Showing posts with label Saudi Arabia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Saudi Arabia. Show all posts

Sunday, August 3, 2014

Tech Talk - fracking tight sand and shales

The recent news that Saudi Arabia has not found natural gas to be as available as it had thought from its shale deposits, and is shifting to exploring for gas in their tight sand formations has not caught a lot of attention. But it is worth considering some of the aspects of this – and hence this post.

The Oil and Gas Journal define tight sands in this way:
The term tight gas sands refers to low-permeability sandstone reservoirs that produce primarily dry natural gas. A tight gas reservoir is one that cannot be produced at economic flow rates or recover economic volumes of gas unless the well is stimulated by a large hydraulic fracture treatment and/or produced using horizontal wellbores. . . . . . . . . Tight sands produce about 6 tcf of gas per year in the United States, about 25% of the total gas produced.
The production of natural gas from tight sands is different to that from shale sources, for, as the Canadian Center for Energy notes:
Initial production rates are low; however, productivity is long lived.
To understand why this is, and why this differentiates from shale production requires a little bit of an explanation.

Back in the time that the plants were growing that went on, over time, to produce the oil and natural gas we now extract, the surrounding ground was typically soil, with intrusions of sand as the tides and rivers shifted. As succeeding layers of ground covered these layers, so the soil turned into shale and the sands into sandstone. Sand particles tend to be more round, and so as the particles packed together the gaps between the grains provided space for the oil and gas to collect. Clay particles, that went on to form the shales, on the other hand are flatter and pack together more tightly. Further, while the sand formed continuous layers of material, with relatively few cracks, the shale, on the other hand cracked as it was compressed, dried and was squeezed – simplistically in the same way as the lake beds crack when they are exposed to the sun after a drought has driven off all the water.

The result of this is that the fine sands that formed into the tight sands have relatively low permeability – fluids within them find it difficult to get through the very narrow passages and driving pressures have to be high to overcome the frictional forces along these passages. At the same time, because there are relatively few natural fractures in the rock, artificial cracks have to be driven through the rocks, in order to provide enough large passage ways for the gas to escape. It still flows relatively slowly through the rock around these cracks before it reaches them, and this is why the production is relatively low, but continues over time.

On the other hand the shale structure holds much of the oil/natural gas in a different way. Firstly there are the natural fractures within the rock, which tend to run into one another, and which hold much of the fluid that is released early in the production of these formations. Secondly the rock immediately around the fractures has been itself fractured somewhat during the formation of the layer, and has a higher porosity (i.e. holds more fluid) and permeability than the central segments of each of the larger pieces.

To simplify the situation therefore, prior to hydro-fracking the natural gas in a tight sand is permeated relatively evenly throughout the rock (given the variety of the conditions that control rock structure over even relatively short distances). On the other hand the natural gas in a shale is preferentially concentrated in the natural fractures and the rock adjacent thereto.

So now a horizontal well is drilled along the rock, and, at intervals pressurized to drive fractures into the surrounding formation. The rock structural differences mean that the sandstone and the shale will respond differently. And a slight qualification at the beginning of the explanation, because of the length of the feed lines to the injection point where the fracture will start, the pressure rises relatively slowly on the rock, rather than with the sharp pressure spike from an explosive blast, which produces multiple fractures. (The use of a small shaped charge to induce the fracture by driving a small hole into the rock, will similarly only produce a single fracture extending out from the well bore for each charge).

Contrary to the pictures that are shown by oil and natural gas companies on how fracking cracks grow out into the rock, the cracks will not branch out under their own normal development. Crack splitting only occurs at relatively high energy transfer rates, when the crack speed reaches the maximum, and the crack has to bifurcate to absorb the input energy, those conditions normally will not exist at any distance from the wellbore.

What happens in the case of the shale formations is that the pressure opens the natural fractures in the rock and as these link together the pressure can open them over a significant volume of the rock, giving the equivalent spread of fractures away from the wellbore as the initial pressurized joints intersect others as the sand and fracking fluid migrate along the joints into the rock. Opening up these passages and giving access to the relatively higher porosity rock along their edges allows a relatively high rate of flow for the initial volume of natural gas which is found in these zones. But as they deplete, and the natural gas has to travel from the more central part of the shale blocks, so there is the dramatic drop in production which has been remarked by many (around 65% drop within the first year in some cases). Production continues to fall as the more easily produced volumes drain through the intersected fractures, and the residual production falls to a slight fraction of its initial value.

In contrast, the tight sand formation will flow in a different manner. Because of the low number of natural fractures and the lack of permeability changes along the joints, much of the channeling through the rock has to be put in place by the fracking process itself. Because there is much less collection of fluids into natural fractures (though there is still some) the initial production rates are not as high as they are from the shale formations, since the overall induced fracture density and dispersed penetration is not as pervasive. On the other hand once the fractures are in place, although permeability is low, if the formation does initially produce at an acceptable rate, it is more likely that the well will continue to flow with a lower, but steadier flow, than the shale well, and for a considerably longer time.

Thus the news that Saudi Arabia is now moving to try and develop their tight sand fields suggests that they will need to carry out much more extensive development in order to get the initial volumes of natural gas that they will need, but that once these wells are producing, that they will last longer than they would in the shale fields.

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Sunday, August 18, 2013

Tech Talk - Where to look for more oil this year.

The news that Saudi Arabia is planning to employ 200 drilling rigs next year (up from 20 back in 2005) suggests that there is a recognition that future reserves may not measure up to the planned volumes needed. Plans now include exploration of the shale deposits in the country, looking primarily for natural gas. There are estimates that this resource could run as high as 600 trillion cubic ft. Current plans are to drill seven exploratory wells in the Red Sea, off Tabuk.


Figure 1. Location of Tabuk in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (WikiMedia )

This is across the country from the major oil fields currently in use, which lie more along the Persian Gulf coast, centered perhaps around Damman. It therefore suggests that they are looking for extensions of the Israeli and Egyptian fields into northern KSA. (Minister Al-Naimi said that they still “had to find them.”)

In discussing the venture Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi also noted that, choosing to look for – and presumably finding - natural gas, would take the pressure off the country to maintain its oil reserve.
Al-Naimi said that prospects for global production of shale gas and oil – including in China, Ukraine, Poland and Saudi Arabia – were so promising that the Kingdom might not need to continue with its decades-long policy of maintaining an oil-output cushion for use in global supply disruptions.
“It is not a question whether Saudi Arabia has spare (oil) capacity. It is a question of whether we need to spend billions maintaining it at all,” Al-Naimi said.


Now over the years KSA has lowered the volume it has projected that it can produce from 12.5 mbd to 12 mbd, and this is, perhaps, an early indication that they intend (whether by policy or natural reserve availability) to lower that maximum further.

This has to be of at least a little concern, since the number of places with significant flexibility to increase production are getting closer to zero every year. The gains in global production that are foreseen by OPEC in the next year, for example come in dribs and drabs.

OPEC notes that in May the 8,915 producing wells in North Dakota collectively produced over 800 kbd. (The Department of Mineral Resources reports 821 kbd in June, over the 811 kbd in May with well numbers of 8,932 in May and 9,071 in June. Production per well is thus running an average of 90 barrels a day, with a well cost of $9 million.) There are 187 rigs plus/minus working and this is still enough to keep production rising at a rate of 1.3% per month. One of the maps I find interesting is this, from the Department.


Figure 3. Location and production values for wells in North Dakota (Department of Mineral Resources )

It is this illustration of the relatively heavy drilling already in the “sweet spots” and the poorer performance in the less well drilled regions that gives me concern for the longer term prospects for the formations. And as an aside note that crude from Alaska is declining, July output was 498 kbd against the year-to-date average of 542 kbd. The EIA is noting that, since there aren’t any major oil pipelines running into California from the East, that there is an increase in rail traffic to make up the difference. The EIA is suggesting that the traffic is already at a level of around 100 kbd.

And this in happening in the most promising region to increase production (though it includes Canada, for which OPEC projects a growth over the year of around 40 kbd, which is set against Mexican production, for which OPEC sees a decline of around 60 kbd).

Malaysia is projected to increase production by 50 kbd, from the Gumusut field. This is a Deepwater project, and one can get some estimate of the shape of the field from the well pattern. The production gain is viewed by OPEC as likely being the highest in the region.


Figure 4. Planned Well pattern for the GUMUSUT KAKAP project in Malaysia (Rawingbadi)

In Latin America Colombia is expected to increase production by 80 kbd, though the country is having some issues with pipe damage from terrorism. There have been more than 30 attacks this year. OPEC also looks for an increase in Brazilian production of 10 kbd over the year, this gain coming after some 14 months of decline, which drop hopefully will be recovered before the end of the year.

Oman will grow production by 20 kbd, but it is in Sudan and Southern Sudan that OPEC anticipates the greatest growth, of 90 kbd. However the two countries are not the best of friends, with oil from Southern Sudan having to ship by pipeline to Sudan, for shipment onwards. At present oil, at an average rate of 75 kbd is continuing to flow up the pipe, but Sudan continues to threaten to halt shipments, leading Southern Sudan, in turn, to plan to shut-in the wells. The OPEC projection seems to be best defined therefore as “iffy.”

OPEC expect Russia to increase production by 80 kbd in 2013, yet there is some caution in that estimate, with other numbers suggesting that Russia is reaching a modern peak in production. Kazakhstan is projected to increase production by 50 kbd (coming from the startup of Kashagan, now expected at the end of September). The 100 kbd production will more than offset declines in the rest of the country. And China may increase production over the year by 60 kbd.

I have listed the countries that OPEC anticipates will grow production by more than 10 kbd, and have not listed the many countries that will see production decline by more than that amount. It is remarkable that listing the increases in production outside of OPEC can be done with just a few paragraphs. And it is a little disturbing that the threats to pipeline security throw questions over the reliability of some of the numbers. And yet this only addresses the possible growth in production, declining producers would require a much longer list. Combined it becomes a little more difficult, as turmoil in MENA continues to grow, to remain optimistic over the OPEC projections.

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Thursday, July 19, 2012

OGPSS - Saudi Arabian production - then and now

The latest OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) foresees that demand for OPEC crude oil will decline over the next year by about 300 kbd. This is largely in anticipation of additional production from elsewhere:
Non-OPEC supply is forecast to increase by 0.7 mb/d in 2012, supported by the anticipated growth from North America, Latin America, and FSU. In 2013, non-OPEC oil supply is expected to grow by 0.9 mb/d. The US, Canada, Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Colombia are expected to be the main contributors to supply growth, while Norway, Mexico, and the UK are seen experiencing the largest declines. OPEC NGLs and non-conventional oils are seen averaging 5.9 mb/d in 2013, indicating an increase of 0.2 mb/d over this year.
Overall OPEC sees demand staying below 90 mbd over the remainder of this year, with total growth in demand lying at 1.01 mbd.


Figure 1. OPEC forecast for global demand for the rest of the year (July MOMR )

Much has happened since the late Matt Simmons and Nansen Saleri got together to debate scenario’s for future oil production in Washington, back in February, 2004. While Matt had developed his research that then led into the publication of “Twilight in the Desert”, this was the meeting where Aramco pushed back to explain that there would not be a global problem, for at least fifty years. As this series of posts on Saudi Arabia comes to a conclusion, and moves on to other countries, it is perhaps of some value to look back on the presentation by Mahmoud Abdul Baqi and Hansen Saleri to remember what was said. Back in those days oil demand was expected to steadily rise, with increasing rate, to reach 100 mbd in 2015.



Figure 2. Aramco estimate of demand from 2000 to 2020 (Baqi and Saleri)

At the time Aramco had no concern over the industry being able to meet this increase in demand, and fully expected that Aramco itself would be able to more than sustain its share of the increased demand. They had 9 seismic crews out surveying the country, and some 48 rigs drilling both to sustain their then current level of production, and also to explore for new resources.



Figure 3. Location of exploration wells in Saudi Arabia in 2004 (Baqi and Saleri)

At the time Aramco reported that with 700 billion barrels of oil initially in place, that had been already discovered in the country, they expected to find another 200 billion barrels. Of that discovered oil they considered 260 billion barrels as their reserve, of which, by 2004, they had 131 billion barrels in development. (Note that they defined the reserve as the total amount of extractable oil, not the amount left to recover, they have done that in later computations also, and the latest annual report uses 259.7 billion barrels as that discovered reserve). The Annual Report notes that they discovered one new field in 2011, the Wedyan-1 well in the Empty Quarter flowed at 2.3 kbd from the Mishraf reservoir, while they drilled 161 exploration and development wells.


Figure 4. Amount of Saudi oil that had been developed by 2004 (Baqi and Saleri)

For a short arithmetic problem consider that 260 less 131 equals 129, and it one adds another 21, as a percentage of the 200 billion barrels to be found, then one gets 150 billion barrels. Divide this by 3 billion barrels a year of rough annual production and you get the 50 years of remaining life, that Saudi Arabia considered, back then, that their oilfields have left.

And this is the interesting plot, for it shows what Aramco define as their depletion rate, which is annual reduction of the initial proved reserve. The relevant term is the annual depletion rate:


Figure 5. Annual depletion rates for Saudi and other reserves (Baqi and Saleri)

This should be read in conjunction with the state of depletion of the different reservoirs in the KSA, as reported for 2004.


Figure 6. State of field depletion in Saudi Arabia as reported in 2004 (Baqi and Saleri)

And remember that this was eight years ago, so there has been that much change in the numbers! Aramco also expects to recover about 75% of the Original Oil in Place (OOIP) in all fields. They have been able to reach around that level with Abqaiq, which also suggests that the days of that field are now very numbered. But whether this will be possible in the other reservoirs is more open to doubt, and if there is less recoverable oil, then the actual depletion rates go higher.

But where the field is just starting, such as the new development of Haradh, if they hold the extraction rate to 1.7% of the anticipated total recovery then they anticipate that the field will continue to yield 300 kbd for decades.


Figure 7. Future production anticipated for Haradh III (Baqi and Saleri)

It was this anticipation of success across their endeavours that led the company to project that they would be able to hold a Maximum Sustainable Capacity of 10 mbd until 2042, with it only then becoming necessary to replace reserves from the probable and possible fields yet to be found and developed).

The last few posts have described how, as declining output has now hit the original fields, Aramco has moved to add production from other fields (Shaybah for example will soon be producing at up to 1 mbd) and is introducing multiphase pumps to Haradh and Shaybah to improve production from marginal wells, and in Safaniya to sustain a maximum production capacity of 1.3 mbd. Production from Manifa is also anticipated to step in to cover declines in other fields, and come on line in 2014, with a capacity of 900 kbd.

But these new additions are required to offset the decline in existing fields, which have been somewhat protected from the severity of declining well production by the switch from vertical to maximum reservoir contact (MRC) wells. Although this conceals the depletion of the oil in the reservoir during normal production it does not, by itself, improve the ultimate production from the field, but rather can shorten field life, since these wells have proved to be more productive in rate. Nansen Saleri now appears to duck questions which ask if KSA can increase production beyond 10 mbd.

Within The Oil Drum (TOD) there has been considerable discussion over the rate at which well production declines, and the remaining reserve in the field depletes. One impact of the shift in wells from old established fields is that production from the average well will decline over time, a subject that Euan has visited in the past.


Figure 8. Individual oil well production values for Aramco (Euan Mearns)

It should be noted that the use of the submersible pumps are reported to have brought wells back to around 3,000 bd. But the move over to horizontal and MRC wells has slowed the impact of other changes in the country.

Nevertheless, after putting all this together, I re-iterate my conclusion from last time in that I doubt that KSA will increase production much above 10 mbd, (in June it was producing 9.888 or 10.103 mbd depending on source, and with the rising internal demands (domestic use in the Middle East is now projected to average 7.7 mbd in 2012) world markets will get tighter in the shorter, rather than the longer term.

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Thursday, July 12, 2012

OGPPS - Saudi Arabia and what lies ahead

Saudi Aramco has stated that it designs the well layouts and extraction patterns from its oil fields so that they effectively decline at a rate of 2% per year.* If one divides 100 by 2 it yields 50. If one subtracts 50 from 2012, one gets the year 1962. Even to those with poor math skills, these are not difficult operations, and they lead to the conclusion that those fields that came into production in the early 1960’s and earlier are now reaching the end of their productive lives. They are not there yet, since production took time to ramp up, and some fields have been rested over the years, when production was cut back, or even mothballed. But it gives you some perspective on the overall scope of the situation, without the need for complex mathematical modeling.

Figure 1. Table of oil fields in KSA and their start dates

(* The IEA apparently believes that the figure is closer to 3.5%) (H/t Matt) Saudi Arabia states that, without using advanced recovery techniques and “maintain potential” drilling sites – often not in the same field as that being depleted – the rate would be 8%.(h/t Darwinian ).

In earlier production practices, where companies “stepped out” production wells away from the original producers, and in this way gradually extended the knowledge of the size of the field, reserve growth over time was a normal development. However, with the large size of the fields in Saudi Arabia, and the need to maintain operational pressure during production, Aramco (as JoulesBurn has clearly shown) rings their fields with water injection wells that drive oil to the central high point of the reservoir and slowly migrates the producing and injection wells towards that center as the field is drawn down. This practice precludes the incremental increase in reserves over time, since the field boundaries are constrained and as the wells reach the central part of the reservoir (the crest of the anticline) a clear definition of the closing days of the field becomes more evident.

At the same time it is worth pointing out that until fairly recently when Aramco were carrying out their “maintain potential” drilling they were merely drilling additional wells at 1 km spacing further down the reservoir. But when one moves from the perimeter of the reservoir to the crest, then there are no more places within that reservoir to continue the practice. Thus, in more recent years Aramco have offset declines in older reservoirs by bringing new fields into production. But, as the illustration below that JoulesBurn has provided for Haradh 3 shows, in the smaller reservoirs it is no longer possible to have the space for multi-year progressions of the wells across the field and thus, to sustain production new fields will have to be added to the network at more frequent intervals to sustain levels of production.

  

Figure 2. Planned well layout in Haradh III (from Aramco via JoulesBurn

Saudi reservoirs have also been large. This brings with it the need for large infrastructure to be in place not only to remove the oil, but also to separate the oil, gas and water (and occasional sand) that come out of the well, and to inject water into the reservoir to replace the oil and maintain the reservoir pressure that drives the fluid to the well. That infrastructure is tied to specific design flow rates and it is difficult to change the volume flow rates by significant amounts at short notice. Thus when a field, such as Abu Sa’fah, for example, is brought on line to produce 300 kbd, the plant is all designed for that flow and there is no immediate way to handle an increase in flow. Aramco can only, therefore produce, to the capacity of the infrastructure in place. It is this requirement and “step-function” nature of the additions to oil flow that provides some of the shape to the flow of oil in the region.

However, it is also a limitation, in that the two remaining large sources of crude oil that Saudi Arabia anticipates coming on line must wait until all the logistical handling is in place.

The first of these is the Shaybah expansion. Shaybah began with a production of 250 kbd, and has seen this progressively increased, first to 500 kbd, and then, in 2009, to 750 kbd.. The expansion requires that additional plant be installed to process the hydrocarbons produced which will include 264 kbd of NGL. The anticipated completion date is in 2014.

Manifa has been the more controversial of the fields in Saudi Arabia for some time. Although it has been known to exist for a long time (see above table) and was initially brought into production in 1964, it has never seen the major thrust to develop production that is now underway. There have been several reasons for this, the primary one being that KSA has never needed the production in the past to be able to meet anticipated demand. However there have also been significant questions as to the make-up of the oil, and its need for special treatment. In 2005 it was producing at around 50 kbd, back in the days when KSA was admitting to a decline rate of 6%. JoulesBurn has written about the controversy over the make-up of the oil, which is a heavy, sour crude containing vanadium. Regardless of the validity of those arguments, it does appear that the oil is now going to be fed, as it is produced, to two new refineries that have been planned in the Kingdom. These are at Jubail which is expected to be completed in 2013, and will handle 400 kbd of oil, and the second at Yanbu which, as of this year is being developed with Sinopec, ConocoPhilips having pulled out of the deal. That, together, comprises some 800 kbd of the 900 kbd of oil that Manifa is being developed to produce.

It is pertinent, relative to the opening comment, to note that this is the last large project that Saudi Aramco has reported to be on their books. If one were to accept that their real decline rate is some 3.5% then, at a production level of roughly 10 mbd a year, this would be reducing at 350 kbd per year. A 1.2 mbd addition to current production (Manifa and Shaybah combined) would thus only match just over three years of such a decline rate. For there to be new sources of production brought on line in the future, there must first be a considerable infrastructure put in place, and there does not, at present, appear to be any evidence of this, nor planning and bid documents being prepared for such an eventuality. Remember that Aramco began construction for Manifa in 2007, and it is still likely at least a year from major production.

To some extent this can be overcome by feeding new production from fields not now in production into the existing GOSPs and related facilities. But what that implies is that production will not grow beyond its current levels, which is around 10 mbd. Aramco have become very skilled at controlling water floods, enhancing production from existing reservoirs, and previously bypassed oil, but those wells can only be revisited a limited number of times. Because of the large number of highly productive wells that the country has, it is possible in the short term to raise production but that increase has to go through production facilities which are of only limited volume. Thus the increase can be of only a short duration, and as has been commented by others in the past few weeks, a system cannot be run at full production for long without problems developing. Further the underlying assumption that production declines can be offset by new production to hold depletion to 2% a year is really only true for the country as a whole, and individual decline rates for specific reservoirs have been reported to run between 6 and 8%. As there are become fewer large projects to provide the offset for such decline rates, then the impact of the greater values will become more evident. And so while I expect that the Kingdom will reclaim its position as leading oil producer before long, I continue to believe it will be because of a drop in Russian production, rather than a gain in that from the Kingdom.

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Friday, July 6, 2012

OGPSS - The "best of the rest" in Saudi Arabia

The discussion that swirls over the future of global oil supplies often seems to focus, from the side of those who suggest that there is no problem, on the large volumes of oil that still remain in place around the world. The critical point however is not that this oil exists, but rather the rate at which it can be recovered. This is perhaps most obviously pertinent to the discussion of the oil coming from the Bakken formation in North Dakota, where the rapid decline in individual well performance means that a great many wells must be developed and remain on line in the out years to sustain any significant flow past peak. It is a point that clearly was missed by Leonardo Maugeri, as I noted last week, and equally by George Monbiot, who has now finally been swayed to the side of the cornucopians, after years of doubt.

But the issue of individual well flow rates are an increasingly critical factor when future oil production in oilfields around the world are considered and this holds equally true when the fields in Saudi Arabia are discussed.

The history of oil production from Saudi Arabia has largely come from individual wells that produced in the thousands of barrels a day. In order to sustain that production over decades it has been necessary to ensure that the pressure differential between the well and the rock are sustained; that the rock has an adequate permeability to ensure that flow continues at a steady state; that the oil itself is of relatively low viscocity and is thus able to easily flow through the rock; and that there is a sufficient thickness and extent in the reservoir to allow such sustained production. All of those factors came together in the giant fields that provided high levels of production over many decades, most particularly in the northern segments of Ghawar.

 Yet those conditions are less commonly congruent in the fields that Aramco must now move into to address the coming falls in production from the historic sources. These “best of the rest” (as the late Matt Simmons called them) that must now increasingly carry the burden of sustaining Saudi production fail, individually, on differing grounds from meeting those earlier parameters, but collectively, and in the face of Ghawar’s decline, they will only be able to sustain production to their original targets and will not be able to provide replacement production as the oldest and larger begin to fade. I would remind you of the curve that Euan put up back in 2007 .

Figure 1, Euan’s production estimates from 2007.
Euan’s overall estimates for total production have not been met, rather KSA chose to reduce the volumes that they provided to the world market in order to sustain a higher price for their product. (And I would note that it was their recent production of an increased flow into that market that provided the cushion for the rest of the world, so that it can view the current sanctions on Iran (which came into full force at the beginning of this month) with considerable equanimity – at least for the next few months. That supply has provided the backup as Iranian exports are reported to have already halved.(Now, if supply starts to get tight, it won’t be the fault of the KSA.)

 But, in regard to the longer term question of total flow, will KSA increase their production to the 12 mbd that appears as some magic figure in the tables of the cornucopians as they look toward the end of the decade? I think not. Euan’s plot, if perhaps a little pessimistic over the rate at which Ghawar is declining is nevertheless true from an overall perspective of the changes that we can anticipate. Bear in mind that Aramco was only then moving to increase the size of their drilling fleet from historic levels of around 20 rigs to as many as 200 in the years since. And it is that change, with the underlying realities that it implies, that must be recognized when looking into the future.
 As the largest fields are depleted, so production moves from them to smaller fields in the region. And as those fields are depleted production moves to yet smaller, and initially relatively uneconomic fields, that now have value. But to achieve the same production a greater number of wells must be drilled, as their individual production levels and operational lives are now shorter. 

 The Kingdom has been building production in a number of different regions over the past ten years. These have added considerably to overall Saudi capacity, but even if they are being drawn down at only 2% p.a. (as has been claimed in the past) that slow reduction makes it more difficult for them to be the source of additional production to meet any future increase in demand/replacement of depleted reserves. As I list the fields remember that when Ghawar‘s decline becomes evident these fields are already in production, and so it must be the smaller fields that lie beneath them in the hierarchy that will then have to carry the burden. 

Qatif has been producing 500 kbd since 2004, from a field that started with a projected 6.2 x 31 mile size, with 151 development wells, and an 8.4 billion barrel reserve. Both it and Abu Sa’fah lie near Abqaiq and Berri. 

 Abu Sa’fah, which was expanded at the same time as Qatif, to 300 kbd is an offshore field that covers 6.2 by 11 miles and in the expansion had 90 wells and reserves of 6.1 billion barrels. (Half the revenue from Abu Sa’fah goes to Bahrain as JoulesBurn has explained and that arrangement continues with Bahrain getting the revenue from 150 kbd of oil. 

    
Figure 2. The location of Qatif and Abu Sa’fah (JoulesBurn)

 In 2007 Aramco brought 500,000 bpd of Arabian Light onto the market through the Khursaniyah development. (this included the onshore Abu Hadriya, Harmaliyah, and Fadhili fields) though it first began production at a lower volume in 2008. The associated gas plant ran through some troubles and delays before coming on line in 2010, and this also delayed the time over which the field came up to full production. 
 Down at the other end of Ghawar there are a group of oilfields found since 1967 including Hawtah and Nuayyim, in the Central Region. The group of fields, referred to as the Hawtah Trend or Najd Fields has had problems in the past with sand inflow into the wells, and there is some debate as to whether the reserves in the region total 10 billion or 30 billion barrels of light, sweet crude. Hawtah itself produces around 150 kbd, but the associated fields brought this up to 400 kbd.

Nuayyim came on line with an additional 100 kbd in August 2009.


Figure 3. Named Saudi fields, with those coming on line or expanded in 2009 being emphasized. (Energy-pedia ) 
 Haradh has been discussed earlier as part of Ghawar, and the major addition that came that year was at Khurais, which added 1.2 mbd to supply potential. (Increase in production from Shaybah brought another 250 kbd to the total). Khurais, was mapped by JoulesBurn in 2008, and it was here that the need for additional drilling rigs became more evident in getting all the wells brought on line in time for the scheduled start of the upgrade. With that completed, the increase (which actually comes from the three adjacent fields of Khurais, Abu Jifan and Mazalij) of 1.2 mbd began production in June 2009. 
 In terms of the production of the heavier oils that are taking a greater portion of the marketable Saudi product it has been suggested that KSA have planned to increase production at Zuluf, which has some 8 billion barrels in reserve, to a capacity of 1.2 mbd from 500 mbd (but with 200 mbd mothballed). 
 Up on the Kuwaiti border lies the Hout oilfield, where work is now being developed to capture increasing volumes of natural gas now flared from the field. This is one of the four fields that the two countries share, and which includes Khafji, Lulu and Dorra. Most of the oil goes to Japan. Khafji came on line in 1960, and Hout in 1963. The fields have produced around 4 billion barrels of oil, and are now producing at around 610 kbd. Bids for the new development are now due in September.
 I will leave Shaybah and Manifa until next time.

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Thursday, June 21, 2012

OGPSS - Saudi Arabia - production from Safaniya

In recent posts I have been looking at the potential for the historically high producing Saudi oilfields at Abqaiq, Berri and Ghawar to increase, or even sustain current levels of production into the future. This is particularly important when one considers the historic main oilfields in production within that country. And of these the largest not yet covered is the offshore field at Safaniya, today's topic.

 Because of the change in well design, so that long horizontal wells, many with a number of lateral feeds, known collectively as Maximum Reservoir Contact (MRC) wells, located within the top 5 ft of the reservoir are now used, initial declines in production in the major fields have largely stopped. This is partially explained because as a vertical well through an oil reservoir sees the pool getting smaller, the length of well productively exposed to the oil in the reservoir reduces, and so there is a steady reduction in well performance over the years. Where the oil is, however, being pushed up to the horizontal well by an under-flood of injected water (which sustains the differential pressure between the fluid in the rock and the well bore) then the exposed length, and the driving pressure both remain relatively constant, and production is sustained at closer to a constant level until the water flood reaches the well, when the well dies.

 Aramco have changed the design of their MRC wells so that the arrival of water at one location along a lateral is no longer sufficient to kill the well. Installed valves isolate the region of the well where the water enters, and the rest of the well can remain in production. But it will produce at a reduced rate, and is an early warning that the water levels are nearing the well location, and that, before long, the well will no longer be able to sustain the x,000 bd production which has been the characteristic of most Saudi wells for over five decades. This is not to decry the efforts that have been made to recover residual oil left in those fields. As I have noted Aramco have been diligent in seeking to find additional ways to extract the oil that has been left as the waterfloods progressed through their senior fields. But they are also smart enough to know that alternate fields would have to be developed, and brought on line as the limits in the older fields are reached, as they now have been, in some cases for years. There is an interesting feature to the sources of production, back in 1994.
 
Figure 1 Saudi oil production, by field, in1994 (Matt Simmons, “Twilight in the Desert”)
   
Figure 2. Oilfields in Saudi Arabia (from Aramco via energy-pedia 


 The immediately obvious characteristic is that they are, at least to some degree (as with Berri) land-based. (Other less obvious differences are a change in the host rock and the quality of the oil). The most significant of the remaining four is Safaniya which came on line in 1951. But it was not, immediately, produced.
Aramco, in accordance with the terms of its concession, went ahead with the careful development of the field. Between 1951 and 1954, 17 wells were drilled, but they were not produced. . . . . . When it was first put in production in 1957, it flowed 50,000 barrels of crude oil a day from 18 wells. At the beginning of 1962 it possessed the facilities to handle 350,000 barrels a day (almost 128 million barrels a year) from 25 wells.
It was found to be the world’s largest offshore oilfield, and Matt Simmons has conjectured (in Twilight in the Desert) that it is connected to Khafji and through that field into Burgan. When Saudi oil production peaked in 1980/81 he notes that it was producing at over 1.5 mbd. Since then production fell to around 600 kbd, but then has increased back to 900 kbd with plans now afoot to bring it back up to full volume of earlier levels of production, which will require additional forms of artificial lift this being the electrical submersible pumps that have already been introduced into Ghawar. 


 The phase 1 upgrade at Safaniya is anticipated to be completed by next year. The oil is found in sandstone, rather than the carbonates at Ghawar, and in the original development Matt has noted that the weak nature of the sand was causing the wells to collapse as the oil was removed, and that the flow of water into the reservoirs was bypassing a lot of the oil being left in place. As other fields have been developed, they have largely been brought into production fairly quickly. This has not been the case at Safaniya, which as Matt noted:
. . .holds the entire remaining spare daily oil supply of any magnitude . .
In the sense that other fields and opportunities take a little time to bring on line this remains true.

 Manifa, for example, will only start to bring in significant production as the refineries to accept the oil are themselves brought on line in the years ahead. Yet it is still counted as part of the total volume that KSA can bring to the market. Safaniya had, however, been integrated with secondary development of the nearby fields of Marjan and Zuluft into a Northern Area Producing Region (NAPR) back in 1995 and there are enough wells and Gas Oil Separation Plants available, to be able to handle flows of up to 2 mbd. Because, however, the oil produced is Heavy (relative to the Arab Light classification of the production from the land-based reservoirs initially) Aramco also found it sometimes more difficult to market, though that demand also fluctuates. And it has been this marketing problem that sometimes seems to produce the headlines when Aramco sees a world that is increasingly demanding more oil, but has not always been willing to use this heavier supply as an immediate fill-in for existing shortages. (It could not, for example, provide an immediate replacement for Libyan oil last year, even though it was available). As a result the heavier oil is discounted against other Saudi oil. 

 At present the major effort offshore is going toward development of Manifa, which will ultimately bring an additional 900 kbd into production (staged to coincide with refinery construction) but as those wells come on stream (starting next year) so the effort will swing back to Safaniya, Marjan and the related fields of the NAPR. (And as an aside I had mentioned at the beginning of this series of posts there was some talk of bringing Damman back into production, and those talks are apparently still continuing). This additional production capability will, with the further development of some of the other fields in the region (which I will discuss next time) leaves me believing that, of the three largest oil producers, it will be Saudi Arabia that sustains its current levels of production (give or take 500 kbd) much longer than its two rivals. Though I would again stress the difference between production and export volumes.

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Thursday, June 14, 2012

OGPSS - Current oil production and the future of Ghawar

(Updated intro)There is a growing impression being given in the discussion of oil and natural gas supplies, that the world is moving into a period where there will soon be such a plentiful sufficiency of crude that the US may consider exporting some of its production. (h/t Leanan). But if one looks behind the headlines, and particularly at the current status of the largest oilfield contributing toward this rosy picture, the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia, that optimism becomes more evidently built on a very transient set of data that, as this series of posts seeks to show, will not be sustainable for any significant period into the future.

 The three major oil producers (i.e. those producing more than 5 mbd each) are currently seeing surges in production as the world moves to an overall production of 90 mbd. The OPEC June Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) notes that this has brought Russia to 10.33 mbd in May, some 100 kbd over the same period in 2011; and Saudi Arabia is reported to have averaged 9.917 mbd in May, up 40 kbd over April. The United States is running at 6.236 Mbd of crude (from the EIA TWIP), while importing 9.117 mbd. The MOMR reports US oil supply at 9.66 mbd on average, but counts more than just crude in this value. The gain over the past year is around 600 kbd. It is interesting to note, in regard to OPEC production the continued difference between the volumes that OPEC reports from direct contact with the suppliers, and that when the numbers are obtained from “secondary sources.”
Figure 1. OPEC production from its members, with values provided by them (OPEC June MOMR)

 
Figure 2. OPEC production from information provided by secondary sources (OPEC June MOMR).

 This surge from the majors has, in part, led the EIA to project that oil prices will, for the remainder of the year, remain relatively stable.
 
Figure 3. EIA estimate of crude oil prices going forward over the next eighteen months (EIA TWIP)

 In the short term, and leading into a national election, there is no significant event (short of a hurricane or two) that obviously threatens this projection – though the Iranian situation and the questionable stability of nations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has to remain a concern. But sadly the continued ill health of the global economy, with no evident savior or realistic plan for growth now visible, means that demand – which OPEC projects will still grow 1.17 mbd y-o-y on average this year, may continue to be met.

I have, however, in previous posts, given my reasons for anticipating that the surge in both Russian production and that in the United States are at near peak, and will soon decline. Saudi Arabia’s fall will be less dramatic and a little later, but the combination does not bode well for the international supply in the next presidential term. The big question with Saudi Arabian production has been, to date, more focused on the production from Ghawar, which at 5 mbd has been the rock on which the overall production builds. But that rock is continuously eroding under the long production periods that its different regions have seen. The final major new effort to bring new production on line in the overall field was the effort at Haradh, down in the South tip of the field.

 JoulesBurn has written comprehensively on this region, beginning with the first well that came into production. In 1979, as the late Matt Simmons pointed out in “Twilight in the Desert”, the three northern segments of Ghawar, Ain Dar, Shedgum and North Uthmaniyah were producing 4.2 mbd of the 5.3 mbd total Ghawar output, with South Uthmaniyah producing another 400 kbd. By 2006 North Uthmaniyah was running at a 46% water cut. Joules has taken the historic record for that region of the field and made a short movie presentation included in a post that shows how Uthmaniyah was developed over the years.
 
Figure 4. Single frame from the movie on drill site development in Uthmaniyah, over time (JoulesBurn)

 The sequence of wells, moving inexorably to the crest of the field, shows how the wells had to move as the underlying reservoir became more depleted in oil. Uthmaniyah is the region where the test program to inject carbon dioxide to enhance EOR is under construction, as mentioned earlier, and scheduled for completion in the fourth quarter of 2013. It is worth noting that Aramco are also planning on using more steam injection for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and that plans have just been signed to increase steam production at the Ju’aymah, Shedgum and Uthmaniyah plants, with completion dates in 2014 and 2015.


Figure 5. Sectors of Ghawar with the date of discovery (Afifi )
As one moves south the quality of the reservoir changes, and becomes more difficult to produce. However as Greg Croft has noted the two lower segments of the field Hawiyah and Haradh were developed with horizontal wells, rather than the vertical wells further north in Ghawar. This has overcome some of the geological constraints and the fact that the productivity index drops from around 140 barrels of oil per day/psi to 45 BOPD/psi at Hawiyah, and 31 at Haradh. In 2008 the Hawiyah NGL recovery plant was commissioned, to yield 310 kbd of ethane and NGL. 


 The further development of the lowest segment of Ghawar, down at Haradh, was one of the major projects that Aramco listed as contributing to their ability to produce up to 12.5 mbd. The latest development built on earlier development and because the use of horizontal wells had transitioned into maximum reservoir contact (MRC) designs by the time of Haradh III reduced the anticipated number of wells from 280 verticals to 32 MRC wells.
  
Figure 6. Planned well layout in Haradh III (from Aramco via JoulesBurn) 
 In his initial review of how that developed JoulesBurn showed how the wells were developed and laid out and explained how he was able to use satellite images to determine the different components of the production equipment. It is relevant to note that Joules updated his view of the region in 2010 when he noted that, after looking at the satellite images of the region, he was able to show that instead of the production coming from the original 32 wells, there were actually some 52 production wells connected up, which – as he noted – raise a few questions as to the actual performance of the wells over the original projections. 

 Aramco have reported, however (pdf) using Real-Time Reserve Management, that it had by the summer of 2009, been more successful than anticipated. Some of the additional wells drilled were to allow cross-hole tomography (pdf) to monitor the location of the oil:water front which, as production evolved, did not follow the anticipated path. This was particularly important to establish given the 1 km spacing between wells and the more complex geology relative to that further north in Ghawar. 
 
Figure 7. Schematic showing how cross-hole tomography is carried out (Stephen Prenskey ) 

 
Figure 8. Image from Crosshole tomography at Haradh (out (Stephen Prenskey) 
 What is, however, also clear from looking at the different regions of Ghawar is that there are no places left for new programs to restore production as wells become exhausted. If KSA is to sustain its production it must look beyond the King of Oil Fields, who now lies stricken in years.

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Wednesday, June 6, 2012

OGPSS - Saudi Arabia and Natural Gas Liquids

Stuart Staniford has been watching the decline in oil prices. He has then commented that, given the Saudi need for income to hold off “Arab Spring” dissatisfaction, they are unlikely to let prices fall too far, before cutting production, since even a 10% reduction in output could raise prices 20%, thereby resolving possible income concerns. This well reflects the role of the Texas Railroad Commission back when, which controlled US production in order to sustain an acceptable price for oil. But that role collapsed when overall US production was no longer able to spring to the rescue when demand rose, and US production could not, passing the control over prices to OPEC and more particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) who could, and have shown a willingness to, control output to ensure that it proximately followed demand and has kept prices within an acceptable range, for them.

 It is easier to do this by curtailing production, and as Stuart noted, this can increase KSA revenue at a time of falling global demand. However, in the opposing case, where the global economy requires a “reasonable” price for oil, and will require them to increase production, as they have done to the limits of demand growth in the past year, that ability may be limited and of a shorter duration. It also occurs at a time that the internal use of crude is limiting the amount that the KSA can export. But while there is considerable discussion about this situation, there has been some increase in natural gas liquid production that is also important, and thus a main point of this post.

 

Figure 1. Recent KSA production and exports of oil (Export Databrowser )


In the past, when the Kingdom has been challenged on the ability to increase production, it has listed the number of future fields that it would bring on line. Previous lists of future projects are, however, now reaching completion. Shaybah, for example, in the Empty Quarter, raised production in January 2009, from 500 kbd to 750 kbd, and will soon raise it an additional 250 kbd to 1 million barrels a day.


 The increased production at Shaybah, however, also helps identify an additional source of increased production, since is also increasing natural gas production to 2.4 bcf/day, with a concomitant production of 264 kbd of NGL. The increase in overall production of NGL from OPEC has, for some time, provided a significant volume of additional fuel. By the last quarter of 2011 OPEC as a whole was producing 5.42 mbd of NGL and NCF (non-conventional fuel), (up from 3.89 mbd in 2006) Rune has written about NGL production here and here with the relative importance of this supply perhaps best illustrated with this graph from the latter post. 

 
Figure 2. OPEC crude oil, condensate and NGL supplies over the decade from 2001 to 2010 (Rune Likvern) 



 OPEC is anticipating an overall increase in NGL production from the 2011 average of 5.3 mbd to 5.7 mbd in 2012, with final quarter 2012 volume reaching 5.86 mbd. Apart from the increased supply from Shaybah, KSA is developing the Arabiyah/Hasbah offshore fields with onshore processing at Wasit. This will produce 2.5 bcf/d of natural gas, with 240 kbd of NGL production associated with that. 


There is also the development of the Karan field that will, with the other programs in development, collectively raise KSA natural gas production to 15.5 bcf/day from the 10.2 bcf/d it was achieving in 2010. Unfortunately the high sulfur content of the gas to be fed to Wasit is causing some problems and that project completion may now be delayed until 2015, though the problem (of sulfur freezing in the lines) is not yet solved. Saudi production of NGL’s has steadily grown over the years.


 


Figure 3. Saudi Arabian NGL production (Index Mundi from EIA ) 


 Last August, for example, it shipped 197,824 metric tons roughly equivalent to 66 kbd, of exports through ports under the Saudi Port Authority – note that this does not include the amount used internally, but was 79% up on the previous year and does not include shipments from ports operated by Saudi Arabian Oil Co, or by Aramco. It should be also be noted that, following the drop in consumption caused by the recession, the United States has increased the amount of crude that it is importing from KSA over the last couple of years.

 


Figure 4. U. S. Imports of Crude and Petroleum Products from Saudi Arabia (EIA) 


 However, because of the increase in the volume of natural gas produced in the United States, there has been a concomitant rise in the amount of NGL produced. The volume of NGL produced varies with the field, with the relative differences shown in the following figure.

 


Figure 5. Volume of NGL produced per kcf of natural gas in different fields around the United States (NPC North American Resource Development Study) (PDF)


 In 2010 the US averaged a production of 2.42 mbd of NGL, and were production of natural gas to rise to 110 Bcf/day by 2035 as has been projected by some, this will, at that time yield some 3.9 mbd of NGL with an additional 0.69 mbd from refinery production. The US does not, sensibly, import any NGL, and with rising production will likely start exporting to Canada, where production is declining. The Saudi market for NGL lies largely in Asia, with an export terminal at Yanbu The terminal is connected to Abqaiq through a 1,170 km pipeline, and can handle exports of up to 2 mbd of NGL.

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Thursday, May 31, 2012

OGPSS - The potential for Saudi EOR

Without getting into the discussion of the other aspects of the site, it was interesting to read a post dealing with future oil production on “Watts Up with That” today, in which it is suggested that the forthcoming fall in Saudi oil production will presage the decline in overall global oil production. (The site has won the “Best Science” weblog award the past two years). The relevant quote is
The next big one to tip over into decline will be Saudi Arabia.
And, if you have been following this series, then you will understand the basis on which I make the observation that this is, in fact, incorrect. The site uses a plot by Euan (without the link) from back in 2007, though it is credited to 2008.


Figure 1, Euan’s production estimates from 2007.

 One of the reasons that I am writing the current OGPSS series is to see how the earlier estimates that we made “back when” are playing out, and, for reasons I have explained both in earlier posts and below, Saudi Arabia is likely still a couple of years away from peaking. No, (to finish the opening thought) the major player who will tip over first is much more likely to be Russia (of which I have written earlier) than the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Very simply Russian producers will likely soon yield back global production leadership to the KSA, (though presently still slightly ahead) and further, since they run on maximizing current production, rather than overall field yield, they are not doing the necessary steps to sustain future production which is a growing characteristic of the KSA operations.  There are a number of different examples to illustrate this, as I have documented earlier. In addition the KSA seems increasingly interested in developing the enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques that have helped other fields in the latter stages of their lives.


Figure 2. Enhanced Oil Recovery methods and production volumes (Saudi Aramco)

 As Aramco note, as the price of oil has risen, so the economic viability of EOR technologies covers a greater range of options.






Figure 3. Comparative volumes of oil available as the price (in 2008 US$) rises (Saudi Aramco )

 Traditional CO2 injection, for example, can enhance overall field production by perhaps 18% or more.



Figure 4. Traditional use of CO2 for EOR (DOE ) DOE notes
In WAG injection, water/CO2 injection ratios have ranged from 0.5 to 4.0 volumes of water per volume of CO2 at reservoir conditions. The sizes of the alternate slugs range from 0.1 percent to 2 percent of the reservoir pore volume. Cumulative injected CO2 volumes vary, but typically range between 15 and 30 percent of the hydrocarbon pore volume of the reservoir. Historically, the focus in CO2 enhanced oil recovery is to minimize the amount of CO2 that must be injected per incremental barrel of oil recovered, especially since CO2 injection is expensive. However, if carbon sequestration becomes a driver for CO2 EOR projects, the economics may begin to favor injecting larger volumes of CO2 per barrel of oil recovered, i.e., if the cost of the CO2 is low enough.
And how effective can it be? Consider this plot of production gains in the Wasson field in West Texas. 





Figure 5. Production gains from the injection of CO2 in the Wasson field of West Texas (DOE ) 

 Note that the DOE reported that in 2008 the industry was injecting 1.6 bcfd (billion cubic ft/day) into Permian Basin fields to produce 170 kbd of oil.




Figure 6. Sites of US Co2 injection projects as reported in 2010 (DOE )

 It is worth noting that the KSA initial site is being set up to inject 40 mcf/d (million cubic ft/day) some 2.5% of the US volume, into 7 wells in the initial pilot project, in Uthmaniyah so that the initial gain in KSA production may well be quite small, but there are additional CO2 sources in country which, should the pilot show to the gains potentially possible, can be tapped and which could significantly change the overall ultimate recovery of oil from Ghawar (and others). Further there is ongoing research into enhancing the performance of CO2 in EOR, that will likely pay off in the medium term.

 In regard to the SmartWater flooding the first field injections have been successful, and a full scale demonstration is now planned. The advantages for this change are considered to be:
• It can achieve higher ultimate oil recovery with minimal investment in current operations (this assumes that a water- flooding infrastructure is already in place). The advantage lies in avoiding extensive capital investment associated with conventional EOR methods, such as expenditure on new infrastructure and plants needed for injectants, new injection facilities, production and monitoring wells, changes in tubing and casing, for example 

• It can be applied during the early life cycle of the reservoir, unlike EOR. 

• The payback is faster, even with small incremental oil recovery.
A BP study (Lager, A., Webb, K.J. and Black, J.J.: “Impact of Brine Chemistry on Oil Recovery,” Paper A24, presented at the EAGE IOR Symposium, Cairo, Egypt, April 22-24, 2007. Also Strand, S., Austad, T., Puntervold, T., Høgnesen, E.J., Olsen. M. and Barstad, S.M.: “Smart Water for Oil Recovery from Fractured Limestone: A Preliminary Study,”) showed the following incremental gains over conventional water flooding.


Figure 7. Gains achieved by BP in changing salinity in recovery from different fields (Saudi Aramco ). 

 The current areas of investigation have extended into dealing with the tar mats that are present in parts of Ghawar.




Figure 8. A core of tar-bearing carbonate rock under attack by hydrochloric acid (Aramco Journal of Technology) 

 Current research is aimed at extending wormholes into the formation, through which it will be possible to pass different EOR treatments in order to further improve the extraction rate from the field. 

 When these current projects, in their various stages, are combined with the future production from Manifa, and enhanced production from Safaniyah, I expect that the Kingdom will continue to produce at around 10 mbd for at least a few years more, though I continue to doubt that it will be able to increase much beyond that. After all, even when field declines are held to 2% a year, after 50 years the arithmetic starts to take an increasing toll – Ghawar began production in 1951. And so, with respect, I disagree with David Archibald, if only in the short term - but for those of you with a few minutes, the comments that follow his post at WUWT are quite entertaining.

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