. Increasing the number of rigs will, in that interval, increase the number of wells that will produce, even though the volume from each well will be less, and the overall life of the wells will similarly reduce, as higher production techniques tap into smaller fields.
But we are now on the treadmill in the squirrel cage, or, as Rune would have it, we have wrapped ourselves in the cape and crown of the Red Queen, and must run faster and faster just to stay in place. (There are additional concerns since, as an example, Manifa could not be brought on line until there were refineries built that could process that crude, and so the options for increasing production beyond the capacity of refineries to absorb that increase is a futile exercise).
There will soon come a time when the gain from the overall increase in new wells will not match the decline in production from older wells, particularly if the effort to “run faster” is restricted to only a few players (Russia for example is not yet putting the effort and investment into increased drilling rates in order to sustain their overall levels of production, and given the age of their major fields are likely now in terminal decline).
Ouch!
Read more!
Sunday, July 6, 2014
Tech Talk - of longer wells and drawdown pressure
There are, simply, three major parts to the coming global economic mess that will be created as we enter into the period of Peak Oil. The first of these comes from the current rising demand for oil, particularly emphasized by those countries, such as China and India, where demand is rising fastest. The second part is the declining production from existing fields as their reserves are drawn down. (Though it should be remembered that even when “exhausted” the fields will still contain vast quantities of oil, but oil which is at present not economically recoverable). And finally there is the oil in the undeveloped, and undiscovered wells and fields that can be added to the existing reserve to help ameliorate the imbalance between demand and supply from existing wells.
The high decline rates from long horizontal wells drilled into, and along the shale deposits in the United States, most particularly the Bakken and the Eagle Ford, mean that there is a constant need to drill new wells to sustain existing production. The EIA has taken note of this and calculated based on some assumptions, the number of rigs that must be operating in these fields, so that they will drill enough new wells to sustain current production.
Figure 1. The number of rigs required in the Bakken and Eagle Ford formations to sustain production at the level of the previous month (EIA).
Should the need be to increase production (which is the current assumption by most prognosticators of future equilibrium between demand and supply) then these numbers need to be significantly higher, perhaps by as many as 50 additional rigs. At present the Bakken rig count is running at around 176 rigs while there are around 270 rigs drilling in the Eagle Ford.
One of the ways in which production is anticipated to expand above earlier estimates for the wells drilled in both fields comes from the ability to drill longer horizontal wells and to increase the fracture density along these wells.
However, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia discovered some years ago, longer wells can only be viably effective out to a certain distance, beyond which there is no gain in productivity. As a result they have changed their drilling patterns so that the wells are shorter, with multiple laterals spreading from the original wells to more thoroughly cover the rock within the formation. Initially wells were drilled out to distances of up to 12 km, but over time the KSA found that this was too long.
Since there is a somewhat similar argument to be made for the wells in the United States, as they move to longer distances, I thought I would go over the explanation as to why this is not a very productive idea a second time.
To begin consider that regardless of whether I put a tiny glass of water or a huge glass of soda in front of you, if I glue it to the table then the amount that you can drink at one time becomes limited by the size of the straw that I give you to drink the liquid, rather than the amount in the container. And to get that liquid into the straw and up into your mouth requires that you suck on the straw.
What you are doing is reducing the pressure at the bottom of the straw, while the pressure from the atmosphere on the top of the liquid remains the same. By creating this differential pressure there is now a force to move the liquid into the straw and thence up into your mouth.
But, as Fishbuch et al showed, as the horizontal well bore gets longer the pressure at the back of the hole declines as then does the difference in pressure between the oil in the rock and the well (the drawdown pressure), and while the longer hole gives an overall increase in production to a certain point this seems to maximize at a length of around 6,000 ft. Beyond that distance the differential pressure between the formation and the well falls to a point where there is less benefit to the additional cost of drilling to that distance.
Figure 2. Drop in well pressure with increased well length, while increasing overall oil flow (Simulation by Fishbuch et al )
The answer which Aramco came up with to get around this problem was to use a main lateral from which a number of shorter laterals could then be drilled out into the formation, providing higher drawdown pressures within the wells and making it also easier to isolate any well section where the underlying water broke through into the well.
Figure 3. Schematic of a Maximum Reservoir Contact well as used in Saudi Arabia (Aramco).
The optimum length at which a well can produce is a function of the rock type and structure as well as the nature of the oil/natural gas that it contains and the water content (to name by a few of the parameters). Thus there are limits to the analogy, nevertheless it does show, even in the much more productive rocks of the fields in KSA that there are limits to how far a well can be productively driven, and these limits will also exist in the shales of the United States, although the oil locations and the optimal ways of extracting it are somewhat different.
The extraction of oil and natural gas in these shales is more sensitive to the levels of drawdown pressure, since much of the oil and gas is found in natural fractures that are not that wide (although they may be spread further apart by the fracking process itself). With exposure to the lower well pressure thus being restricted to a relatively small volume, significant reduction in the pressure because of the location relative to the heel of the well can have significant effects on lowering the overall well production.
Further as a general rule the complex valve systems used in KSA are not installed in the shale wells of the United States, making it less practical to focus the relative pressure differentials at different points along the well bore as a means of increasing production sequentially along the well.
The high decline rates from long horizontal wells drilled into, and along the shale deposits in the United States, most particularly the Bakken and the Eagle Ford, mean that there is a constant need to drill new wells to sustain existing production. The EIA has taken note of this and calculated based on some assumptions, the number of rigs that must be operating in these fields, so that they will drill enough new wells to sustain current production.
Figure 1. The number of rigs required in the Bakken and Eagle Ford formations to sustain production at the level of the previous month (EIA).
Should the need be to increase production (which is the current assumption by most prognosticators of future equilibrium between demand and supply) then these numbers need to be significantly higher, perhaps by as many as 50 additional rigs. At present the Bakken rig count is running at around 176 rigs while there are around 270 rigs drilling in the Eagle Ford.
One of the ways in which production is anticipated to expand above earlier estimates for the wells drilled in both fields comes from the ability to drill longer horizontal wells and to increase the fracture density along these wells.
However, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia discovered some years ago, longer wells can only be viably effective out to a certain distance, beyond which there is no gain in productivity. As a result they have changed their drilling patterns so that the wells are shorter, with multiple laterals spreading from the original wells to more thoroughly cover the rock within the formation. Initially wells were drilled out to distances of up to 12 km, but over time the KSA found that this was too long.
Since there is a somewhat similar argument to be made for the wells in the United States, as they move to longer distances, I thought I would go over the explanation as to why this is not a very productive idea a second time.
To begin consider that regardless of whether I put a tiny glass of water or a huge glass of soda in front of you, if I glue it to the table then the amount that you can drink at one time becomes limited by the size of the straw that I give you to drink the liquid, rather than the amount in the container. And to get that liquid into the straw and up into your mouth requires that you suck on the straw.
What you are doing is reducing the pressure at the bottom of the straw, while the pressure from the atmosphere on the top of the liquid remains the same. By creating this differential pressure there is now a force to move the liquid into the straw and thence up into your mouth.
But, as Fishbuch et al showed, as the horizontal well bore gets longer the pressure at the back of the hole declines as then does the difference in pressure between the oil in the rock and the well (the drawdown pressure), and while the longer hole gives an overall increase in production to a certain point this seems to maximize at a length of around 6,000 ft. Beyond that distance the differential pressure between the formation and the well falls to a point where there is less benefit to the additional cost of drilling to that distance.
Figure 2. Drop in well pressure with increased well length, while increasing overall oil flow (Simulation by Fishbuch et al )
The answer which Aramco came up with to get around this problem was to use a main lateral from which a number of shorter laterals could then be drilled out into the formation, providing higher drawdown pressures within the wells and making it also easier to isolate any well section where the underlying water broke through into the well.
Figure 3. Schematic of a Maximum Reservoir Contact well as used in Saudi Arabia (Aramco).
The optimum length at which a well can produce is a function of the rock type and structure as well as the nature of the oil/natural gas that it contains and the water content (to name by a few of the parameters). Thus there are limits to the analogy, nevertheless it does show, even in the much more productive rocks of the fields in KSA that there are limits to how far a well can be productively driven, and these limits will also exist in the shales of the United States, although the oil locations and the optimal ways of extracting it are somewhat different.
The extraction of oil and natural gas in these shales is more sensitive to the levels of drawdown pressure, since much of the oil and gas is found in natural fractures that are not that wide (although they may be spread further apart by the fracking process itself). With exposure to the lower well pressure thus being restricted to a relatively small volume, significant reduction in the pressure because of the location relative to the heel of the well can have significant effects on lowering the overall well production.
Further as a general rule the complex valve systems used in KSA are not installed in the shale wells of the United States, making it less practical to focus the relative pressure differentials at different points along the well bore as a means of increasing production sequentially along the well.
Read more!
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Tech Talk - the numbers keep going down
One problem with defining a peak in global oil production is that it is only really evident some time after the event, when one can look in the rearview mirror and see the transition from a growing oil supply to one that is now declining. Before that relatively absolute point, there will likely come a time when global supply can no longer match the global demand for oil that exists at that price. We are beginning to approach the latter of these two conditions, with the former being increasingly probable in the non-too distant future. Rising prices continually change this latter condition, and may initially disguise the arrival of the peak, but it is becoming inevitable.
Over the past two years there has been a steady growth in demand, which OPEC expects to continue at around the 1 mbd range, as has been the recent pattern. The challenge, on a global scale, has been to identify where the matching growth in supply will come from, given the declining production from older oilfields and the decline rate of most of the horizontal fracked wells in shale.
Figure 1. Growth in global demand for oil (OPEC MOMR )
At present the United States is sitting with folk being relatively complacent, anticipating that global oil supplies will remain sufficient, and that the availability of enough oil in the global market to supply that reducing volume of oil that the US cannot produce for itself will continue to exist.
Increasingly over the next couple of years this is going to turn out to have created a false sense of security, and led to decisions on energy that will not easily be reversed. Consider that the Canadians have now decided to built their Pipeline to the Pacific. The Northern Gateway pipeline that Enbridge will build from the oil sands to the port of Kitimat.
Figure 2. Route for the Northern Gateway pipeline (Northern Gateway )
The 731 mile long pipeline will carry 525 kbd to the port, and a twin pipe will carry some 193 kbd of condensate back to Bruderheim to help in the processing of the initial crude. It will, sensibly, move the oil that was to have come down through the Keystone pipeline to American refineries instead to tankers out to the Canadian coast, where it will be shipped to Asia to meet their growing demands. Given the investment in the pipe, infrastructure etc once this oil is committed to that market and the US will not be able to gain that supply back when it is needed in a few years.
There is a secondary impact to the opening of that market that may not be evident for a little time, but it something that the Russians discovered after the gas pipeline connected Turkmenistan to China. Suddenly there is a second market for the product, and producers are no longer tied to having to accept the price that the sole purchaser is willing to pay. At the moment, when there is a sufficiency of oil, that is an incidental, with significant impact only in improving the economics of the oil sand operations, but since it now ties the American refineries that would have received this oil more closely to the Venezuelan production it now receives (a somewhat less reliable supplier) this change remains as something of a future concern. It is not likely, in itself, to initially change the price of oil much ( a minor increase) but it will change the names and nationalities of those that profit from the trade.
The problems that the Keystone pipeline had are, to a degree, a function of the lack of concern over the supply of oil to the American market. As long as oil production continues to increase, from the Bakken and Three Forks in North Dakota, and the Eagle Ford in Texas, then there is no clear evidence for concern. But those wells are cumulatively starting to reach peak production, and the next shales on the list (the Spearfish and the Tyler) don’t hold the potential to match the gains that have been achieved to date. Particularly this is when, as the North Dakota DMR notes, the wells see an average decline of 65% in the first year.
Figure 3. Typical Oil production from a well in the Bakken:Three Forks region of North Dakota (ND DMR Oil and Gas Division )
The projections that gains in production continue thus rely on a continued high level of drilling and production with a defined rig count required having been estimated, and an assumed sustained level of production even beyond the time that the “sweet spots” start to disappear.
Figure 4. Projected production from the Bakken:Three Forks formations, assuming well productions are sustained and that the rigs are available. (ND DMR Oil and Gas Division )
At the end of June, 2014 the rig count in North Dakota is less than 190 (DNR says 189, but Kirk Eggleston notes that some 15 of these are moving, so that the real number is 173, a bit less than 225. That suggests that peak production may be delayed, and lowered from 1.75 mbd down to around 1.4 mbd. This reduction in short-term supply will have less impact in the US than elsewhere since it will be used to release oil that the US would otherwise have bought to the world market, but less than anticipated, and at a slower rate than expected. (Note that Eagle Ford production growth rate is also slowing and that this also affects OPEC projections which anticipates that US oil production will grow some 950 kbd this year).
At the same time, as I have noted in an earlier piece the reliance of many models of future oil supply have focused on Iraq as the next major supplier to sustain growth in production, even as other suppliers decline. But those projections are increasingly obsolete. It is unrealistic to expect the oil export business from Iraq to be sustained and continue to grow in the face of the developing civil war. The nature of the conflict makes it difficult to see how it can be easily resolved, and particularly if the country becomes divided, then the oil pipelines become a target of opportunity to attack the financial underpinnings of the different sectors. It is likely that the pipeline from Kurdistan into Turkey will carry increasing volumes up to Ceyhan and thence to the world market, under better security, given that does not now venture into Sunni territory, but the vulnerabilities likely remain.
The result of these declines in anticipated production (not to mention Libya, the Sudan’s etc) is likely to become evident within a year, while demand continues to grow. The balance need change only a small amount however, for the consequences to be dire. As Mr. Micawber said in “David Copperfield”:
Over the past two years there has been a steady growth in demand, which OPEC expects to continue at around the 1 mbd range, as has been the recent pattern. The challenge, on a global scale, has been to identify where the matching growth in supply will come from, given the declining production from older oilfields and the decline rate of most of the horizontal fracked wells in shale.
Figure 1. Growth in global demand for oil (OPEC MOMR )
At present the United States is sitting with folk being relatively complacent, anticipating that global oil supplies will remain sufficient, and that the availability of enough oil in the global market to supply that reducing volume of oil that the US cannot produce for itself will continue to exist.
Increasingly over the next couple of years this is going to turn out to have created a false sense of security, and led to decisions on energy that will not easily be reversed. Consider that the Canadians have now decided to built their Pipeline to the Pacific. The Northern Gateway pipeline that Enbridge will build from the oil sands to the port of Kitimat.
Figure 2. Route for the Northern Gateway pipeline (Northern Gateway )
The 731 mile long pipeline will carry 525 kbd to the port, and a twin pipe will carry some 193 kbd of condensate back to Bruderheim to help in the processing of the initial crude. It will, sensibly, move the oil that was to have come down through the Keystone pipeline to American refineries instead to tankers out to the Canadian coast, where it will be shipped to Asia to meet their growing demands. Given the investment in the pipe, infrastructure etc once this oil is committed to that market and the US will not be able to gain that supply back when it is needed in a few years.
There is a secondary impact to the opening of that market that may not be evident for a little time, but it something that the Russians discovered after the gas pipeline connected Turkmenistan to China. Suddenly there is a second market for the product, and producers are no longer tied to having to accept the price that the sole purchaser is willing to pay. At the moment, when there is a sufficiency of oil, that is an incidental, with significant impact only in improving the economics of the oil sand operations, but since it now ties the American refineries that would have received this oil more closely to the Venezuelan production it now receives (a somewhat less reliable supplier) this change remains as something of a future concern. It is not likely, in itself, to initially change the price of oil much ( a minor increase) but it will change the names and nationalities of those that profit from the trade.
The problems that the Keystone pipeline had are, to a degree, a function of the lack of concern over the supply of oil to the American market. As long as oil production continues to increase, from the Bakken and Three Forks in North Dakota, and the Eagle Ford in Texas, then there is no clear evidence for concern. But those wells are cumulatively starting to reach peak production, and the next shales on the list (the Spearfish and the Tyler) don’t hold the potential to match the gains that have been achieved to date. Particularly this is when, as the North Dakota DMR notes, the wells see an average decline of 65% in the first year.
Figure 3. Typical Oil production from a well in the Bakken:Three Forks region of North Dakota (ND DMR Oil and Gas Division )
The projections that gains in production continue thus rely on a continued high level of drilling and production with a defined rig count required having been estimated, and an assumed sustained level of production even beyond the time that the “sweet spots” start to disappear.
Figure 4. Projected production from the Bakken:Three Forks formations, assuming well productions are sustained and that the rigs are available. (ND DMR Oil and Gas Division )
At the end of June, 2014 the rig count in North Dakota is less than 190 (DNR says 189, but Kirk Eggleston notes that some 15 of these are moving, so that the real number is 173, a bit less than 225. That suggests that peak production may be delayed, and lowered from 1.75 mbd down to around 1.4 mbd. This reduction in short-term supply will have less impact in the US than elsewhere since it will be used to release oil that the US would otherwise have bought to the world market, but less than anticipated, and at a slower rate than expected. (Note that Eagle Ford production growth rate is also slowing and that this also affects OPEC projections which anticipates that US oil production will grow some 950 kbd this year).
At the same time, as I have noted in an earlier piece the reliance of many models of future oil supply have focused on Iraq as the next major supplier to sustain growth in production, even as other suppliers decline. But those projections are increasingly obsolete. It is unrealistic to expect the oil export business from Iraq to be sustained and continue to grow in the face of the developing civil war. The nature of the conflict makes it difficult to see how it can be easily resolved, and particularly if the country becomes divided, then the oil pipelines become a target of opportunity to attack the financial underpinnings of the different sectors. It is likely that the pipeline from Kurdistan into Turkey will carry increasing volumes up to Ceyhan and thence to the world market, under better security, given that does not now venture into Sunni territory, but the vulnerabilities likely remain.
The result of these declines in anticipated production (not to mention Libya, the Sudan’s etc) is likely to become evident within a year, while demand continues to grow. The balance need change only a small amount however, for the consequences to be dire. As Mr. Micawber said in “David Copperfield”:
Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen [shillings] and six [pence], result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.
Read more!
Tuesday, March 11, 2014
Tech Talk - Arthur Berman talks to OilPrice
One of the great concerns that I have expressed in the pieces I write here relates to the high decline rates, and increasing costs of fossil fuel extraction from oil shales. Just recently Oilprice discussed this with Arthur Berman, and have allowed me to reproduce the interview here. Since Arthur is more articulate than I on this subject I am glad to do so.
Oilprice.com: Almost on a daily basis we have figures thrown at us to demonstrate how the shale boom is only getting started. Mostly recently, there are statements to the effect that Texas shale formations will produce up to one-third of the global oil supply over the next 10 years. Is there another story behind these figures?
Arthur Berman: First, we have to distinguish between shale gas and liquids plays. On the gas side, all shale gas plays except the Marcellus are in decline or flat. The growth of US supply rests solely on the Marcellus and it is unlikely that its growth can continue at present rates. On the oil side, the Bakken has a considerable commercial area that is perhaps only one-third developed so we see Bakken production continuing for several years before peaking. The Eagle Ford also has significant commercial area but is showing signs that production may be flattening. Nevertheless, we see 5 or so more years of continuing Eagle Ford production activity before peaking. The EIA has is about right for the liquids plays--slower increases until later in the decade, and then decline.
The idea that Texas shales will produce one-third of global oil supply is preposterous. The Eagle Ford and the Bakken comprise 80% of all the US liquids growth. The Permian basin has notable oil reserves left but mostly from very small accumulations and low-rate wells. EOG CEO Bill Thomas said the same thing about 10 days ago on EOG's earnings call. There have been some truly outrageous claims made by some executives about the Permian basin in recent months that I suspect have their general counsels looking for a defibrillator.
Recently, the CEO of a major oil company told The Houston Chronicle that the shale revolution is only in the "first inning of a nine-inning game”. I guess he must have lost track of the score while waiting in line for hot dogs because production growth in U.S. shale gas plays excluding the Marcellus is approaching zero; growth in the Bakken and Eagle Ford has fallen from 33% in mid-2011 to 7% in late 2013.
Oil companies have to make a big deal about shale plays because that is all that is left in the world. Let's face it: these are truly awful reservoir rocks and that is why we waited until all more attractive opportunities were exhausted before developing them. It is completely unreasonable to expect better performance from bad reservoirs than from better reservoirs. The majors have shown that they cannot replace reserves. They talk about return on capital employed (ROCE) these days instead of reserve replacement and production growth because there is nothing to talk about there. Shale plays are part of the ROCE story--shale wells can be drilled and brought on production fairly quickly and this masks or smoothes out the non-productive capital languishing in big projects around the world like Kashagan and Gorgon, which are going sideways whilst eating up billions of dollars.
None of this is meant to be negative. I'm all for shale plays but let's be honest about things, after all! Production from shale is not a revolution; it's a retirement party.
OP: Is the shale “boom” sustainable?
Arthur Berman: The shale gas boom is not sustainable except at higher gas prices in the US. There is lots of gas--just not that much that is commercial at current prices. Analysts that say there are trillions of cubic feet of commercial gas at $4 need their cost assumptions audited. If they are not counting overhead (G&A) and many operating costs, then of course things look good. If Walmart were evaluated solely on the difference between wholesale and retail prices, they would look fantastic. But they need stores, employees, gas and electricity, advertising and distribution. So do gas producers. I don't know where these guys get their reserves either, but that needs to be audited as well.
There was a report recently that said large areas of the Barnett Shale are commercial at $4 gas prices and that the play will continue to produce lots of gas for decades. Some people get so intrigued with how much gas has been produced and could be in the future, that they don't seem to understand that this is a business. A business must be commercial to be successful over the long term, although many public companies in the US seem to challenge that concept.
Investors have tolerated a lot of cheerleading about shale gas over the years, but I don't think this is going to last. Investors are starting to ask questions, such as: Where are the earnings and the free cash flow. Shale companies are spending a lot more than they are earning, and that has not changed. They are claiming all sorts of efficiency gains on the drilling side that has distracted inquiring investors for awhile. I was looking through some investor presentations from 2007 and 2008 and the same companies were making the same efficiency claims then as they are now. The problem is that these impressive gains never show up in the balance sheets, so I guess they must not be very important after all.
The reason that the shale gas boom is not sustainable at current prices is that shale gas is not the whole story. Conventional gas accounts for almost 60% of US gas and it is declining at about 20% per year and no one is drilling more wells in these plays. The unconventional gas plays decline at more than 30% each year. Taken together, the US needs to replace 19 billion cubic feet per day each year to maintain production at flat levels. That's almost four Barnett shale plays at full production each year! So you can see how hard it will be to sustain gas production. Then there are all the efforts to use it up faster--natural gas vehicles, exports to Mexico, LNG exports, closing coal and nuclear plants--so it only gets harder.
This winter, things have begun to unravel. Comparative gas storage inventories are near their 2003 low. Sure, weather is the main factor but that's always the case. The simple truth is that supply has not been able to adequately meet winter demand this year, period. Say what you will about why but it's a fact that is inconsistent with the fairy tales we continue to hear about cheap, abundant gas forever.
I sat across the table from industry experts just a year ago or so who were adamant that natural gas prices would never get above $4 again. Prices have been above $4 for almost three months. Maybe "never" has a different meaning for those people that doesn't include when they are wrong.
OP: Do you foresee any new technology on the shelf in the next 10-20 years that would shape another boom, whether it be fossil fuels or renewables?
Arthur Berman: I get asked about new technology that could make things different all the time. I'm a technology enthusiast but I see the big breakthroughs in new industries, not old extractive businesses like oil and gas. Technology has made many things possible in my lifetime including shale and deep-water production, but it hasn't made these things cheaper.
That's my whole point about shale plays--they're expensive and need high oil and gas prices to work. We've got the high prices for oil and the oil plays are fine; we don't have high prices for the gas plays and they aren't working. There are some areas of the Marcellus that actually work at $4 gas price and that's great, but it really takes $6 gas prices before things open up even there.
OP: In Europe, where do you see the most potential for shale gas exploitation, with Ukraine engulfed in political chaos, companies withdrawing from Poland, and a flurry of shale activity in the UK?
Arthur Berman: Shale plays will eventually spread to Europe but it will take a longer time than it did in North America. The biggest reason is the lack of private mineral ownership in most of Europe so there is no incentive for local people to get on board. In fact, there are only the negative factors of industrial development for them to look forward to with no pay check. It's also a lot more expensive to drill and produce gas in Europe.
There are a few promising shale plays on the international horizon: the Bazherov in Russia, the Vaca Muerte in Argentina and the Duvernay in Canada look best to me because they are liquid-prone and in countries where acceptable fiscal terms and necessary infrastructure are feasible. At the same time, we have learned that not all plays work even though they look good on paper, and that the potentially commercial areas are always quite small compared to the total resource. Also, we know that these plays do not last forever and that once the drilling treadmill starts, it never ends. Because of high decline rates, new wells must constantly be drilled to maintain production. Shale plays will last years, not decades.
Recent developments in Poland demonstrate some of the problems with international shale plays. Everyone got excited a few years ago because resource estimates were enormous. Later, these estimates were cut but many companies moved forward and wells have been drilled. Most international companies have abandoned the project including ExxonMobil, ENI, Marathon and Talisman. Some players exited because they don't think that the geology is right but the government has created many regulatory obstacles that have caused a lack of confidence in the fiscal environment in Poland.
The UK could really use the gas from the Bowland Shale and, while it's not a huge play, there is enough there to make a difference. I expect there will be plenty of opposition because people in the UK are very sensitive about the environment and there is just no way to hide the fact that shale development has a big footprint despite pad drilling and industry efforts to make it less invasive. Let me say a few things about resource estimates while we are on the subject. The public and politicians do not understand the difference between resources and reserves. The only think that they have in common is that they both begin with “res.” Reserves are a tiny subset of resources that can be produced commercially. Both are always wrong but resource estimates can be hugely misleading because they are guesses and have nothing to do with economics.
Someone recently sent me a new report by the CSIS that said U.S. shale gas resource estimates are too conservative and are much larger than previously believed. I wrote him back that I think that resource estimates for U.S. shale gas plays are irrelevant because now we have robust production data to work with. Most of those enormous resources are in plays that we already know are not going to be economic. Resource estimates have become part of the shale gas cheerleading squad's standard tricks to drum up enthusiasm for plays that clearly don't work except at higher gas prices. It's really unfortunate when supposedly objective policy organizations and research groups get in on the hype in order to attract funding for their work.
OP: The ban on most US crude exports in place since the Arab oil embargo of 1973 is now being challenged by lobbyists, with media opining that this could be the biggest energy debate of the year in the US. How do you foresee this debate shaping up by the end of this year?
Arthur Berman: The debate over oil and gas exports will be silly.
I do not favor regulation of either oil or gas exports from the US. On the other hand, I think that a little discipline by the E&P companies might be in order so they don't have to beg the American people to bail them out of the over-production mess that they have created knowingly for themselves. Any business that over-produces whatever it makes has to live with lower prices. Why should oil and gas producers get a pass from the free-market laws of supply and demand?
I expect that by the time all the construction is completed to allow gas export, the domestic price will be high enough not to bother. It amazes me that the geniuses behind gas export assume that the business conditions that resulted in a price benefit overseas will remain static until they finish building export facilities, and that the competition will simply stand by when the awesome Americans bring gas to their markets. Just last week, Ken Medlock described how some schemes to send gas to Asia may find that there will be a lot of price competition in the future because a lot of gas has been discovered elsewhere in the world.
The US acts like we are some kind of natural gas superstar because of shale gas. Has anyone looked at how the US stacks up next to Russia, Iran and Qatar for natural gas reserves?
Whatever outcome results from the debate over petroleum exports, it will result in higher prices for American consumers. There are experts who argue that it won't increase prices much and that the economic benefits will outweigh higher costs. That may be but I doubt that anyone knows for sure. Everyone agrees that oil and gas will cost more if we allow exports.
OP: Is the US indeed close to hitting the “crude wall”—the point at which production could slow due to infrastructure and regulatory restraints?
Arthur Berman: No matter how much or little regulation there is, people will always argue that it is still either too much or too little. We have one of the most unfriendly administrations toward oil and gas ever and yet production has boomed. I already said that I oppose most regulation so you know where I stand. That said, once a bureaucracy is started, it seldom gets smaller or weaker. I don't see any walls out there, just uncomfortable price increases because of unnecessary regulations.
We use and need too much oil and gas to hit a wall. I see most of the focus on health care regulation for now. If there is no success at modifying the most objectionable parts of the Affordable Care Act, I don't suppose there is much hope for fewer oil and gas regulations. The petroleum business isn't exactly the darling of the people.
OP: What is the realistic future of methane hydrates, or “fire ice”, particularly with regard to Japanese efforts at extraction?
Arthur Berman: Japan is desperate for energy especially since they cut back their nuclear program so maybe hydrates make some sense at least as a science project for them. Their pilot is in thousands of feet of water about 30 miles offshore so it's going to be very expensive no matter how successful it is.
OP: Globally, where should we look for the next potential “shale boom” from a geological perspective as well as a commercial viability perspective?
Arthur Berman: Not all shale is equal or appropriate for oil and gas development. Once we remove all the shale that is not at or somewhat above peak oil generation today, most of it goes away. Some shale plays that meet these and other criteria didn't work so we have a lot to learn. But shale development is both inevitable and necessary. It will take a longer time than many believe outside of North America.
OP: We've spoken about Japan's nuclear energy crossroads before, and now we see that issue climaxing, with the country's nuclear future taking center-stage in an election period. Do you still believe it is too early for Japan to pull the plug on nuclear energy entirely?
Arthur Berman: Japan and Germany have made certain decisions about nuclear energy that I find remarkable but I don't live there and, obviously, don't think like them.
More generally, environmental enthusiasts simply don't see the obstacles to short-term conversion of a fossil fuel economy to one based on renewable energy. I don't see that there is a rational basis for dialogue in this arena. I'm all in favor of renewable energy but I don't see going from a few percent of our primary energy consumption to even 20% in less than a few decades no matter how much we may want to.
OP: What have we learned over the past year about Japan's alternatives to nuclear energy?
Arthur Berman: We have learned that it takes a lot of coal to replace nuclear energy when countries like Japan and Germany made bold decisions to close nuclear capacity. We also learned that energy got very expensive in a hurry. I say that we learned. I mean that the past year confirmed what many of us anticipated.
OP: Back in the US, we have closely followed the blowback from the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed new carbon emissions standards for power plants, which would make it impossible for new coal-fired plants to be built without the implementation of carbon capture and sequestration technology, or “clean-coal” tech. Is this a feasible strategy in your opinion?
Arthur Berman: I'm not an expert on clean coal technology either but I am confident that almost anything is possible if cost doesn't matter. This is as true about carbon capture from coal as it is about shale gas production. Energy is an incredibly complex topic and decisions are being made by bureaucrats and politicians with little background in energy or the energy business. I don't see any possibility of a good outcome under these circumstances.
OP: Is CCS far enough along to serve as a sound basis for a national climate change policy?
Arthur Berman: Climate-change activism is a train that has left the station. If you've missed it, too bad. If you're on board, good luck.
The good news is that the US does not have an energy policy and is equally unlikely to get a climate change policy for all of the same reasons. I fear putting climate change policy in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians more than I fear climate change (which I fear).
The interview was with James Stafford of Oilprice.com, and I am grateful for the chance to reproduce it. Arthur Berman writes at Petroleum Truth Report.
Oilprice.com: Almost on a daily basis we have figures thrown at us to demonstrate how the shale boom is only getting started. Mostly recently, there are statements to the effect that Texas shale formations will produce up to one-third of the global oil supply over the next 10 years. Is there another story behind these figures?
Arthur Berman: First, we have to distinguish between shale gas and liquids plays. On the gas side, all shale gas plays except the Marcellus are in decline or flat. The growth of US supply rests solely on the Marcellus and it is unlikely that its growth can continue at present rates. On the oil side, the Bakken has a considerable commercial area that is perhaps only one-third developed so we see Bakken production continuing for several years before peaking. The Eagle Ford also has significant commercial area but is showing signs that production may be flattening. Nevertheless, we see 5 or so more years of continuing Eagle Ford production activity before peaking. The EIA has is about right for the liquids plays--slower increases until later in the decade, and then decline.
The idea that Texas shales will produce one-third of global oil supply is preposterous. The Eagle Ford and the Bakken comprise 80% of all the US liquids growth. The Permian basin has notable oil reserves left but mostly from very small accumulations and low-rate wells. EOG CEO Bill Thomas said the same thing about 10 days ago on EOG's earnings call. There have been some truly outrageous claims made by some executives about the Permian basin in recent months that I suspect have their general counsels looking for a defibrillator.
Recently, the CEO of a major oil company told The Houston Chronicle that the shale revolution is only in the "first inning of a nine-inning game”. I guess he must have lost track of the score while waiting in line for hot dogs because production growth in U.S. shale gas plays excluding the Marcellus is approaching zero; growth in the Bakken and Eagle Ford has fallen from 33% in mid-2011 to 7% in late 2013.
Oil companies have to make a big deal about shale plays because that is all that is left in the world. Let's face it: these are truly awful reservoir rocks and that is why we waited until all more attractive opportunities were exhausted before developing them. It is completely unreasonable to expect better performance from bad reservoirs than from better reservoirs. The majors have shown that they cannot replace reserves. They talk about return on capital employed (ROCE) these days instead of reserve replacement and production growth because there is nothing to talk about there. Shale plays are part of the ROCE story--shale wells can be drilled and brought on production fairly quickly and this masks or smoothes out the non-productive capital languishing in big projects around the world like Kashagan and Gorgon, which are going sideways whilst eating up billions of dollars.
None of this is meant to be negative. I'm all for shale plays but let's be honest about things, after all! Production from shale is not a revolution; it's a retirement party.
OP: Is the shale “boom” sustainable?
Arthur Berman: The shale gas boom is not sustainable except at higher gas prices in the US. There is lots of gas--just not that much that is commercial at current prices. Analysts that say there are trillions of cubic feet of commercial gas at $4 need their cost assumptions audited. If they are not counting overhead (G&A) and many operating costs, then of course things look good. If Walmart were evaluated solely on the difference between wholesale and retail prices, they would look fantastic. But they need stores, employees, gas and electricity, advertising and distribution. So do gas producers. I don't know where these guys get their reserves either, but that needs to be audited as well.
There was a report recently that said large areas of the Barnett Shale are commercial at $4 gas prices and that the play will continue to produce lots of gas for decades. Some people get so intrigued with how much gas has been produced and could be in the future, that they don't seem to understand that this is a business. A business must be commercial to be successful over the long term, although many public companies in the US seem to challenge that concept.
Investors have tolerated a lot of cheerleading about shale gas over the years, but I don't think this is going to last. Investors are starting to ask questions, such as: Where are the earnings and the free cash flow. Shale companies are spending a lot more than they are earning, and that has not changed. They are claiming all sorts of efficiency gains on the drilling side that has distracted inquiring investors for awhile. I was looking through some investor presentations from 2007 and 2008 and the same companies were making the same efficiency claims then as they are now. The problem is that these impressive gains never show up in the balance sheets, so I guess they must not be very important after all.
The reason that the shale gas boom is not sustainable at current prices is that shale gas is not the whole story. Conventional gas accounts for almost 60% of US gas and it is declining at about 20% per year and no one is drilling more wells in these plays. The unconventional gas plays decline at more than 30% each year. Taken together, the US needs to replace 19 billion cubic feet per day each year to maintain production at flat levels. That's almost four Barnett shale plays at full production each year! So you can see how hard it will be to sustain gas production. Then there are all the efforts to use it up faster--natural gas vehicles, exports to Mexico, LNG exports, closing coal and nuclear plants--so it only gets harder.
This winter, things have begun to unravel. Comparative gas storage inventories are near their 2003 low. Sure, weather is the main factor but that's always the case. The simple truth is that supply has not been able to adequately meet winter demand this year, period. Say what you will about why but it's a fact that is inconsistent with the fairy tales we continue to hear about cheap, abundant gas forever.
I sat across the table from industry experts just a year ago or so who were adamant that natural gas prices would never get above $4 again. Prices have been above $4 for almost three months. Maybe "never" has a different meaning for those people that doesn't include when they are wrong.
OP: Do you foresee any new technology on the shelf in the next 10-20 years that would shape another boom, whether it be fossil fuels or renewables?
Arthur Berman: I get asked about new technology that could make things different all the time. I'm a technology enthusiast but I see the big breakthroughs in new industries, not old extractive businesses like oil and gas. Technology has made many things possible in my lifetime including shale and deep-water production, but it hasn't made these things cheaper.
That's my whole point about shale plays--they're expensive and need high oil and gas prices to work. We've got the high prices for oil and the oil plays are fine; we don't have high prices for the gas plays and they aren't working. There are some areas of the Marcellus that actually work at $4 gas price and that's great, but it really takes $6 gas prices before things open up even there.
OP: In Europe, where do you see the most potential for shale gas exploitation, with Ukraine engulfed in political chaos, companies withdrawing from Poland, and a flurry of shale activity in the UK?
Arthur Berman: Shale plays will eventually spread to Europe but it will take a longer time than it did in North America. The biggest reason is the lack of private mineral ownership in most of Europe so there is no incentive for local people to get on board. In fact, there are only the negative factors of industrial development for them to look forward to with no pay check. It's also a lot more expensive to drill and produce gas in Europe.
There are a few promising shale plays on the international horizon: the Bazherov in Russia, the Vaca Muerte in Argentina and the Duvernay in Canada look best to me because they are liquid-prone and in countries where acceptable fiscal terms and necessary infrastructure are feasible. At the same time, we have learned that not all plays work even though they look good on paper, and that the potentially commercial areas are always quite small compared to the total resource. Also, we know that these plays do not last forever and that once the drilling treadmill starts, it never ends. Because of high decline rates, new wells must constantly be drilled to maintain production. Shale plays will last years, not decades.
Recent developments in Poland demonstrate some of the problems with international shale plays. Everyone got excited a few years ago because resource estimates were enormous. Later, these estimates were cut but many companies moved forward and wells have been drilled. Most international companies have abandoned the project including ExxonMobil, ENI, Marathon and Talisman. Some players exited because they don't think that the geology is right but the government has created many regulatory obstacles that have caused a lack of confidence in the fiscal environment in Poland.
The UK could really use the gas from the Bowland Shale and, while it's not a huge play, there is enough there to make a difference. I expect there will be plenty of opposition because people in the UK are very sensitive about the environment and there is just no way to hide the fact that shale development has a big footprint despite pad drilling and industry efforts to make it less invasive. Let me say a few things about resource estimates while we are on the subject. The public and politicians do not understand the difference between resources and reserves. The only think that they have in common is that they both begin with “res.” Reserves are a tiny subset of resources that can be produced commercially. Both are always wrong but resource estimates can be hugely misleading because they are guesses and have nothing to do with economics.
Someone recently sent me a new report by the CSIS that said U.S. shale gas resource estimates are too conservative and are much larger than previously believed. I wrote him back that I think that resource estimates for U.S. shale gas plays are irrelevant because now we have robust production data to work with. Most of those enormous resources are in plays that we already know are not going to be economic. Resource estimates have become part of the shale gas cheerleading squad's standard tricks to drum up enthusiasm for plays that clearly don't work except at higher gas prices. It's really unfortunate when supposedly objective policy organizations and research groups get in on the hype in order to attract funding for their work.
OP: The ban on most US crude exports in place since the Arab oil embargo of 1973 is now being challenged by lobbyists, with media opining that this could be the biggest energy debate of the year in the US. How do you foresee this debate shaping up by the end of this year?
Arthur Berman: The debate over oil and gas exports will be silly.
I do not favor regulation of either oil or gas exports from the US. On the other hand, I think that a little discipline by the E&P companies might be in order so they don't have to beg the American people to bail them out of the over-production mess that they have created knowingly for themselves. Any business that over-produces whatever it makes has to live with lower prices. Why should oil and gas producers get a pass from the free-market laws of supply and demand?
I expect that by the time all the construction is completed to allow gas export, the domestic price will be high enough not to bother. It amazes me that the geniuses behind gas export assume that the business conditions that resulted in a price benefit overseas will remain static until they finish building export facilities, and that the competition will simply stand by when the awesome Americans bring gas to their markets. Just last week, Ken Medlock described how some schemes to send gas to Asia may find that there will be a lot of price competition in the future because a lot of gas has been discovered elsewhere in the world.
The US acts like we are some kind of natural gas superstar because of shale gas. Has anyone looked at how the US stacks up next to Russia, Iran and Qatar for natural gas reserves?
Whatever outcome results from the debate over petroleum exports, it will result in higher prices for American consumers. There are experts who argue that it won't increase prices much and that the economic benefits will outweigh higher costs. That may be but I doubt that anyone knows for sure. Everyone agrees that oil and gas will cost more if we allow exports.
OP: Is the US indeed close to hitting the “crude wall”—the point at which production could slow due to infrastructure and regulatory restraints?
Arthur Berman: No matter how much or little regulation there is, people will always argue that it is still either too much or too little. We have one of the most unfriendly administrations toward oil and gas ever and yet production has boomed. I already said that I oppose most regulation so you know where I stand. That said, once a bureaucracy is started, it seldom gets smaller or weaker. I don't see any walls out there, just uncomfortable price increases because of unnecessary regulations.
We use and need too much oil and gas to hit a wall. I see most of the focus on health care regulation for now. If there is no success at modifying the most objectionable parts of the Affordable Care Act, I don't suppose there is much hope for fewer oil and gas regulations. The petroleum business isn't exactly the darling of the people.
OP: What is the realistic future of methane hydrates, or “fire ice”, particularly with regard to Japanese efforts at extraction?
Arthur Berman: Japan is desperate for energy especially since they cut back their nuclear program so maybe hydrates make some sense at least as a science project for them. Their pilot is in thousands of feet of water about 30 miles offshore so it's going to be very expensive no matter how successful it is.
OP: Globally, where should we look for the next potential “shale boom” from a geological perspective as well as a commercial viability perspective?
Arthur Berman: Not all shale is equal or appropriate for oil and gas development. Once we remove all the shale that is not at or somewhat above peak oil generation today, most of it goes away. Some shale plays that meet these and other criteria didn't work so we have a lot to learn. But shale development is both inevitable and necessary. It will take a longer time than many believe outside of North America.
OP: We've spoken about Japan's nuclear energy crossroads before, and now we see that issue climaxing, with the country's nuclear future taking center-stage in an election period. Do you still believe it is too early for Japan to pull the plug on nuclear energy entirely?
Arthur Berman: Japan and Germany have made certain decisions about nuclear energy that I find remarkable but I don't live there and, obviously, don't think like them.
More generally, environmental enthusiasts simply don't see the obstacles to short-term conversion of a fossil fuel economy to one based on renewable energy. I don't see that there is a rational basis for dialogue in this arena. I'm all in favor of renewable energy but I don't see going from a few percent of our primary energy consumption to even 20% in less than a few decades no matter how much we may want to.
OP: What have we learned over the past year about Japan's alternatives to nuclear energy?
Arthur Berman: We have learned that it takes a lot of coal to replace nuclear energy when countries like Japan and Germany made bold decisions to close nuclear capacity. We also learned that energy got very expensive in a hurry. I say that we learned. I mean that the past year confirmed what many of us anticipated.
OP: Back in the US, we have closely followed the blowback from the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed new carbon emissions standards for power plants, which would make it impossible for new coal-fired plants to be built without the implementation of carbon capture and sequestration technology, or “clean-coal” tech. Is this a feasible strategy in your opinion?
Arthur Berman: I'm not an expert on clean coal technology either but I am confident that almost anything is possible if cost doesn't matter. This is as true about carbon capture from coal as it is about shale gas production. Energy is an incredibly complex topic and decisions are being made by bureaucrats and politicians with little background in energy or the energy business. I don't see any possibility of a good outcome under these circumstances.
OP: Is CCS far enough along to serve as a sound basis for a national climate change policy?
Arthur Berman: Climate-change activism is a train that has left the station. If you've missed it, too bad. If you're on board, good luck.
The good news is that the US does not have an energy policy and is equally unlikely to get a climate change policy for all of the same reasons. I fear putting climate change policy in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians more than I fear climate change (which I fear).
The interview was with James Stafford of Oilprice.com, and I am grateful for the chance to reproduce it. Arthur Berman writes at Petroleum Truth Report.
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Monday, January 20, 2014
Tech Talk - Production, Profit and Projection
As we move steadily through the first month of this new year, US production of crude has continued to increase, with the EIA now showing levels of around 8.2 mbd production.
Figure 1. US Domestic Crude production through the end of 2013 (EIA TWIP)
Finished gasoline production has been floating around a level of 9.2 mbd.
Figure 2. U.S. Finished gasoline production at the end of 2013. (EIA TWIP)
At the same time ethanol production continues at around 0.9 mbd.
Figure 3. U.S. Ethanol production at the end of 2013 (EIA TWIP)
US gasoline demand, on the other hand, has fallen below 9 mbd, in the normal seasonal decline during the winter months.
Figure 4. US gasoline demand at the end of 2013. (EIA TWIP)
In the latest Director’s Cut of the news from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources the state reports that production averaged 973 kbd in November, up from 945 kbd in October). The rig count is running around 190 rigs (below the all time high of 218 – roughly 18-months ago) and the agency notes that companies are moving toward a higher density for horizontal wells as a means of enhancing oil recovery. They estimate that at the current rig count there will be enough work under this program to sustain the industry for more than 20-years. However production will decline as the richer spots are drained, and in the most favorable scenario production will rise for another 2 to 3 years before stabilizing and then declining. At present the rate of growth in production is in the range of 300 kbd per year.
Figure 5. North Dakota Oil Production – historical and projected (ND Dept of Mineral Resources )
This is roughly similar to the growth in production from the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas over the past year.
Figure 6. Changes in production from the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas (Texas Railroad Commission )
Growth in production from the deep waters of the Gulf are likely to be closer to 50 kbd. Even combined, and recognizing that there may be some additional production from developing shale prospects, it is difficult, as the above three regions hit production peaks in the near future, to anticipate that US production will increase by the 2 mbd that is projected by some forecasts.
Some of this doubt comes from North Dakota agency itself, which has some concerns over the continued ability of the industry to attract drilling capital, as well as the impact of additional regulations. This limit of available funds is something that Gail Tverberg has pointed out in a recent post. Shell is only one of the major companies recognizing that the increasing costs of development in more difficult parts of the world are not being offset by compensating increases in production, price and profit. As operations around the world continue to attest, (offshore Brazil being but one example) just because the money is invested does not mean that production will of a certainty arrive on the original date forecast, nor will it be at the original price estimated. In the case of Brazil, while new fields show the promise for the future with a steady increase in the reserves that the country projects, this has yet to be reflected in increased production.
Figure 7. Growth in projected reserves offshore Brazil over the past 30 years (Offshore )
The problems of development are being blamed on a lack of available drilling rigs as well as budget constraints. This may be a considerably simplified version of the realities which are likely to continue to see delays in production against target figures into the medium term future. This is unfortunate since there remain few places where global production can be expected to increase in the near future.
In the latest Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) OPEC notes that non-OPEC supply growth is anticipated to be 1.2 mbd this year, with the bulk of that growth coming from the United States, Canada, Brazil and the two Sudans. Oil production from the Canadian oil sands is anticipated to reach 3 mbd by 2015 on its way to a total production estimate of around 6 mbd by 2035, at an approximate growth rate of 100 kbd per year.
Figure 8. Anticipated growth in Canadian oil production (NEB )
Perhaps more than most the Canadian growth is likely to follow the projected path, although there, as in other parts of the world, the need to ensure future capital for the increasingly expensive operations, and the provision of sufficient infrastructure to handle the increased production are matters that will continue to provide caveats to the overall levels achieved.
And as regards the increase in production from Sudan and South Sudan, certainly the conditions in South Sudan are not encouraging to hopes for increased production at any time in the near future. Fighting in the regional capital of Malakal shows the increasingly tribal nature of the conflict and this may well indicate that fighting will not easily be stopped and order (let alone oil flow) restored. This is of concern to China, which imported some 14 million barrels of oil from the region in 2013 but is now faced with the problems of sustained investment in the face of lost production and facilities after seeing a similar collapse in production from Libya. And while these problems are considered relatively small at the moment, at this time when global production and supply are relatively closely tied, the continuation of problems will mean the China must look elsewhere for that production, with consequent impacts on overall prices.
The problem, as the very short list from OPEC illustrates, is that there are not that many places around the world where increased production is likely and where China can invest to achieve the levels that it anticipates that it will need as demand continues to grow. And as the market becomes more competitive, so prices are unlikely to decline much (apart from regional short term issues such as the recent desire in the US to produce more diesel from refineries). Yet while this will give some reassurance to those seeking to invest capital in the industry it comes at a time where there remain concerns over regulation in some countries, and conflicts in others both of which cause investors to hesitate in their commitment. The problem is that there aren’t that many alternative strategies that hold much hope for working.
Figure 1. US Domestic Crude production through the end of 2013 (EIA TWIP)
Finished gasoline production has been floating around a level of 9.2 mbd.
Figure 2. U.S. Finished gasoline production at the end of 2013. (EIA TWIP)
At the same time ethanol production continues at around 0.9 mbd.
Figure 3. U.S. Ethanol production at the end of 2013 (EIA TWIP)
US gasoline demand, on the other hand, has fallen below 9 mbd, in the normal seasonal decline during the winter months.
Figure 4. US gasoline demand at the end of 2013. (EIA TWIP)
In the latest Director’s Cut of the news from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources the state reports that production averaged 973 kbd in November, up from 945 kbd in October). The rig count is running around 190 rigs (below the all time high of 218 – roughly 18-months ago) and the agency notes that companies are moving toward a higher density for horizontal wells as a means of enhancing oil recovery. They estimate that at the current rig count there will be enough work under this program to sustain the industry for more than 20-years. However production will decline as the richer spots are drained, and in the most favorable scenario production will rise for another 2 to 3 years before stabilizing and then declining. At present the rate of growth in production is in the range of 300 kbd per year.
Figure 5. North Dakota Oil Production – historical and projected (ND Dept of Mineral Resources )
This is roughly similar to the growth in production from the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas over the past year.
Figure 6. Changes in production from the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas (Texas Railroad Commission )
Growth in production from the deep waters of the Gulf are likely to be closer to 50 kbd. Even combined, and recognizing that there may be some additional production from developing shale prospects, it is difficult, as the above three regions hit production peaks in the near future, to anticipate that US production will increase by the 2 mbd that is projected by some forecasts.
Some of this doubt comes from North Dakota agency itself, which has some concerns over the continued ability of the industry to attract drilling capital, as well as the impact of additional regulations. This limit of available funds is something that Gail Tverberg has pointed out in a recent post. Shell is only one of the major companies recognizing that the increasing costs of development in more difficult parts of the world are not being offset by compensating increases in production, price and profit. As operations around the world continue to attest, (offshore Brazil being but one example) just because the money is invested does not mean that production will of a certainty arrive on the original date forecast, nor will it be at the original price estimated. In the case of Brazil, while new fields show the promise for the future with a steady increase in the reserves that the country projects, this has yet to be reflected in increased production.
Figure 7. Growth in projected reserves offshore Brazil over the past 30 years (Offshore )
The problems of development are being blamed on a lack of available drilling rigs as well as budget constraints. This may be a considerably simplified version of the realities which are likely to continue to see delays in production against target figures into the medium term future. This is unfortunate since there remain few places where global production can be expected to increase in the near future.
In the latest Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) OPEC notes that non-OPEC supply growth is anticipated to be 1.2 mbd this year, with the bulk of that growth coming from the United States, Canada, Brazil and the two Sudans. Oil production from the Canadian oil sands is anticipated to reach 3 mbd by 2015 on its way to a total production estimate of around 6 mbd by 2035, at an approximate growth rate of 100 kbd per year.
Figure 8. Anticipated growth in Canadian oil production (NEB )
Perhaps more than most the Canadian growth is likely to follow the projected path, although there, as in other parts of the world, the need to ensure future capital for the increasingly expensive operations, and the provision of sufficient infrastructure to handle the increased production are matters that will continue to provide caveats to the overall levels achieved.
And as regards the increase in production from Sudan and South Sudan, certainly the conditions in South Sudan are not encouraging to hopes for increased production at any time in the near future. Fighting in the regional capital of Malakal shows the increasingly tribal nature of the conflict and this may well indicate that fighting will not easily be stopped and order (let alone oil flow) restored. This is of concern to China, which imported some 14 million barrels of oil from the region in 2013 but is now faced with the problems of sustained investment in the face of lost production and facilities after seeing a similar collapse in production from Libya. And while these problems are considered relatively small at the moment, at this time when global production and supply are relatively closely tied, the continuation of problems will mean the China must look elsewhere for that production, with consequent impacts on overall prices.
The problem, as the very short list from OPEC illustrates, is that there are not that many places around the world where increased production is likely and where China can invest to achieve the levels that it anticipates that it will need as demand continues to grow. And as the market becomes more competitive, so prices are unlikely to decline much (apart from regional short term issues such as the recent desire in the US to produce more diesel from refineries). Yet while this will give some reassurance to those seeking to invest capital in the industry it comes at a time where there remain concerns over regulation in some countries, and conflicts in others both of which cause investors to hesitate in their commitment. The problem is that there aren’t that many alternative strategies that hold much hope for working.
Read more!
Sunday, August 18, 2013
Tech Talk - Where to look for more oil this year.
The news that Saudi Arabia is planning to employ 200 drilling rigs next year (up from 20 back in 2005) suggests that there is a recognition that future reserves may not measure up to the planned volumes needed. Plans now include exploration of the shale deposits in the country, looking primarily for natural gas. There are estimates that this resource could run as high as 600 trillion cubic ft. Current plans are to drill seven exploratory wells in the Red Sea, off Tabuk.
Figure 1. Location of Tabuk in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (WikiMedia )
This is across the country from the major oil fields currently in use, which lie more along the Persian Gulf coast, centered perhaps around Damman. It therefore suggests that they are looking for extensions of the Israeli and Egyptian fields into northern KSA. (Minister Al-Naimi said that they still “had to find them.”)
In discussing the venture Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi also noted that, choosing to look for – and presumably finding - natural gas, would take the pressure off the country to maintain its oil reserve.
Now over the years KSA has lowered the volume it has projected that it can produce from 12.5 mbd to 12 mbd, and this is, perhaps, an early indication that they intend (whether by policy or natural reserve availability) to lower that maximum further.
This has to be of at least a little concern, since the number of places with significant flexibility to increase production are getting closer to zero every year. The gains in global production that are foreseen by OPEC in the next year, for example come in dribs and drabs.
OPEC notes that in May the 8,915 producing wells in North Dakota collectively produced over 800 kbd. (The Department of Mineral Resources reports 821 kbd in June, over the 811 kbd in May with well numbers of 8,932 in May and 9,071 in June. Production per well is thus running an average of 90 barrels a day, with a well cost of $9 million.) There are 187 rigs plus/minus working and this is still enough to keep production rising at a rate of 1.3% per month. One of the maps I find interesting is this, from the Department.
Figure 3. Location and production values for wells in North Dakota (Department of Mineral Resources )
It is this illustration of the relatively heavy drilling already in the “sweet spots” and the poorer performance in the less well drilled regions that gives me concern for the longer term prospects for the formations. And as an aside note that crude from Alaska is declining, July output was 498 kbd against the year-to-date average of 542 kbd. The EIA is noting that, since there aren’t any major oil pipelines running into California from the East, that there is an increase in rail traffic to make up the difference. The EIA is suggesting that the traffic is already at a level of around 100 kbd.
And this in happening in the most promising region to increase production (though it includes Canada, for which OPEC projects a growth over the year of around 40 kbd, which is set against Mexican production, for which OPEC sees a decline of around 60 kbd).
Malaysia is projected to increase production by 50 kbd, from the Gumusut field. This is a Deepwater project, and one can get some estimate of the shape of the field from the well pattern. The production gain is viewed by OPEC as likely being the highest in the region.
Figure 4. Planned Well pattern for the GUMUSUT KAKAP project in Malaysia (Rawingbadi)
In Latin America Colombia is expected to increase production by 80 kbd, though the country is having some issues with pipe damage from terrorism. There have been more than 30 attacks this year. OPEC also looks for an increase in Brazilian production of 10 kbd over the year, this gain coming after some 14 months of decline, which drop hopefully will be recovered before the end of the year.
Oman will grow production by 20 kbd, but it is in Sudan and Southern Sudan that OPEC anticipates the greatest growth, of 90 kbd. However the two countries are not the best of friends, with oil from Southern Sudan having to ship by pipeline to Sudan, for shipment onwards. At present oil, at an average rate of 75 kbd is continuing to flow up the pipe, but Sudan continues to threaten to halt shipments, leading Southern Sudan, in turn, to plan to shut-in the wells. The OPEC projection seems to be best defined therefore as “iffy.”
OPEC expect Russia to increase production by 80 kbd in 2013, yet there is some caution in that estimate, with other numbers suggesting that Russia is reaching a modern peak in production. Kazakhstan is projected to increase production by 50 kbd (coming from the startup of Kashagan, now expected at the end of September). The 100 kbd production will more than offset declines in the rest of the country. And China may increase production over the year by 60 kbd.
I have listed the countries that OPEC anticipates will grow production by more than 10 kbd, and have not listed the many countries that will see production decline by more than that amount. It is remarkable that listing the increases in production outside of OPEC can be done with just a few paragraphs. And it is a little disturbing that the threats to pipeline security throw questions over the reliability of some of the numbers. And yet this only addresses the possible growth in production, declining producers would require a much longer list. Combined it becomes a little more difficult, as turmoil in MENA continues to grow, to remain optimistic over the OPEC projections.
Figure 1. Location of Tabuk in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (WikiMedia )
This is across the country from the major oil fields currently in use, which lie more along the Persian Gulf coast, centered perhaps around Damman. It therefore suggests that they are looking for extensions of the Israeli and Egyptian fields into northern KSA. (Minister Al-Naimi said that they still “had to find them.”)
In discussing the venture Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi also noted that, choosing to look for – and presumably finding - natural gas, would take the pressure off the country to maintain its oil reserve.
Al-Naimi said that prospects for global production of shale gas and oil – including in China, Ukraine, Poland and Saudi Arabia – were so promising that the Kingdom might not need to continue with its decades-long policy of maintaining an oil-output cushion for use in global supply disruptions. “It is not a question whether Saudi Arabia has spare (oil) capacity. It is a question of whether we need to spend billions maintaining it at all,” Al-Naimi said.
Now over the years KSA has lowered the volume it has projected that it can produce from 12.5 mbd to 12 mbd, and this is, perhaps, an early indication that they intend (whether by policy or natural reserve availability) to lower that maximum further.
This has to be of at least a little concern, since the number of places with significant flexibility to increase production are getting closer to zero every year. The gains in global production that are foreseen by OPEC in the next year, for example come in dribs and drabs.
OPEC notes that in May the 8,915 producing wells in North Dakota collectively produced over 800 kbd. (The Department of Mineral Resources reports 821 kbd in June, over the 811 kbd in May with well numbers of 8,932 in May and 9,071 in June. Production per well is thus running an average of 90 barrels a day, with a well cost of $9 million.) There are 187 rigs plus/minus working and this is still enough to keep production rising at a rate of 1.3% per month. One of the maps I find interesting is this, from the Department.
Figure 3. Location and production values for wells in North Dakota (Department of Mineral Resources )
It is this illustration of the relatively heavy drilling already in the “sweet spots” and the poorer performance in the less well drilled regions that gives me concern for the longer term prospects for the formations. And as an aside note that crude from Alaska is declining, July output was 498 kbd against the year-to-date average of 542 kbd. The EIA is noting that, since there aren’t any major oil pipelines running into California from the East, that there is an increase in rail traffic to make up the difference. The EIA is suggesting that the traffic is already at a level of around 100 kbd.
And this in happening in the most promising region to increase production (though it includes Canada, for which OPEC projects a growth over the year of around 40 kbd, which is set against Mexican production, for which OPEC sees a decline of around 60 kbd).
Malaysia is projected to increase production by 50 kbd, from the Gumusut field. This is a Deepwater project, and one can get some estimate of the shape of the field from the well pattern. The production gain is viewed by OPEC as likely being the highest in the region.
Figure 4. Planned Well pattern for the GUMUSUT KAKAP project in Malaysia (Rawingbadi)
In Latin America Colombia is expected to increase production by 80 kbd, though the country is having some issues with pipe damage from terrorism. There have been more than 30 attacks this year. OPEC also looks for an increase in Brazilian production of 10 kbd over the year, this gain coming after some 14 months of decline, which drop hopefully will be recovered before the end of the year.
Oman will grow production by 20 kbd, but it is in Sudan and Southern Sudan that OPEC anticipates the greatest growth, of 90 kbd. However the two countries are not the best of friends, with oil from Southern Sudan having to ship by pipeline to Sudan, for shipment onwards. At present oil, at an average rate of 75 kbd is continuing to flow up the pipe, but Sudan continues to threaten to halt shipments, leading Southern Sudan, in turn, to plan to shut-in the wells. The OPEC projection seems to be best defined therefore as “iffy.”
OPEC expect Russia to increase production by 80 kbd in 2013, yet there is some caution in that estimate, with other numbers suggesting that Russia is reaching a modern peak in production. Kazakhstan is projected to increase production by 50 kbd (coming from the startup of Kashagan, now expected at the end of September). The 100 kbd production will more than offset declines in the rest of the country. And China may increase production over the year by 60 kbd.
I have listed the countries that OPEC anticipates will grow production by more than 10 kbd, and have not listed the many countries that will see production decline by more than that amount. It is remarkable that listing the increases in production outside of OPEC can be done with just a few paragraphs. And it is a little disturbing that the threats to pipeline security throw questions over the reliability of some of the numbers. And yet this only addresses the possible growth in production, declining producers would require a much longer list. Combined it becomes a little more difficult, as turmoil in MENA continues to grow, to remain optimistic over the OPEC projections.
Read more!
Thursday, February 7, 2013
OGPSS - Future Bakken production and hydrofracking
Before there were refrigerators folks kept drinks cool by putting them into clay jars that had been soaked in water. The evaporation of the water from the clay cooled the container and its contents, which today includes wine bottles. On the other hand, for many years artisans have taken clay in a slightly different form, shaped it and baked it and provided the teacups which keep the liquid inside until we drink it.
Two different forms of the same basic geological material, with two different behaviors and uses. Why bring this up? Well there is a growing series of articles which continue to laud the volumes of oil and natural gas that the world can expect from the artificial fracturing of the layers of shale in which these hydrocarbons have been trapped for the past few million years. It has been suggested that there is no difference between this “unconventional” oil and the “conventional” oil that has been produced over the past century to power the global economy. And yet, despite the scientific detail which some of these critics discuss other issues, they seem unable to grasp the relatively simple geologic and temporal facts that make the reserves in such locations as the Marcellus Shale of Pennsylvania and the Bakken of North Dakota both unconventional and temporally transient. Let me therefore try again to explain why, despite the fact that the oil itself may be relatively similar, the recovery and economics of that oil are quite different from those involved in extracting conventional deposits.
But, before getting to that, let’s first look at the current situation in North Dakota, using the information from the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR). According to the January Director’s Cut the rig count in the state has varied from 188 in October, through 186 in November, and 184 in December, to 181 at the time of the report. Why is this number important? Well, as I will explain in more detail later, the decline rate of an individual well in the region is very high, and thus the industry has to continue to drill wells at a rapid rate, just to replace the decline. (This is the “Red Queen” scenario that Rune Likvern has explained so well.) The DMR recognize this by showing the effect of several different scenarios as the number of rigs changes.
For example they project that 170 rigs will be able to drill around 2,000 wells a year. At that level, and with some assumptions about the productivity of individual wells that I am not going to address here, but which Rune discussed. I would, however, suggest that it is irrational to expect that new wells will continue to sustain existing first year levels as the wells move away from formation sweet spots. Yet, accepting their assumptions for now, DMR project that the 170 rigs will generate the following production from the state:
Figure 1. Achieved and projected North Dakota production when 170 rigs are used to continue to develop the field into the foreseeable future. (ND DMR).
The DMR plot also assumes that the wells are developed and brought into production in a timely manner. In October the state produced an average of 749 kbd of oil, which was through mid-January the current peak level of production. Currently it is estimated to cost $2 million to frack a well, and in January there were 410 wells waiting on that service.
In order to reach a higher level of production (and bear in mind that OPEC has been projecting significant further increases in production to make their anticipated supply and demand levels balance) the DMR looked at estimates of production if there were 225-250 rigs, and contrasted that with what would happen if the rig count fell almost immediately to 60.
Figure 2. North Dakota oil production with either 225-250 rigs, or with 60. (ND DMR)
Note that at 60 rigs the state production goes into an immediate decline. Somewhere in between those two extremes lies the likely future, but with the Director noting a December price of $77.09 that future may be at the lower, rather than higher end of the scale. (Though in January it popped back up to $87.25).
To illustrate the sensitivity of these numbers consider that if the rig count fell from 170 to 100, then production would decline to 800 kbd but would still fall into decline in 2020, while at 200 rigs the production would rise to a peak of 1 mbd, although the peak interval might only be four years from the 2,400 new wells added each year.
The ferocity of the decline rates of these wells is part of the reason that they are called unconventional, since they do not behave in the same manner as a conventional well, nor can they be developed in a similar way.
To return to the geology of the deposits (and shale is a consolidated clay) the middle Bakken formation is made up of a combination of layers of shale, sandstone, siltstone and limestone. These are, in general, rocks that have a very low permeability, and that property was explained in more detail in an earlier post. Simplistically it is a measure of how easy it is for fluid to flow through the rock, and for most of the Bakken rock it is not easy at all. If it were then there would be no need to put in the crack paths that the oil uses to reach the well. Let me repeat a figure from that post:
Figure 3. Block of sandstone with a crack in it (shown by the arrows).
I have been on a site where my hosts (a federal agency) had injected fluid that they were hoping would penetrate a layer of ground so that it would form an impermeable barrier. It had not, even though the ground was relatively easy for the fluid to penetrate. Instead it had all flowed into a crack no bigger than the one shown in the picture above, and the attempt was a failure.
Put that into reverse where you are trying to pull fluid out of the ground. There are two places where the fluid (oil or gas) is located, in the natural cracks and joints of the rock – which the hydrofrack is designed to cut across. And in the much lower permeability of the blocks of rock that are edged by these fractures, bedding planes and joints.
Figure 4. Representation of a horizontal well drilled in the Marcellus, shown against the natural fracture pattern (Source AAPG )
Over the millennia the oil/gas has migrated to those bedding planes and natural joints and fractures in the rock. When the well is first put in place it is that fluid that is more easily available to flow through the intersecting crack pattern to the well. But as those interstices empty out it is much more difficult to move the oil from the rock surrounding the natural cracks into that crack and thence to the well.
Most illustrations of hydraulic fracturing show a network of artificially induced cracks getting more numerous as they move away from the well. That, actually, is not the way it normally happens. The majority of the cracks that open are already there, and these are much easier to develop – as my unfortunate hosts learned – that it is to try and generate a multiplicity of new fractures, as I have previously explained here and here. The production, to go back to my initial metaphor, begins to move, over that first year of production, and dramatic fall in yield, from relying on the permeability of the wine cooler part of the rock, to that of the teacup.
Two different forms of the same basic geological material, with two different behaviors and uses. Why bring this up? Well there is a growing series of articles which continue to laud the volumes of oil and natural gas that the world can expect from the artificial fracturing of the layers of shale in which these hydrocarbons have been trapped for the past few million years. It has been suggested that there is no difference between this “unconventional” oil and the “conventional” oil that has been produced over the past century to power the global economy. And yet, despite the scientific detail which some of these critics discuss other issues, they seem unable to grasp the relatively simple geologic and temporal facts that make the reserves in such locations as the Marcellus Shale of Pennsylvania and the Bakken of North Dakota both unconventional and temporally transient. Let me therefore try again to explain why, despite the fact that the oil itself may be relatively similar, the recovery and economics of that oil are quite different from those involved in extracting conventional deposits.
But, before getting to that, let’s first look at the current situation in North Dakota, using the information from the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR). According to the January Director’s Cut the rig count in the state has varied from 188 in October, through 186 in November, and 184 in December, to 181 at the time of the report. Why is this number important? Well, as I will explain in more detail later, the decline rate of an individual well in the region is very high, and thus the industry has to continue to drill wells at a rapid rate, just to replace the decline. (This is the “Red Queen” scenario that Rune Likvern has explained so well.) The DMR recognize this by showing the effect of several different scenarios as the number of rigs changes.
For example they project that 170 rigs will be able to drill around 2,000 wells a year. At that level, and with some assumptions about the productivity of individual wells that I am not going to address here, but which Rune discussed. I would, however, suggest that it is irrational to expect that new wells will continue to sustain existing first year levels as the wells move away from formation sweet spots. Yet, accepting their assumptions for now, DMR project that the 170 rigs will generate the following production from the state:
Figure 1. Achieved and projected North Dakota production when 170 rigs are used to continue to develop the field into the foreseeable future. (ND DMR).
The DMR plot also assumes that the wells are developed and brought into production in a timely manner. In October the state produced an average of 749 kbd of oil, which was through mid-January the current peak level of production. Currently it is estimated to cost $2 million to frack a well, and in January there were 410 wells waiting on that service.
In order to reach a higher level of production (and bear in mind that OPEC has been projecting significant further increases in production to make their anticipated supply and demand levels balance) the DMR looked at estimates of production if there were 225-250 rigs, and contrasted that with what would happen if the rig count fell almost immediately to 60.
Note that at 60 rigs the state production goes into an immediate decline. Somewhere in between those two extremes lies the likely future, but with the Director noting a December price of $77.09 that future may be at the lower, rather than higher end of the scale. (Though in January it popped back up to $87.25).
To illustrate the sensitivity of these numbers consider that if the rig count fell from 170 to 100, then production would decline to 800 kbd but would still fall into decline in 2020, while at 200 rigs the production would rise to a peak of 1 mbd, although the peak interval might only be four years from the 2,400 new wells added each year.
The ferocity of the decline rates of these wells is part of the reason that they are called unconventional, since they do not behave in the same manner as a conventional well, nor can they be developed in a similar way.
To return to the geology of the deposits (and shale is a consolidated clay) the middle Bakken formation is made up of a combination of layers of shale, sandstone, siltstone and limestone. These are, in general, rocks that have a very low permeability, and that property was explained in more detail in an earlier post. Simplistically it is a measure of how easy it is for fluid to flow through the rock, and for most of the Bakken rock it is not easy at all. If it were then there would be no need to put in the crack paths that the oil uses to reach the well. Let me repeat a figure from that post:
Figure 3. Block of sandstone with a crack in it (shown by the arrows).
I have been on a site where my hosts (a federal agency) had injected fluid that they were hoping would penetrate a layer of ground so that it would form an impermeable barrier. It had not, even though the ground was relatively easy for the fluid to penetrate. Instead it had all flowed into a crack no bigger than the one shown in the picture above, and the attempt was a failure.
Put that into reverse where you are trying to pull fluid out of the ground. There are two places where the fluid (oil or gas) is located, in the natural cracks and joints of the rock – which the hydrofrack is designed to cut across. And in the much lower permeability of the blocks of rock that are edged by these fractures, bedding planes and joints.
Figure 4. Representation of a horizontal well drilled in the Marcellus, shown against the natural fracture pattern (Source AAPG )
Over the millennia the oil/gas has migrated to those bedding planes and natural joints and fractures in the rock. When the well is first put in place it is that fluid that is more easily available to flow through the intersecting crack pattern to the well. But as those interstices empty out it is much more difficult to move the oil from the rock surrounding the natural cracks into that crack and thence to the well.
Most illustrations of hydraulic fracturing show a network of artificially induced cracks getting more numerous as they move away from the well. That, actually, is not the way it normally happens. The majority of the cracks that open are already there, and these are much easier to develop – as my unfortunate hosts learned – that it is to try and generate a multiplicity of new fractures, as I have previously explained here and here. The production, to go back to my initial metaphor, begins to move, over that first year of production, and dramatic fall in yield, from relying on the permeability of the wine cooler part of the rock, to that of the teacup.
Read more!
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